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To Members of the Forty-seventh General Assembly:

Under direction of House Joint Resolution No.
1026, Forty-sixth General Assembly (1968), the Legislative Council appointed the Committee on Appellate
Courts to make a thorough study of the Supreme Court
case load problem and possible solutions. The report
of this committee, which contains the committee's recommendations and a draft of proposed legislation to
create an intermediate court of appeals, is submitted
herewith.
The committee submitted its report and draft
of the proposed bill on December 9, 1968, at which
time the report was accepted by the Legislative Council for transmittal to the Forty-seventh General Assembly.
Respectfully submitted,

/s/

Representative
Chairman
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Representative C. P. (Doc) Lamb
Chairman
Colorado Legislative Council
341 State Capitol
Denver, Colorado
80203
Dear Mr. Chairman:
Your Committee on Appellate Courts appointed
to study the Supreme Court case load problem and
possible solutions submits the accompanying report,
containing a draft of suggested legislation to establish an intermediate court of Appeals.
The seriousness of the Supreme Court backlog
problem indicates that immediate action is necessary.
The committee considered many proposed solutions to
the problem and concluded that of all the alternative solutions considered, the creation of an intermediate Court of Appeals for Colorado offered the
best solution to the Supreme Court backlog problem
for now.and for the foreseeable future. The committee's report thus recommends the creation of a Court
of Appeals.
Respectfully submitted,

/s/

Senator James C. Perrill
Chairman, Committee on
Appellate Courts

JCP/pw
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FOREWORD
The Legislative Council's Committee on Appellate Courts
was created pursuant to the provisions of House Joint Resolution
No. 1026, Forty-sixth General Assembly (1968), to study the Supreme Court backlog problem and the consequent delay in case
disposition. The mission of the Committee on Appellate Courts
was to take cognizance of the backlog problem and attempt to
arrive at a workable and feasible solution. The members appointed to the committee were:
Senator James Perrill, Chairman
Representative Ronald Strahle,
Vice Chairman
Senator Clarence Decker
Senator Ruth Stockton

Representative
Representative
Representative
Representative
Representative

Thomas Dameron
Barbara Frank
John Macfarlane
Harold McCormick
Clarence Quinlan

Advisory committee members were:
Mr. Jim R. Carrigan
Mr. Bryant O'Donnell
Mr. Kenneth Wormwood

Judge Francis W. Jamison
Judge Robert E. Lee
Justice R. H. McWilliams
Justice E. E. Pringle

The Committee on Appellate Courts held five meetings during the study. At these meetings the committee attempted to
formulate a solution to the backlog problem. Early in its deliberations the committee directed the Judicial Administrator,
with the cooperation of the Legislative Council staff, to conduct an analysis of the Supreme Court docket. This information
was of much assistance to the committee. In addition, the committee consulted with persons from outside the state in order to
gain information on how other states are facing the problems of
court congestion and delay.
The committee wishes to express its appreciation to the
Colorado Supreme Court and the Supreme Court Clerk's Office for
their cooperation and assistance in the conduct of this study.
Valuable assistance was also given by Mr. Harry Lawson, Colorado
Judicial Administrator, who was responsible for the Supreme Court
docket analysis, and who supplied valuable information to the
committee. The information received from these sources was particularly beneficial to the committee and their cooperation and
assistance is gratefully acknowledged.
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Earl Thaxton, senior research assistant for the Legislative Council, had the primary responsibility for the staff work
on this study and Robert Holt of the Legislative Drafting Office
had primary responsibility for bill drafting services provided
the committee.

Lyle C. Kyle
Director

December 9, 1968
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COMMITTEE FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Delay in the courts is unqualifiedly
bad. It is bad because it deprives citizens of a basic public service . •. it is
bad because delay may cause severe hardship to some parties; • • • and it is bad
because it brings to the entire court
system a loss of 1 ~ublic confidence, respect and pride.!,,
History records that man has usually had a contempt for
delayed justice. Thus, it was not surprising that the Founders
of our nation saw fit constitutionally to grant and protect the
concept of prompt and just trial and appeal for all. Yet important as this concept seems in the constitutions and statutes of
the nation and the several states, it appears to be one of the
most frustrating principles of justice to guarantee and secure,
for the prompt disposition of cases has become almost impossible
in recent years because of the delay caused by appellate court
congestion. Not only is the quality of justice important, but
it is equally important that legal disputes be promptly resolved.
This delay in justice has in part created the general disrespect
for law and contempt for our courts with which our country and
state is faced today.
In Colorado, our Supreme Court has for several years been
plagued by an excessive case load, congested docket and burdensome backlog that impedes its efficiency and creates delay. The
problem quite simply is that there are too many cases too often,
for too few judges. The number of cases filed annually in the
Colorado Supreme Court has increased steadily during the past
decade, reaching an all time high of 639 in 1967, and is expected
to approach 700 by 1970.
There were 861 cases pending in the Supreme Court at the
end of 1967 even though the court disposed of more cases, 588,
and produced more written opinions, 378, than in any other year
in the court's history, such dispositions exceeding those of any
other seven-judge Supreme Court with no intermediate court of
appeals. There is presently an average delay of approximately 18
to 20 months from the date a case is filed in the Supreme Court
until the date of final disposition. In other words, some litigants now have to wait for a period of approximately two years
before a final decision is reached in their case.

Hans Zeise!, Harry Kalven, Jr., and Bernard Buchholz 1 Deljy
Court, p. xxii, Boston: Little, Brown & Co. \1959 •

!n !!:!.!,
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The causes for this increase of cases today continue to
be many and varied. Among the main causes are population increase, industrial growth, and urbanization. Our society, in ·
general, has become more complex, more mobile and.is today subjected to more governing bodies. The increase of governmental
regulations, the growing number of automobiles, the abrasion of
human relationships, particularly in dense urban living, and
many other factors, all contribute to increased litigation and
produce more opportunity for potential litigation. New commodities, new developments in trade, business, sciences, and housing, have paved the way for more potential suits.
Another major cause of the increase in case filings is
the increase in the financial ability of litigants to finance
appeals. Today, more citizens have the money to turn to the Supreme Court in many more civil matters than ever before. In the
area of criminal law, as well, many more cases of drug addiction,
liquor, narcotics and gambling come before the courts. The increase in the crime rate will necessarily result in an increase
of criminal cases. In addition, civil rights litigation has
opened a whole new horizon in civil jurisdiction.
In the last 15 years the state has nearly doubled the number of trial court judges. The increase in district court judges,
in addition to the increase in the jurisdiction of the district
courts, has resulted in an increase in the number of dispositions
at the trial court level. This increase, in turn, has resulted
in an increase in the number of cases coming to the Supreme Court.
In the meantime, however, the Supreme Court has had to do an adequate job with substantially the same personnel and structure
which existed in 1905. As is readily apparent from the figures,
the court has simply not been able to keep up with the increasing
number of cases filed, thus creating a backlog.
There is no reason to believe that Colorado's current
rate of population and economic growth will diminish appreciably
in the near future, rather it appears that the converse is more
likely. Consequently, a continued increase in new matters coming before the Supreme Court can be anticipated. When the filing rate trend over the past several years is projected into the
future, it is estimated that the number of cases filed annually
will approach 700 by 1970 and will be approximatelr 940 by 1980.
By 1970 the backlog of cases is estimated to be l, 68, and by
1980 the backlog will approach 3,792 cases. Such a backlog will
create an estimated delay at between 5 and 5.5 years in 1980.
In other words, it would take more than five years from filing to
termination for a case on the civil docket in 1980. It is evident that additional steps are necessary in order to cope with
the backlog problem and to prevent further delay.
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Case Filings and Dispositions
The 1967 term of the Colorado Supreme Court was significant in that it pointed up vividly the extraordinary burdens that
have been placed upon the Colorado Supreme Court by its ever-expanding case load. Although more cases were disposed of during
the 1967 term (588) than during any other prior term, the intake
of 639 cases filed was the highest in the court's history. The
639 cases filed in 1967 was 83 (or 15 percent) more than the previous high of 556 in 1966. The figures demonstrate that there
has been a steady increase in the filing rate over the last seventeen years.
The previous high for cases closed was 524 in 1961 and
the five-year average, 1962 through 1966, was 419, demonstrating
that cases closed in 1967 (588) far exceeded the number closed
in any previous year. Of the 588 cases that were closed, 378 of
them were by written opinion. The previous high for written
opinions was 371 in 1960, and the five-year average, 1962 through
1966, was 251. The number of cases closed has been less than the
filing rate in each of the years from 1950 through 1967, with the
exception of the years 1954, 1960 and 1961, when cases closed exceeded those cases filed. This situation has created a backlog
of pending cases which has grown from 319 in 1962 to 861 in 1968.
As of August 1, 1968, there was a backlog of 913 cases pending
before the Colorado Supreme Court.
Other Considerations
In addition to the record number of appeals filed in 1967,
the number of original proceedings has also increased. In 1955,
only 12 original proceedings were filed in the Supreme Court. By
1965, the number of original proceedings filed in the court had
grown to 131 and in 1967 there were approximately 150 original
proceedings, 20 of which were disciplinary proceedings. This
factor is especially significant because study and action on these
proceedings often takes as much or more time than the usual appellate cases.
To be considered also are the other matters which take up
a sizable portion of the court's time, because the growing volume
of work in the court is not reflected entirely by case filings
and dispositions and the number of written opinions. These other
matters are requests for extensions of time, motions to dismiss,
and similar paper work -- all of which have to be received, examined, stamped, listed and studied and then orders issued.
In 1966, the Colorado Supreme Court received 1,668 requests for extensions of time and 1,476 other motions of various
kinds for a total of 3,144 items. As statistics were not kept on
these matters prior to 1965, a comparison must necessarily be
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limited; however, the increase of 1,198 or 53.7 percent over the
1965 total of 2,046 illustrates the increased activity in this
area.
Delay
The backlog of pending cases in the court has necessarily
resulted in a delay in the time it takes a case to be finally
disposed of by the court. The committee found that the median
time lapse from the date a case becomes at issue until the date
it is orally argued is ten months in civil cases, six months in
criminal cases, and one month in workmen's compensation cases.
The committee also determined that the average length of time
from the date a case if filed until it becomes at issue is approximately six to eight months. In other words, six to eight
months precede the date the case becomes at issue.
It was noted that the court often grants extensions of
time within which attorneys must file their briefs. All extensions of time, of course, increase the length of time from filing to issue date. The committee also found that the average
length of time from oral argument to final disposition is approximately two months. This means that there is an average
lapse of approximately 18 to 20 months from the filing date to
the date of final disposition. Thus some litigants now have to
wait for a period of approximately two years before a final decision is reached in their case.
Written Opinions
The figures show that the judges of the Colorado Supreme
Court are being called upon to write more opinions than ever before. In 1967, there was a total of 378 written opinions, a
figure which has never been exceeded. The previous high was 371
and occurred during the 1960 term when approximately 70 opinions
were written by outside judges. In 1967, only 20 opinions were
written by outside judges.
Each judge, during the 1967 term, wrote an average of 50
opinions, not including whatever concurring or dissenting opinions he may have filed. Of those 30 states which do not have an
intermediate appellate court, only Kentucky, with the equivalent
of 11 justices, exceeded Colorado in the number of written opinions.
It is difficult to assess the extraordinary increase of
cases in terms of the burdens it places upon the individual
judges of the Supreme Court. Necessarily, a great deal more time
is consumed by oral arguments and by conference discussing each
case. And since there is an increase in the total number of
opinions turned out by the court, each judge must expend more
xviii

time considering opinions other than those he writes, if the
opinion is to be a seven-man opinion. Thereby, the judges are
deprived of time during which they could have been preparing
opinions in cases assigned to them.
To expect the present judges to write more opinions appears to be unreasonable for the quality of judicial opinions
is more likely to be deficient when a judge is expected· to write
more than the optimum number of opinions. The effect of poor
quality opinions is to produce uncertainty in the law • . This uncertainty usually has the effect of encouraging more appeals.
It is believed by the committee that the judges of the
Supreme Court should be afforded sufficient time to study thoroughly the cases presented to them so that, while maintaining
high quality in their work, they can meet their dual responsibility: dispensing justice to individual litigants, and molding
the body of Colorado law. Because of the important matters coming before the Supreme Court and the effect of the court's decisions on Colorado law, there should be sufficient time for
consideration of these matters and for each member to review
carefully the opinions written by his colleagues.
In this regard it is appropriate to ask how many cases a
seven-man appellate court can be expected to dispose of annually
by written opinions consistent with the time needed to give
proper consideration to important matters and consistent with
the development of good case law. Verious opinions have been
expressed on this subject, but generally an average of 50 cases
per judge is probably the maximum, and 35 to 40 cases is considered a more satisfactory total. This means that the court can
be expected under the best of circumstances to dispose of a maximum of 350 cases in any one year by written opinion, and the
total is more likely to fall between 225 and 275. In a survey
of the 30 states without an intermediate appellate court it was
shown that the median number of written opinions was 130, with
an average of 26.2 per judge.
Court Capability
Judging from the experience each year from 1960 through
1967, an annual average of 167 cases are closed without written
opinion. Assuming that the court could produce from 225 to 350
written opinions per year, it can be seen that the court may be
capable of disposing of a total number of cases annually of 392
to 517 cases. Thus the maximum capability of the Supreme Court
is about 517 cases per year. As long as the filing rate continues to exceed this maximum, no reduction in the number of cases
pending can be anticipated. In fact, the number of pending
cases is expected to increase, as explained in the next paragraph.

Antioipated Cu;e Load
Assuming that the court could dispose of 550 cases per
year (a ve~y optimistic assumption), which means that the court
would have to write approximately 325-335 opinions per year, and
assuming that there is no reform of some type to ease the continuing backlog, it is anticipated that by 1980 the backlog will be
at almost 3,800 cases. This figure is based upon a projection
of the annual filing rate using past population-case filing ratios and population projections.
It is anticipated that in 1970 there will be a filing rate
of 679 and a cumulative backlog of 1,168; in 1975 there will be
a filing rate of 809 and a cumulative backlog of 2,103; in 1980
there will be a filing rate of 940 and a cumulative backlog of
3,792.
The Problem
When the anticipated case load is compared with court capability, the staggering, cumulative backlog which will develop is
obvious. Stated briefly, the seven-man Supreme Court responsible
for all appellate review cannot hope to keep abreast of the appeals being generated by a growing population and economy. The
court, already with a delay of approximately two years, is losing
ground rapidly and by 1980 it is conservatively anticipated that
it will require more than six years for a case on the civil docket to be finally decided. Without reform of some type to ease
the increasing backlog and delay, the right of appellate review
in civil cases may become virtuallr nonexistent in a decade or so.
Therefore, it is evident that a so ution designed to alleviate
the increasirtg case load of the_ Supreme Court should be implemented, and that such a solution should be sufficiently flexible
to serve both present and future needs.
Alternative Solutions
The problem of appellate court congestion and delay is not
limited to the Colorado judiciary but has existed and exists
presently in varying degrees in most of the judicial systems in
the United States. The committee found that there are numerous
ways to reduce appellate court congestion, many of which have
been tried elsewhere in the United States, and some of which have
been utilized in Colorado.
The committee considered and examined these various alternative solutions, both in light of the experience of other
states with such solutions and in relation to the application of
such solutions to Colorado. These alternative solutions include:
(1) increase the number of Supreme Court judges from seven to
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nine; (2) more extensive use of retired and outside judges; (3)
some limitations on the right of appeal; (4) a Supreme Court
Commissioner plan; (5) improvement in the internal efficiency
of the Supreme Court; (6) creation of a separate Criminal Court
of Appeals; and (7) the creation of an intermediate Court of
Appeals.
The idea of increasing the number of Supreme Court justices from seven to nine was rejected by the committee. It is
believed by the committee that a nine-member court would be too
unwieldy and would not increase the court's production appreciably, because each member would be required to review the opinions
of eight other justices instead of six as at present. The extra
time involved in such a review would probably offset or at least
minimize the increase in the number of written opinions which
might be expected from the addition of two justices. Furthermore, an increase in the size of the court would provoke more
discussion, disagreement and diversity, thus causing a substantial reduction in net gain of judicial time.
If the court were increased to nine members and coupled
with the practice of sitting in three-man departments, the liklihood of conflicting opinions from the different departments would
exist. Because it was felt by the committee that increasing the
court to nine members would provide an excessive and unwieldy
number, in addition to the concern that dividing the court into
three-man departments would produce conflicting opinions, this
solution appeared to the committee to be impractical and probably
ineffective as a long term solution.
The committee also concluded that the use of outside
judges or commissioners to assist the court was not a satisfactory long term solution. The main criticism of this plan is that
the use of commissioners or other outside help is not really that
beneficial to the court. Persons who are called to assist the
court are just not as precise and clear with r~spect to opinion
writing as are the regular justices who are responsible for their
opinions and who are familiar with opinion writing techniques.
The most important challenge which may be leveled at this plan is
that litigants are entitled to a decision in a case made by
judges, not by assistants of the court. If the court is to be
expanded by providing for additional personnel, there is no reason why they should not be full fledged justices, rather than a
judge in fact but not in name. The same arguments militating
against the addition of more judges to the Supreme Court apply to
the employment of commissioners or other outside assistance. The
use of outside judges or commissioners to assist the court is
simply not facing the need for a permanent solution. They are
what their name implies, a temporary expedient. The committee
concluded that the need is for a more permanent solution to the
problem which is no longer viewed as a temporary condition.

The idea of changing the system of appellate re~i~w or

restricting the right of appeal to the Suprefne Court in at-der to
curtail the number of cases filed was also considered by the com-

mit tee, However, the corrurd. ttee ruled out serious considetation
of devices designed to reduce appellate congestion whith would
preclude in all or some instances one's absolute right to an appeal in every case. The committee believes that ~very litigant
should be entitled to at least one appeal as a matter of right
in every case.
·

Other solutions to the backlog problem were considered by
the committee. These proposals were mainly concerned with i~proving the internal efficiency of the Colorado Supreme Court.
The committee gave consideration to several of these proposals,
including (1) the use of memorandum opinions, (2) doing away with
oral argument in some instances, (3) not granting extensions of
time, and (4) providing for more assistants.
The committee generally concluded that the Supreme Court
is already using the memorandum opinion or the per curiam system
wherever it thinks it possible to do so. At the present rate of
filing, even more extensive use of the memorandum opinion is not
likely to be effective in reducing substantially the backlog of
cases. Therefore, the committee determined that this method
could not be an effective long term solution. With respect to
the suggestion that the court abandon the practice of hearing
oral argument, at least in some cases, the committee believes
that the hearing of oral argument is very important and valuable
to the individual justices and that the practice should not be
abolished.
In regard to the granting of extensions of time by the
court, the committee recognized that there is no reason why the
court should not grant extensions of time given the present delay in the Supreme Court. Nothing would be gained by not granting extensions of time. It is believed that if other things
could be done to expedite the process of cases through the court,
any problems with respect to the granting of extensions will work
itself out. With respect to the idea of using more assistants,
it is believed by the committee that the employment of additional
law clerks for justices of the Supreme Court would not bear appreciably on the workload of the justices. Assistants could not
help out in many of the time-consuming tasks such as reading
briefs, hearing arguments, and attending conferences.
The committee generally concluded that the present case
load appears to be well beyond what even the most efficient court
can reasonably be expected to handle with the present number of
personnel. Thus, even if there should be an increase in the internal operating efficiency of the court, it would not furnish a
complete solution to the extsting problem.
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The committee also considered a proposal to create a separate Court of Criminal Appeals. A Court of Criminal Appeals
could be established by any one of the following three alternative methods: 1) a Court of Criminal Appeals with final jurisdiction; 2) an intermediate appellate Court of Criminal Appeals
with further appeal to the Supreme Court; and 3) an increase in
the size of the Supreme Court and establishment of a Criminal
Appeals Department.
The major objection to the Court of Criminal Appeals approach is that the creation of such a court with final jurisdiction would require a constitutional amendment and would be inflexible, when the need is for a flexible system. Another
objection is that the decisions of the Supreme Court and the
Court of Criminal Appeals might conflict, and there would be no
method of resolving differences of opinion. The committee generally concluded that two courts with final jurisdiction are undesirable.
An intermediate Court of Criminal Appeals, while avoiding
the objections raised with respect to the establishment of a
court with final jurisdiction, is subject to criticism because
it would probably lead to double appeals in many instances. Thus,
while there might be a considerable saving of judicial time,
there would, at the same time, be a considerable waste.
Consideration of the two foregoing alternative approaches
suggested another alternative approach wherein the Supreme Court
could be increased in number, with provision that three members
of the court, on assignment by the Chief Justice, sit as a Department of Criminal Appeals. This approach would require a
constitutional amendment if the Supreme Court were increased to
more than nine members. Thus, if more than nine members were
necessary in order to establish the suggested plan, there would
be a delay of two or more years before the system could be operative. The implementation of the plan with just nine members
(thus obviating the necessity for a constitutional amendment)
would probably not be effective in reducing the case load. On
the other hand, it is argued that a Supreme Court with more than
nine members will be too many. Because the delay inherent in
obtaining voter approval of a constitutional amendment would
create further delay, because the problem of the backlog is an
immediate problem, and because the Court of Criminal Appeals approach is inflexible, the committee concluded that such a proposal was not desirable.
All of the measures utilized by the various states have
been tried in an attempt to bring balance and a semblance of order to appellate procedure. Yet no one of these methods seems
to be the panacea which will totally alleviate the court congestion problem. While all of these ~ethods aid and assist !n some
degree in overcoming court congestion and delay, the committee
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generallr found that none are sufficient measures in thf~6elves
to be so ely relied upon, with th~ exception of the proposal to
create an intermediate Court of Appeals.
The ~omm!ttee found that many of those states which have
used some of the measures mentioned above still experienced excessive case loads. As a result many of them turned t~ the intermediate appellate court system as a more permanent and long
lasting solution to their court problems. There are currently
20 states which use one form or another of the intermediate appellate court system. The committee concluded that of all the
alternative solutions considered, the creation of an intermediate Court of Appeals for Colorado offered the best solution to
the Supreme Court backlog problem for now and for the foreseeable future.
Creation of Court of Appeals
The Committee on Appellate Courts recommends the creation
of an intermediate appellate court 1 to be known as the Court of
Appeals. In recommending such an intermediate court, the committee was guided by several fundamental pri~ciples which were
thought to be controlling in the creation of such a new court.
These guiding principles are as follows:
1. The committee, in its deliberations, abided by what
seems to be an unvarying thesis: a litigant is entitled to at
least one trial on the merits, and one appeal on the law, as a
matter of right in every case. The principle that there should
be no limitation on the right to at least one appeal in every
case is the traditional principle of Anglo-Saxon and Colorado
jurisprudence, and must be preserved.
2
As a corollary to the above principle, the committee
believes that double appeals, as of right, are to be avoided.
There is no object in having an intermediate court of appeals if
litigants have an ab~olute right of ~ppeal from the intermediate
court to the Supreme Court. An absolute right of appeal, as a
practical matter, would mean two appeals instead of one. Instead
of dispatch such a system would breed further delay. American
concepts of justice do not require more than one appeal. Therefore, it is essential that an appeal from ·the intermediate court
to the Supreme Court be allowed only at the discretion of the
Supreme Court.

3. The Supreme Court must remain the court entrusted with
final decision in all cases. However, in order to ease the burden on the Supreme Court, certain cases must be left to the determination of the intermediate court, subject to further review
at the discretion of the Supreme Court. A strictly limited category of cases should have direct access to the Supreme Court.
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Again, the committee believes that the Supreme Court should be
afforded sufficient time to study thoroughly the cases presented
to them so as to maintain high quality in their work and to develop those matters of major significance to the state as a
whole.
·
4. Subject to the principle that matters of major importance should always have access to the Supreme Court, a fair and
equitable division of labor must be maintained between the Supreme Court and the intermediate court, to the end that all cases
on appeal are settled without unnecessary delay. To achieve this
goal, jurisdictional allocation of cases between the two appellate courts is to be provided for, subject to the authority of
the Supreme Court to adjust case loads equitably by exercising
its discretion.
5. Any intermediate appellate court system should provide
a considerable degree of flexibility so that the legislature can
expand or reduce the court, and change the jurisdiction of the
court as future experience deems necessary and desirable. This
is necessary in order to readily resolve any problems that may
arise in the future.
6. The intermediate appellate court should be operational
as soon as practicable, the Supreme Court's need for relief being
urgent.
A summary of the salient features of the committee's proposal and recommendation follows:
1. The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals would be:
(a) civil appeals from judgments of the district courts, superior
courts, and probate court of the city and county of Denver, and
the juvenile court of the city and county of Denver, except in
specified cases; and (b) to review awards or actions of the Industrial Commission. All criminal cases tried initially in the
district courts, writs of habeas corpus, cases in which the constitutionality of a statute, municipal charter provision or an
ordinance is in question, cases concerned with decisions or actioni ot th~ Public Utilities Commission, water- cases involving
priorities or adjudications, and all original proceedings. All
other cases not within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
will continue to be within the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals.
2. A petition for a writ of certiorari could be made to
the Supreme Court in all cases decided on appeal by the Court of
Appeals.
3. There would be six judges of the Court of Appeals,
such judges to have the same qualifications as Justices of the
Supreme Court, to be appointed for a term of eight years, and to

receive Jn annual salary equal to a sum halfwa.y between the salaries of the district court judges and the Supreme Court justices.
4. The Court of Appeals would sit in two divisions of
three judges ,ach, both divisions to be located in the city and
county of Denver; however, any division could have authority to
sit in any county seat for the purpose of hearing oral argument
in cases before the division.
5. The Supreme Court would be empowered, prior to final
determination of any such case by the Court of Appeals, to order
the case certified for final determination by the Supreme Court.
6. Opinions would be written by the judges of the Court
of Appeals. The Supreme Court would by rule select opinions to
( be published, and such selected opinions would be published in
Colorado Reports.
Organization of the Court of Appeals
Six judges. A few of the 20 states which have an intermediate court of appeals have only three or six judges; several
of the most populous states have two dozen or more; the most
common number is nine. Fourteen of the 20 states have more than
six judges. Choosing the proper number of Court of Appeals
judges was considered by the committee to be an important matter, because the committee wished to avoid providing for more
judges than was absolutely necessary and at the same time wished
to provide the number of judges necessary to do an adequate job.
This matter had to be considered in relation to the problem of the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals -- the answer to
each problem necessarily influencing the other. Any number less
than six -- two divisions of three judges each -- was considered
to be entirely insufficient if adequate relief for the Supreme
Court was to be realized. Consideration was given to more than
six judges, but the committee determined that the most prudent
course would be to hold the membership at six until experience
clearly demonstrates that a larger number is needed.
The committee thus recommends that the Court of Appeals
have six judges, such judges to have the same qualifications as
the Supreme Court justices. It is further recommended that the
judges be appointed pursuant to section 20 of article VI of the
Colorado Constitution for a term of eight years.
Salary of judges. In the 20 states which have an intermediate appellate court the salaries in 1968 ranged from a high
of $40,000 in New York to a low of $16,500 in Oklahoma, with
$25,000 approximately the median state salary. !n the 20 states,
the intermediate court judges usually receive from $1,000 to
$3,000 less in salary than do justices of the highest court.
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The committee determined that the simplest and most equitable basis upon which to set the salaries of the judges of the
Court of Appeals is to set them in relation to the salaries of
the judges of the Supreme Court and district courts. Therefore,
the committee recommends that the judges of the Court of Appeals
be paid an amount per annum equal to the sum which is halfway between the salaries of the Supreme Court justices and the district
court judges. In addition, the committee recommends that the
Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals be paid an additional amount
of $500. Based on present judicial salaries, the judges of the
Court of Appeals would receive $20,000 annually pursuant to the
committee recommendation. The Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals would receive $20,500.
The present salary of the Chief Justice of the Colorado
Supreme Court is $22,500, and the associate justices now receive
$22,000 annually. The judges of the district courts presently
receive an annual salary of $18,000. In 1968, the national average salary for judges of the highest state courts and general
trial courts was $25,446 and $21,560 respectively. The national
median salary in 1968 for judges of the highest state courts and
general trial courts was $24,500 and $21,000 respectively.
Court to sit in two divisions. The intermediate appellate
courts of other states almost without exception sit in divisions
(sometimes also called panels or parts) of three. In some states
the membership of a division is fixed and unchanging; in other
states the division membership is changed frequently, and each
division is assigned business as it arises. In some states the
divisions have state-wide jurisdiction and in other states the
divisions sit over particular geographical areas of the state.
For Colorado, the committee recommends that appellate
judges sit in the almost universally used grouping -- in divisions of three. With six judges, this means that there will be
two divisions. The committee further recommends that the composition of the divisions be changed frequently so that each appellate judge sits, as nearly as may be, an equal number of times
with every other appellate judge. This system of rotating division membership tends to prevent the growth of diverging bodies
of case law among various divisions of fixed membership.
The committee favors assignment of appellate business to
the various divisions without regard to its geographic origin
within the state. No advantage is apparent in dividing the state
into a number of geographic divisions, over each of which a division of the Court of Appeals would have exclusive control in appellate matters.
This does not mean that a division or divisions could not
sit in various localities throughout the state. On the contrary,
when facilities are available and the convenience of the public
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and the litigants warrants it, the committee sees no reasons why
divisions could not be scheduled to sit at a location or locations anywhere in the state. Initially, however, all divisions
of the court should sit in Denver, and divisions should be scheduled to sit in other locations only after the desirability of
such an arrangement, in terms of convenience and economy, has
been clearly demonstrated.
Situs. As already indicated, the committee recommends
that the two divisions of the Court of Appeals sit in Denver.
The preeminent factor in determining the place where the Court of
Appeals will sit is the availability of a complete law library.
Because the Supreme Court Law Library is located in Denver, and
because of the expense of establishing another law library elsewhere in the state, the committee concluded that the court should
be located in Denver so as to have easy access to the Supreme
Court Law Library.
Chief judge. The committee recommends that the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court designate one of the Court of Appeals
judges to serve as the Chief Judge, to serve at his pleasure.
The Chief Judge in turn should determine the composition of the
various divisions of the Court of Appeals, have authority to
transfer cases from one division to another to maintain equal
case loads or for other appropriate reasons, and to exercise such
•other admini~trative powers as may be delegated to him by the
Chief Justice.
Clerk and staff. The committee recommends that the Court
of Appeals have its own clerk, deputy clerks, and such other assistants as may be necessary, to be appointed by the Court of Appeals subject to the rules and regulations of the Supreme Court.
In addition, each judge of the Court of Appeals should have authority to appoint a law clerk and a secretary or stenographer to
serve at his pleasure. All employees appointed by the court or
by the judges would be paid such compensation as prescribed by
the rules and regulations of the Supreme Court.
Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals
One of the most fundamental questions associated with
creating an intermediate Court of Appeals is that of jurisdiction. A soundly conceived jurisdictional arrangement is the key
to a successful appellate court system. This became clear to
the committee as it studied the great variety of appellate jurisdiction arrangements in other states, and became aware of the
extremely wide range of similar arrangements which could be
utilized in Colorado.
Review by Supreme Court. It must be understood that, in
speaking of the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, we are
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necessarily also dealing with the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court. Article VI, Section 2 (2) of the Colorado Constitution
provides that "Appellate review by the supreme court of every
final judgment of the district courts, the probate court of the
city and county of Denver, and the juvenile court of the city
and county of Denver shall be allowed, • • • " It is generally
the opinion that this section can be interpreted in such a way
that Supreme Co~rt review to determine whether a case should be
heard by the court on a writ of certiorari would be sufficient
to satisfy the appellate review provision. Assuming this to be
the case, it is possible to establish an intermediate Court of
Appeals with specific statutory jurisdiction. Cases falling
within the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals could be taken
up to the Supreme Court on a writ of certiorari. Cases falling
outside of the statutory jurisdiction given the Court of Appeals
would go from the trial court to the Supreme Court on writ of
error.
Thus, the only constitutional limitations on the establishment of a Court of Appeals is that provision has to be made
for review of the court's decisions by th~ Supreme Court. The
committee recommends that the Supreme Court be given authority
to review by writ of certiorari the decisions of the Court of Appeals. It is believed that this procedure will satisfy the requirements of the Constitution with respect to appellate review
because it, in effect, allows the Supreme Court to decide finally
essentially all cases litigated in the state.
Agreement on this aspect of the problem allowed the committee to approach its task essentially unfettered by any constitutional impediment to devising the best possible jurisdictional
division between the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. The
committee thus focused its attention on the problem of identifying the principles which should dictate the allocation of jurisdiction between the two courts, and to defining the proper
functions of each of these courts in a proper system of appeals.
Division of Functions between Supreme Court and Court of
Appeals. The committee believes that the functions of appellate
courts are two-fold: First, they correct error committed at the
trial level which is prejudicial to the litigant, i.e., they attempt to insure justice in the individual case. Second, they
develop the jurisprudence of the state through their reported decisions, i.e., they serve the precedential function of the common
law system by declaring, expanding, and clarifying the case law
of the state.
These two functions of course are frequently carried on
simultaneously. In many cases the general law is clarified or
expanded in the very process of correcting trial court error in
the individual case. However, there are many cases the determination of which at the appellate level cannot be said to have

xxix

any further effect than to correct error by pointing out failure
of the trial court to make correct application of settled principles of law which are neither clarified, expanded, nor changed
in the process. It is of course no less important to the litigant in the latter case than in the former that error be corrected. However, it is true that in the process the added dimension of a general development of the law of the state is not
present. Obviously, those cases having this added dimension of
general jurisprudential significance should be assigned to our
highest court. As a corollary, those cases which, in great numbers, tend not to have this added dimension seem the natural basic material for the intermediate court.
In view of the fundamental principle that one appeal rather than two is the ideal, the committee agreed that these two
different kinds of cases should be identified for what they are,
and routed as speedily as possible to the appropriate court for
appellate review. Double appeals ought to be avoided as much as
possible. If the case has the added dimension of significance
above described, waste of time and added expense results from
having such a case heard in the first instance by the intermediate court. And if the case does not have this added measure of
general significance, then only waste of time and added expense
will result from allowing such a case to be subject to a second
review by the highest court. This last statement of course assumes an intermediate court of first-rate competence which has
the full respect of bench, bar and public. The committee has
assumed this in all its deliberations and in its recommendation.
It is believed that such a basic allocation of primary
functions, and hence of case load, would considerably reduce the
burden of the Supreme Court, which now of necessity must handle
both kinds of cases. This relief of case load alone would serve
the primary legislative purpose in authorizing the creation of
the Court of Appeals. But there is more than simply relief of
the case burden in this idea. There is also allocation to the
Supreme Court, as its primary case load, of precisely that type
of case the very nature of which requires the greatest opportunity for deep, reflective and relatively unhurried consideration
by our highest court.
Statutory division of jurisdiction. The next problem
faced by the committee was to devise a system whereby in practice cases could be readily differentiated and routed to their
appropriate courts. One way to attempt this is to lay down rigid
statutory divisions of jurisdiction between the two courts based
upon the subject matter content of cases. This assumes that the
subject matter content of a case, "contract", "personal injury",
"revenue", etc., is itself a likely indicator of whether the case
has or has not this added dimension of general signi.ficance.
Many states have used this means and the committee studied the
statutes of these states and their experience. The clear impres-
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sion gained was that such an approach is largely an ineffectual
one.
In the first place. the subject matter content of a case
is by no means a reliable guide to whether it has this added dimension of significance. The "landmark" case is just as likely
to arise out of simple subject matter involving a small amount
of money as it is to arise out of a complicated situation involving a fortune. Secondly, it was noted that in some states
problems of jurisdictional interpretation have led to confusion
and delay. The variety of subject matter categories utilized by
different states and the lack of agreement among them as to a
substantial common core of categories is perhaps the best indication that attempts to capture the general jurisprudential significance of a case by means of its subject matter content are
essentially off the mark.
The committee concluded that this quality about a case
can only be detected with predictable reliability after the case
has taken shape in litigation -- and that consequently the detection must be left fundamentally to the highest court itself on a
case-by-case basis. This approach is the central feature of the
committee's jurisdictional proposal for the utilization of the
two courts which is embodied in the draft bill. That proposal
will now be summarized.
Committee proposal. With the exception of criminal cases
tried initially in district courts. and other exceptions (later
to be discussed), every case appealed from judgments of the district courts, superior courts. and probate court of the city and
county of Denver, and the juvenile court of the city and county
of Denver, are to be initially appealed directly to the Court of
Appeals. So far as the Court of Appeals jurisdiction -- its
power to decide these cases -- is concerned, it is fully empowered by the proposed bill to decide all cases so appealed. However, the Supreme Court is empowered, on its own motion prior to
determination of any case by the Court of Appeals, to call the
case up (certify it for final determination by the Supreme Court.
In addition, the Court of Appeals, prior to determination, may
certify any case before it to the Supreme Court for its review
and final determination. The Supreme Court is to consider such
certification in a summary manner and may accept the case for
final determi"nation or-may remand the case for determination by
the Court of Appeals.
The proposed statute lays down specific criteria for the
guidance of the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court in determining whether to certify the case or whether to order the certification of the case before determination by the Court of
Appeals. All but one of these criteria are designed to express
the notion of general jurisprudential significance which, as indicated. provides the basis for the desired fundamental division
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of labor between the two courts. Thus, the Court of Appeals is
directed that it should ordinarily certify to the Supreme Court,
for hearing and final determination, before determination by the
Court of Appeals, all cases which appear to it to involve: (1)
subject matter of significant public interest; or (2) legal principles of major significance to the state.
Additionally, the Court of Appeals is directed that it
should certify cases to the Supreme Court when the case load of
the Court of Appeals is such that the expeditious administration
of justice requires certification. It should be noted at this
point that a certification from the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court under these provisions will not necessitate any
further perfecting of his appeal by a litigant. His appeal is
considered to have been perfected when either court has jurisdiction to decide it. When the case is certified to the Supreme
Court prior to determination by the Court of Appeals, counsel for
the parties simply present themselves for oral argument at the
appointed place and time before the Supreme Court rather than the
Court of Appeals.
The above arrangement for appeals is the basic one in the
committee's proposal. It is believed that the discretionary . and
flexible aspects of the arrangement are the best means to accomplish the desired ends. However, believing that certain categories of cases require special attention, a limited number of
variations to the basic proposal is recommended wherein cases
are appealed directly to the Supreme Court, bypassing the Court
of Appeals.
Criminal cases. The most important variation concerns
criminal cases. Under the proposal, all criminal cases tried
initially in district courts would be appealable as of right directly to the Supreme Court. To provide for direct, by-pass appeal in criminal cases thus departs from the basic principle of
the over-all proposal because it is obvious that not all such
cases would qualify for review by the Supreme Court under the
principle of general jurisprudential significance. However, the
reason for this exception seems obvious.
It is thought that having criminal cases go to the Court
of Appeals would not result in a decision of sufficient finality
to permit review by the federal courts under recent U.S. Supreme
Court decisions. It is believed that any decision of the Court
of Appeals, were it to have jurisdiction of criminal cases, would
have to be reviewed by the Supreme Court before federal jurisdiction could be obtained for further review. In addition, many of
the current criminal cases involve many constitutional issues.
In this respect, the Supreme Court would undoubtedly review the
decisions of the Court of Appeals by certiorari. Because of this
likelihood of double appeals if the intermediate court were to
have jurisdiction of criminal cases, it was recommended that the
Supreme Court have jurisdiction over all criminal cases. This
will avoid double appeals.
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Other cases appealed directly to Supreme Court.

The sec-

ond variation from the basic arrangement involves provisions for
direct appeal to the Supreme Court in a limited category of
cases. These are cases: (1) in which the constitutionality of
a statute, municipal charter, or an ordinance is -in question;

(2) concerned with decisions or actions of the Colorado Public

Utilities Commission; (3) involving water priorities and adjudications; and (4) all cases appealed from the county courts to
the district courts or superior courts.
All but the last of these classes of cases is thought so
typically demanding of final adjudication by the Supreme Court
that the discretionary pattern of routing is varied in favor of
direct appeal to the Supreme Court. The reasons are different
for each. Cases involving a constitutional question with respect
to a statute, charter, or ordinance will invariably by of major
public significance which is the key to discretionary review.
For this reason they would ordinarily be certified to the Supreme
Court prior to review in the Court of Appeals. Rather than have
these few cases go to the Court of Appeals initially and then
certified to the Supreme Court, it was thought desirable to allow
appeal directly to the Supreme Court.
The special quality about the Public Utilities Commission
cases, aside from the almost invariable general state-wide significance they will have, is the fact that the litigants in such
cases usually exhaust all possible remedies. Thus it can be anticipated that the litigants would apply to the Supreme Court for
a writ of certiorari in most cases, were the Court of Appeals to
have initial jurisdiction of such cases. To avoid this likelihood of double appeals, it was thought desirable to allow appeal
directly to the Supreme Court. Similar reasoning was likewise
applied to cases involving water priorities and adjudications.
County court appeals. County court cases, both civil and
criminal, are presently appealed to the district courts or superior courts for review, with further review possible upon writ
of certiorari to the Supreme Court. The committee considered a
suggestion that the present county court appellate procedure be
changed so that these appeals initially go to the Court of Appeals, thus by-passinq the district courts. This proposal would
have added approximately 220 cases to the docket of the Court of
Appeals. This proposal was rejected however because it would
have required nine judges on the Court .of Appeals to handle the
increased case load. In addition, county court appeals have not
yet become a burden on district courts. By handling these appeals in the same way as now provided, litigants would not be
discouraged from taking appeals in minor cases because of a possible increase in the cost of perfecting the appeal. Also, the
pn5sibility of the Court of Appeal's docket becoming clogged with
r ·· l.:1tively minor matters would be avoided. Thus, the committee
. ·. •1::.luded that these appeals should continue to go to the district courts, rather than to the Court of Appeals. Appeals from
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the district court judgments in these cases would continue to be
to the Supreme Court on writ of certiorari.
Review of workmen's com ensation, unemployment compensation cases. At present, judic al review of the decisions of the
Industrial Commission with respect to workmen's compensation and
unemployment compensation is initially undertaken by the district
courts. The committee concluded that judicial review of these
decisions should be undertaken by the Court of Appeals because of
the importance of the subject matter and the need for early decision. By taking the workmen's and unemployment compensation
cases directly to the Court of Appeals, two things would be accomplished. First, a certain degree of finality would be accomplished and, second, the district courts would be relieved of the
responsibility for reviewing these decisions. In addition, the
number of steps necessary to obtain final judgment in such a case
would be cut down in most instances. The committee believes this
is desirable since the policy of the law in this area should be
to afford the claimant relief as soon as possible.

1

All other agency or administrative review cases would continue to be taken to the district courts, with appeal lying to
the Court of Appeals, except in P.U.C. cases which are to be
appealed directly to the Supreme Court. Other administrative review cases involve such things as review of liquor license issuance or denial, zoning orders, etc. In these cases, the district
courts are usually familiar with the area and environment involved.
In addition, local philosophy is often involved in these cases
with which a district court would be more familiar than an intermediate court. On the other hand, workmen's compensation and unemployment compensation cases usually involve general propositions
of law without the presence of any local factors. These cases can
easily be handled by the intermediate courts.
Administrative review cases appealed from the decisions or
orders of state licensing boards or departments will continue to
be within the jursidiction of the district courts. The committee
found that there are very few of these cases, most of which are
taken to the Denver District Court, and considered it best to
leave these cases within the jurisdiction of the district courts,
with the exception of P.U.C. cases.
Transfer of cases. One final variation from the basic
arrangement of the committe~ proposal is important. It proceeds
upon a different principle than that of insuring a basically
functional division of the total appellate case load between the
two appellate courts. It is obvious that such a functional division of the case load will decrease the present case load of
the Supreme Court. This is desirable, and is one of the most
important goals of the proposal. However, there is the possibility that from time to time under the basic arrangement for
routing cases here proposed, the case load of the Court of Ap-
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peals may become burdensome at a time when that of the Supreme
Court is relatively light. In such a situation, there should be
an opportunity for the Supreme Court, acting as a load balancer,
to relieve the Court of Appeals by taking a certain number of
cases in process of appeal without regard to their general jurisprudential significance.
Provision for such a procedure is made in the committee's
proposal by directing that the Court of Appeals certify cases to
the Supreme Court when the case load of the Court of Appeals is
such that the expeditious administration of justice requires
certification. Likewise, the Supreme Court may order the Court
of Appeals to certify any case before it to the Supreme Court for
final determination.
The committee's proposal necessarily imposes a heavy duty
and responsibility on the Supreme Court. It must be alert and
sensitive in fulfilling its duty of selecting for decision the
''significant" type cases. It must also willingly assume the
role, when circumstances dictate, as "load balancer." The tradition of our Supreme Court for hard work and a high sense of
public duty is to the committee an ample guarantee of its effective administration of the proposed system of appeals.
Summary. To summarize the committee proposal: (1) all
civil cases appealed from the district courts, and the probate
court and the juvenile court of the city and county of Denver,
are initially appealed directly to the Court of Appeals; (2) all
criminal cases tried initially in the district courts; all writs
of habeas corpus; cases in which the constitutionality of a statute, municipal charter provision, or an ordinance is in question;
cases concerned with decisions or actions of the Public Utilities
Commission; cases involving water priorities and adjudications;
and all cases appealed from the county courts to the district
courts or superior courts, are appealed directly to the Supreme
Court; (3) while any case is pending on appeal to the Court of
Appeals, it may be certified to the Supreme Court when (a) the
subject matter of the appeal has significant public interest, (b)
the case involves legal principles of major significance, or (c)
the case load of the Court of Appeals is such that the expeditious administration of justice requires certification; (4) the
Supreme Court may order the Court of Appeals to certify any case
before the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court for final consideration; (5) after any case is determined in the Court of Appeals, and within thirty days after a rehearing has been refused,
any party in interest who is aggrieved by the judgment of the
Court of Appeals may appeal by application to the Supreme Court
for a writ of certiorari; {6) when a case is before the Court of
Appeals and a party in interest alleges or the court concludes
that it is properly within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court,
the Court of Appeals can refer the case to the Supreme Court and
the Supreme Court's determination of the question of jurisdiction
is to be conclusive; (7) any case within the jurisdiction of the

i
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Court of Appeals which is filed erroneously in the Supreme Court
shall be transferred to the Court of Appeals by the Supreme
Court; (8) no case filed either in the Supreme Court or the Court
of Appeals shall be dismissed for having been filed in the wrong
court, but shall be transferred and considered properly filed in
the court which the Supreme Court determines has jurisdiction.
Finally, several features of appellate review are retained
in the proposal and should be emphasized. First, there is an absolute right of appeal in every case beyond the trial court level
to one of the appellate courts. Second, double appeals are
avoided except when the Supreme Court grants a petition for a
writ of certiorari. Third, the Supreme Court has the power finally to determine any case tried in any court inferior to it, and
the means of available to any litigant to seek invocation of that
power in any case.
Estimated Case Load
As of January 1, 1970, it is estimated that the annual
filing rate in the Colorado Supreme Court will be approximately
680 cases. The estimated backlog as of that date will be 950
cases, of which approximately 50 percent, -or 475, will be at issue. Approximately 85 percent, or 400, of the cases at issue
will be civil cases.
Assuming that: 1) all civil, mental health, juvenile,
and probate cases will be taken to the Court of Appeals; and 2)
initial judicial review of workmen's compensation and unemployment compensation cases will be in the Court of Appeals, the total estimated appellate cases which will be filed in 1970 is 780,
and of these 780 cases, approximately 350 will be in the Supreme
Court under the committee proposal:
All criminal and habeas corpus
arising out of criminal actions
Original proceedings

150

All cases attacking the constitutionality of a statute or
ordinance; water cases concerning priorities or adjudications;
P.U.C. cases (from district
court); cases certified from
Court of Appeals; granting of
certiorari
Total
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135-150

50-65
350

As 350 of these will be in the Supreme Court, it would
leave a remainder of approximately 430 cases for the two Courts·
of Appeals divisions. It should be recognized, however, that ·
the anticipated increase in the annual filing rate will probably
require one and maybe two additional divisions during the next
decade to keep up with the workload.
Space and Facility Needs
The Committee on Appellate Courts recognizes that adequate
facilities and sufficient space is necessary to the proper conduct of judicial business. The lack of necessary space and facilities has been a problem for many years and is of considerable
concern to the committee, as it has been to the Colorado Supreme
Court and past legislative committees. The lack of adequate
space for the Supreme Cou1t and all of its adjuncts was recognized
in 1967 by the Legislative Council Committee on Legislative Procedures, as follows:
The Judicial Administrator's Office is
currently overcrowded, and, should a merit
system for the courts be established, additional staff members will b~ needed. Accom~~dations for additional staff members will
also have to be found should the General
Assembly decide that the state will finance
the court system of the state. To a lesser
degree, the Legislative Auditor's Office,
the Court Reporter, and the Clerk of the
Court's Office are also in need of more
space.Y
The Legislative Council Committee on Legislative Procedures in 1967 thus proposed that the Legislative Reference Office
be moved to the basement, along with the Legislative Council.
Under this proposal the Court Administrator will move into the
space vacated by the Legislative Reference Office. The Court Reporter will move from the second floor to the previous quarters
of the Court Administrator, freeing some additional space on the
second floor for the Clerk of the Supreme Court. As a result of
the 1967 proposal some of the Supreme Court's present space needs
will be met.

y

Legislative Procedures in Colorado, Part II, Colorado Legislative Council Publication No. 128, December 1967, p. 19.
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Existing space problems. Even though this proposal will
be of temporary assistance and will alleviate the most immediate
and pressing space needs of the Supreme Court agencies, the committee recognizes that there are other existing space problems
which will not be solved by the 1967 proposal. Some of these
problems were pointed out by the Chief Justice in his January,
1968, annual report:
Currently there is no office space
available for the retired and active district judges called in to assist the Court
in coping with the current backlog. Further, there is no separate office available for the Chief Justice's law clerk,
and the Supreme Court conference room is
less than adequate in size •• •,;v
In addition to these existing space problems, the committee recognizes that there are future space needs which will eventually
have to be met. These future needs are discussed below.
Impact of state financial responsibility. The committee
found that if the General Assembly decides in969 to assume full
financial responsibility for the judicial system, the Court Administrator's Office will require approximately six additional
staff members. While the new quarters for this office will be
much more adequate than the present ones for a staff of seven,
there appears to be no way to accommodate a staff of 13. In addition to the necessary increase in the Court Administrator's
staff, if the proposal is adopted, the proposal also calls for
the creation of a state-wide public defender system. It is estimated that 10-12 people will be needed to operate the central
state office in charge of this function. Thus additional space
will have to be found for this staff.
Intermediate court of appeals. All of the above space
need problems exist aside from those which would result from the
creation of an intermediate Court of Appeals, as recommended by
the committee. The additional space requirements which would be
imposed by the recommended Court of Appeals include:
1) office space generally equivalent to that now provided
for Supreme Court Justices to house six judges, six law clerks,
and six secretaries;

The State of the Courts, Annual Report of the Chief Justice,
O.Otto Moore-;--January, 1968, p. 33.
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and

2) space to house the Court of Appeals clerk's office;
3) court room, robing room, conference room, and law 11-

brary.
The creation of a Court of Appeals will thus require considerable space for the judges of such court, and for secretarial
and clerical personnel. It appears impossible that these space
needs can be met through provision of space in the Capitol Building. Thus the judges, their staff, the clerk's office, etc.,
would have to be located elsewhere. In addition, it would be
very difficult, if not impossible, for the Court of Appeals to
use the present Supreme Court chambers for oral argument. Even
if schedule problems could be worked out so that both the Supreme
Court and the Court of Appeals could temporarily use the Supreme
Court chambers, it would be undesirable to separate the judges
and their law clerks from the Supreme Court Law Library and from
easy access to chambers.
Recommendation
The committee recognizes that the creation of an intermediate Court of Appeals will only accentuate, although to a considerable degree, the present space problems of the Supreme Court
and its related offices and agencies. In addition to the understandably greater need for space by the General Assembly and its
related agencies, so that it can conduct its business more expeditiously, there will be a need for more judicial staff space
if the General Assembly assumes full financial responsibility for
the judicial system. The committee finds that these other present and future needs cannot be met in the State Capitol Building.
Therefore, the committee suggests that high priority consideration be given by the Legislative Council Committee on Legislative
Procedures and by the General Assembly to a separate court building in the development of long-range capital construction plans.
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A BILL FOR AN ACT
CRF.ATING A COURT OF APPF.ALS, AND PROVIDING FOR THE JURISDICTION

THEREOF AND PROCEDURES IN CONNECTION THEREWITH.
Beg enacted !?,I.~ General Assembly of the State of Colorado:
SECTION 1.

Chapter 37, Colorado Revised Statutes 1963, as

amended, is amended BY THE ADDITION OF A NEW ARTICLE 21, to read:
ARTICLE 21
COURT OF APPEALS
37-21-1.

Establishment.

There is hereby created the court

of appeals, pursuant to section 1 of article VI of the state constitution.

The court of appeals shall be a court of record.

37-21-2.

Jurisdiction.

(1) (a)

Any provision of law to

the contrary notwithstanding, the court of appeals shall have
initial jurisdiction over appeals from final judgments of the
district courts, superior courts, ·the probate court of the city
and county of Denver, and the juvenile court of the city and
county of Denver, except in:
(b)

Criminal cases tried initially in district court;

(c)

Cases in which the constitutionality of a statute, a

municipal charter provision, or an ordinance is in question;
{d)

Cases concerned with decisions or actions of the public

utilities commission;
(e)

Water cases involving priorities or adjudications;

(f)

Writs of habeas corpus;

(g)

Cases appealed from the county court to the district

court or superior court, as provided in section 37-15-10, C.R.S. 1963j
(h)

Summary proceedings initiated under chapter 49,

C.R.S. 1963, as amended.
xli

(2)

The court of appeals shall have initial jurisdiction

to review awards or actions of the industrial commission, as provided in article 14 of chapter 81 and article 5 of chapter 82,

C.R.S. 1963.
(3)

The court of appeals shall have authority to issue any

writs, directives, orders, and mandates necessary to the determination of cases within its jurisdiction.
37-21-3.

Number of judges - qualifications. (1)

The number

of judges of the court of appeals shall be six.
(2)

Judges of the court of appeals shall have the same

qualifications as justices of the Colorado supreme court.

37-21-4.

Term of office - selection and compensation.

(1)

The term of office for a judge of the court of appeals shall be
eight years.
(2)

Judicial appointments to the court of appeals shall be

made pursuant to Section 20 of article VI of the state constitution.
(3)

Judges of the court of appeals shall receive an annual

salary in an amount equal to the annual salary of a district judge
plus one-half the difference between the annual salary of a district judge and the annual salary of a supreme court justice.
37-21-5.

Chief judge.

The chief justice of the supreme

court shall appoint a judge of the court of appeals to serve as
chief judge at the pleasure of the chief justice.

The chief judge

shall exercise such administrative powers as may be delegated to
him by the chief justice.
37-21-6.

Divisions.

(1) The court of appeals shall sit in

divisions of three judges each to hear and determine all matters
xlii

before the court.
(2)

The chief judge, with the approval of the chief justice,

shall as~ign judges to each division.

Such assignments shall be

changed from time to time as determined by the chief judge, with
the approval of the chief justice.
(3)

Cases shall be assigned to the divisions of the court

of appeals in rotation according to the order in which they are
filed with the clerk of the court of appeals or transferred by
the supreme court, except that the chief judge shall have the
authority to transfer cases from one division to another to maintain approximately equal caseloads or for any other appropriate
reason.
37-21-7.

Place of court.

The court of appeals shall be

located in the city and county of Denver, but any division of the
court of appeals may sit in any county seat for the purpose of
hearing oral argument in cases before the division.
\

37-21-8.

Supreme court review.

(1) Before application may

be made for writ of certiorari, as provided in this section,
application shall be made to the court of appeals for a rehearing
as provided by supreme court rule.
(2)

Within thirty days after a rehearing has been refused

by the court of appeals, any party in interest who is aggrieved
by the judgment of the court of appeals may appeal by application
to the supreme court for a writ of certiorari.
(3)

Procedures on writs of certiorari shall be as prescribed

by rule of the supreme court.

37-21-9.

Certification of cases to the supreme court.
xliii

(1) (a)

The court of appeals, prior to final determination, may

certify any case before it to the supreme court for its review
and final determination, if the court of appeals finds:
(b)

The subject matter of the appeal has significant public

interest;
(c)

The case involves legal principles of major significance;

(d)

The caseload of the court of appeals is such that the

or
expeditious administration of justice requires certification.
(2)

The supreme court shall consider such certification and

may accept the case for final determination or remand it for
determination by the court of appeals.
(3)

The supreme court may order the court of appeals to

certify any case before the court of appeals to the supreme court
for final determination.
37-21-10.
(1)

Determination of jurisdiction - transfer of cases.

When a party in interest alleges, or the court is of the

opinion, that a case before the court of appeals is not properly
within the jurisdiction of the court of appeals, the court of
appeals shall refer the case to the supreme court.

The supreme

court shall decide the question of jurisdiction in a swmnary manner, and its determination shall be conclusive.
(2) (a)

Any case within the jurisdiction of the court of

appeals which is filed erroneously in the supreme court shall be
transferred to the court of appeals by the supreme court.
(b)

Any case within the jurisdiction of the court of appeals

which was filed in the supreme court prior to the effective date
xliv

of this article may be transferred to the court of appeals by the
supreme court.
(3)

No case filed either in the supreme court or the court

of appeals shall be dismissed for having been filed in the wrong
court, but shall be transferred and considered properly filed in
the court which the supreme court determines has jurisdiction.
37-21-11.

Employees - compensation.

(1)

Subject to the rules

and regulations of the supreme court, the court of appeals shall
appoint a clerk, deputy clerks, and such other assistants as may
be necessary.
(2)

Each judge of the court of appeals may appoint a law

clerk who shall be learned in the law and one secretary or stenographer.

The persons so employed may be discharged or removed at

the pleasure of the judge employing them.
(3)

All employees appointed under subsections (1) and (2)

of this section shall be paid such compensation as shall be prescribed by the rules and regulations of the supreme court.
37-21-12.

Fees of the clerk of court of appeals.

(1)

The

fee schedule of the clerk of the court of appeals shall be as
provided by supreme court rule.
(2)

Fees received by the clerk of the court of appeals

shall be deposited as p:-ovided in section 37-2-18, C.R.S. 1963,
and used for the purpose specified in section 37-2-19, C.R.S. 1963.
37-21-13.

Reporter - publication of decisions.

(1)

The -

reporter of decisions for the supreme court shall also be the
reporter of decisions for the court of appeals.
(2)

Those court of appeals opinions to be published in full

shall be selected as prescribed by supreme court rule.
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37-21·14.

Expenses and compensation of judges, retired

1ustices and judges.

(1)

When a district, probate, or juvenile

judge renders service, pursuant to section 5(3) of article VI of
the state constitution to assist the court of appeals in disposing
of cases pending before it, he shall be reimbursed for his actual
and necessary personal maintenance expense while engaged in such
duties outside of his county or district not to exceed twenty
dollars per day together with mileage at the rate of eight cents
for each mile actually and necessarily traveled in going to and
from the hearing or conference.
(2)

When a retired justice or district, probate-, or juvenile

judge renders service, pursuant to section 5(3) of article VI of
the state constitution,

to assist the court of appeals

in disposing of cases pending before it, he shall receive remuneration as provided in said section of the state constitution,
and shall be reimbursed for his actual and necessary personal
maintenance expenses while attending oral argument and conferences, not to exceed twenty dollars per day together with mileage
at the rate of eight cents per each mile actually and necessarily
traveled in going to and from the hearing or conference.
SECTION 2.

37-1-7, Colorado Revised Statutes 1963, is

amended to read:

L

37-1-7.
of appeals.

Certified copy of record in supreme court or court
In all causes which have been removed to the supreme

court of this state OR TO THE COURT OF APPEALS, a duly certified
copy of the record of such cause remaining in the supreme court
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OR THE COURT OF APPEALS may be filed in the court from which said
cause was removed, on motion of any party, person or persons
claiming to be interested therein, and the copy so filed shall
have the same effect as the original record would have had if the
same had not peen lost or destroyed.
SECTION 3.

37-2-21, Colorado Revised Statutes 1963, is

amended to read:
37-2-21.
published.

Supreme court and court of appeals opinions

The opinions of the supreme court of the state of

Colorado AND OF THE COURT OF APPFALS, shall be published in volumes of the size, as nearly as may be, e£-vellllftes-efte;-~we,-and
~hree AS PRESENT VOLUMES of THE Colorado reports, and containing

not less than six hundred and fifty pages each.
SECTION 4.

37-2-22, Colorado Revised Statutes 1963, is

amended to read:
37-2-22.

Duty of reporter.

It is here8y-made the duty of

the reporter of the decisions of said eettr~ COURTS, within four
months after a sufficient number of opinions to constitute a
volume of the PRESCRIBED size a£eresaia shall have been delivered
to him, to compile and prepare the same for publication, together
with such other proceedings of said supreme court as the justices
thereof may designate for insertion in such volume, with syllabi,
title pages, digest, and table of cases reported.
SECTION 5.

37-2-23, Colorado Revised Statutes 1963, is

amended to read:
37-2-23.

Publication of reports.

(1)

The chief justice

and reporter of the supreme court are responsible for the
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publication of the reports of the supreme court, and any republishing or reproduction of said reports and the EARLIER reports
of the court of appeals.

The specifications, contracts, and

sales pertaining to all such reports shall be handled in accordance with the provisions of ARTICLE 2 of chapter 109, ar~iele-2;
C.R.S. 1963, AS AMENDED.
(2)

WHENEVER ANY LAW OF THIS STATE REFERS TO THE REPORTS OF

,, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF COLORADO, SAID LAW SHALL BE CONSTRUED AS REFERRING TO THE REPORTS IN WHICH ARE ALSO CONTAINED THE
\ REPORTED OPINIONS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS CREATED PURSUANT TO
\I ARTICLE 21 OF THIS CHAPTER.

\

SECTION 6.

37-2-26, Colorado Revised Statutes 1963 (1965

Supp.), is REPEALED AND RE-ENACTED, WITH AMENDMENTS, to read:
37-2-26.

Method for review.

Appellate review by the supreme

court of any action or proceeding of an inferior tribunal, whether
such action or proceeding be civil, criminal, special, statutory,
common law, or otherwise, shall be prescribed by rule of the
supreme court, except as otherwise provided by law.
SECTION 7.

37-10-8, Colorado Revised Statutes 1963 (1965

Supp.), is amended to read:
37-10-8.

Appellate review.

Appellate review of final judg-

ments of superior courts shall be by the supreme court OR BY THE
COURT OF APPEALS in such cases and in such manner as may be prescribed by law, the Colorado rules of civil procedure, and the
Colorado rules of criminal procedure for appellate review of final
judgments of the district courts.
SECTION 8.

37-19-26, Colorado Revised Statutes 1963 (1967

Supp.), is REPEALED AND RE-ENACTED, WITH AMENDMENTS, to read:
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37-19-26. Appellate review.

Appellate review of any order,

decree, or judgment may be taken to the supreme court or the court
of appeals, as provided by law and the Colorado rules of civil
procedure, except that an appeal taken pursuant to section 22-3-10,
C.R.S. 1963,. as amended, shall be as provided in the Colorado rules
of criminal procedure.

Initials shall appear on the record on

appeal in place of the name of the child.

Appeals from orders or

decrees concerning legal custody, termination of parental rights,
and adoptions shall be advanced upon the calendars of the supreme
court and the court of appeals, and shall be decided at the
earliest practicable time.
SECTION 9.

37-20-20, Colorado Revised Statutes 1963 (1965

Supp.), is amended to read:
37-20-20.

Appeals.

Appellate review of final judgments of

the probate court shall be by the supreme court OR BY THE COURT OF
APPEALS, AS

PROVIDED BY LAW, and shall be conducted in the same

manner as prescribed by the Colorado rules of civil procedure for
review by the supreme court AND THE COURT OF APPEALS of final
judgments of the district courts.
SECTION 10.

81-14-8, Colorado Revised Statutes 1963, is

amended to read:
81-14-8.

Review of order or award - parties.

Any person in

interest, including the state compensation insurance fund, being
dissatisfied with any stteh finding, order, or award of the coomission issued or promulgated by virtue of the authority conferred in
this chapter, may comnence an action in the eistriet-eettrt-ift-8.lla
£e~-the-ee1111ty-whereift-the-iftjttry-was-sttstaifted-er-in-~ke-dis~rie~
eettrt-ift-afta-fer-the-eity-aftd-eel1ftty-e£-Benver COURT OF APPEALS

xlix

against the commission as defendant, to modify or vacate the-same
en-tne-gr8lffla-herein-speeified ANY SUCH FINDING, ORDER, OR AWARD

ON THE GROUNDS SET FORTH IN SECTION 81-14-12. in-whieh-aetien-any
adverse-~arty-ehall-alse-he-made-a-de£endan~~

IN ANY SUCH ACTION

AN ADVERSE PARTY SHALL ALSO BE MADE A DEFENDANT. previded;-that-said
IF THE state compensation insurance fund has the consent of one or
more of the members of said THE conmission fer-the-pttrpese-e£-hringing-said-aetien TO COMMENCE SUCH AN ACTION IN THE COURT OF APPEALS,
il'l-whien-ease THEN the state compensation insurance fund, by that

name and title, may commence and prosecute, acting through its
manager, such suit to modify or vacate the finding, order, or award
of the commission, and shall be authorized to employ an attorney to
represent stteh THE state compensation insurance fund. in-s~eh-litigatien~

SECTION 11.

81-14-9, Colorado Revised Statutes 1963, is amended

to read:

81-14-9.

Precedence of action.

All such actions shall have

precedence over any civil cause of a different nature pending in
such court, and the district court OF APPEALS shall always be deemed
open for the trial thereof, and the-s8.l'lle SUCH ACTION shall be tried
and determined by the dist~ie~ court OF APPEALS in THE manner asprovided for other civil actions.
SECTION 12.

81-14-10(2), Colorado Revised Statutes 1963, is

amended to read:
81-14-10.
(2)

Complaint - hearing - change of venue - records.

The record of said conmission so filed in said court shall be

returned to said THE commission after the final disposition ef-said
ease by the eis~~iet court OF APPEALS or THE supreme court.
1

SECTION 13.

81-14-15, Colorado Revised Statutes 1963, is

amended to read:
81-14-15.

Court record transmitted to connnission - when.

It

shall be the duty of the clerk of the eis~~ie~ court OF APPF.ALS,
without o~der of court or application of the conmdssion,'to transmit the record in any case to the commission, within twenty-five
days after the order or judgment of the court unless in the meantime, a-lf'l'ite-ei-errer-addressed-te-tne-disEriet-eeurt-snall-he
ehtained-£rem-the-sttpreme-eettrt-£er-tne-reviewing-e£-suen-eraer-er
jttagm.ent FURTHER APPELLATE REVIEW IS GRANTED BY THE SUPREME COURT.
ln-tkat-event;-ne-skall-se-retttrn-it

IF THE SUPREME COURT GRANTS

FURTHER APPELLATE REVIEW, THE CLERK SHALL RETURN THE RECORD upon
receipt of remittitur from the supreme court, unless the order of
the supreme court requires further action by the district court OF
APPF.ALS, and then within twenty-five days after such further action.
SECTION 14.

81-14-7, Colorado Revised Statutes 1963, is

REPFALED AND RE-ENACTED, WITH AMENDMENTS, to read:
81-14-17.

Sunmary review by supreme court.

If the supreme

court reviews the judgment of the court of appeals, such review
shall be limited to a summary review of questions of law.

Any such

action shall be advanced upon the calendar of the supreme court, and
a final decision shall be rendered within sixty days after the date
the supreme court grants further appellate review.

The coomission

or any other aggrieved party shall not be required to file any
undertaking or other security upon review by the supreme court.
SECTION 15.

82-5-11, Colorado Revised Statutes 1963, is

amended to read:
li

82-5-11.

Court review.

Such action, proceeding, or suit

must be commenced within twenty days after the final findings or
decision of the commission, and any party aggrieved thereby may
secure judicial review thereof by commencing an action in the
diserie~ court OF APPEALS where-the-elaim-£er-eeae£its-was-£iled;
er-ia-the-eity-aad-eettl'ley-e£-Beaver for the review of the commis-

sion's findings or decision in the same manner as reviews are now
provided by law in workmen's compensation cases.

The coD1I1ission,

in its discretion, may also certify _to such court questions of
law involved in any decisions by it.

In any judicial proceeding

under sections 82-5-1 to 82-5-11, the findings of the commission
as to the facts, if supported by substantial evidence and in
absence of fraud, shall be conclusive.

Such actions, and the

questions so certified shall be heard in a swmnary manner and shall
be given precedence over all other civil cases except cases arising
under the workmen's compensation laws of this state.

Writs-ef

errer-may-ee-takea-te-the-sttpreme-eettre-£rem-the-deeisiea-e£-a-distriet-eettrt-reviewing-any-stteh-preeeediags-in-the-same-manner
as-aew-previded-ey-law-in-werkmea 1 s-eempensatien-eases~

IF THE

SUPREME COURT REVIEWS THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, SUCH
REVIEW SHALL BE LIMITED TO A SUMMARY REVIEW OF QUESTIONS OF LAW.
ANY SUCH ACTION SHALL BE ADVANCED UPON THE CALENDAR OF THE SUPREME
COURT, AND A FINAL DECISION SHALL BE RENDERED WITHIN SIXTY DAYS
AFTER THE SUPREME COURT GRANTS FURTHER APPELLATE REVIEW.
SECTION 16.

Severab~lity clause.

If any provision of this

act or the application thereof to any person or circumstances is
held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect other provisions
lii

or applications of the act which can be given effect without the
invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions

of this act are declared to be severable.
SECTION 17.

Effective date.

This act shall take effect

Safety clause.

The general assembly hereby

January 1, 1970.
SECTION 18.

finds, determines, and declares that this act is necessary for the
iumediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety.

liii

SUPREME COURT BACKLOG PROBLEM
Introduction
Colorado has long been recognized as a leader among the
several states in the administration of justice. Colorado's
judicial system has achieved national recognition as one of the
most progressive as a consequence of the adoption of two judicial
reform constitutional amendments, Amendment No. 1 in 1962 and
Amendment No. 3 in 1966, and their implementation by law.]/ In
addition to the extensive constitutional modification, legislation designed to modify and improve the judicial system has been
adopted with increasing frequency over the past decade.
The stature of Colorado as a progressive leader in judicial reform is primarily the result of continuous study of the
various phases of court organization and procedure by various
interested groups and legislative committees. These studies have
achieved many positive results and served to focus attention on
judicial problems, even though many of the recommendations made
were rejected or deferred for further study.y
One of the problems which has received considerable attention in past studies is the problem of the backlog of cases in
the Supreme Court due to the continued increase in the annual
filing rate. Several solutions to the problem hav~ been proposed
and adopted, i.e., the employment of law clerks for research assistance; the use of oral argument in all cases; and the use of
district and retired Supreme Court judges to assist in opinion
writing.~ Several other solutions have been proposed and rejected or deferreq for further study, i.e., the establishment of
an intermediate appellate court; the submission of fewer cases on
oral argument; and changes in the prevailing method of appellate
review.,4/

V

Shannon, Judicial Reform for Colorado Courts of Special Jurisdiction, 50 Judicature 16 (June-July 1966); Clark, Colorado
at the Judicial Crossroads, 50 Judicature 118 (December 1966).
Judicial Administration in Colorado, Colorado Legislative
Council, Research Publication No. 49, p. 34 (December 1960).
Doyle, The Battle of the Backlog in the Supreme Court, 33
Rocky Mountain Law Review 489 (June 1961) (Symposium on the
Judicial Administration in Colorado).
Id. at 496.

Despite these proposals, the backlog of cases continues
to exist and a further increase can be expected in the future.~
In light of this problem, the General Assembly expressed its
interest in continued study by the introduction of Senate Joint
Resolution No. 12. The content of this resolution (S.J.R. No.
12) was adopted in House Joint Resolution No. 1026. Pursuant to
House Joint Resolution No. 1026, Forty-sixth General Assembly
(1968), the Legislative Council was directed to appoint a committee to make a thorough stu.dy of appellate case load problems and
possible solutions, including, but not limited to, the following;
{l) the creation of an intennediate court of appeals, (2) more
extensive use of outside and retired judges (3) changes in the
prevailing method of appellate review, and (4) improvement in the
physical facilities of the Supreme Court4
The mission of the Committee on Appellate Courts was thus
to take cognizance of the backlog problem in the Supreme Court
of Colorado and attempt to arrive at a workable and politically
feasible solution to the problem.
A Look at the Backlog Problem
Cases filed. In 1950, 218 cases were filed in the Supreme
Court. This annual filing rate almost doubled by 1959 when 407
cases were filed. In 1967, the number of cases filed reached an
all-time high of 639. The 639 cases filed in 1967 was 83 (or 15
percent) more than the previous high of 556 in 1966. More than
twice as many cases were filed in 1967 as in 1955. These figures
demonstrate that the. Supreme Court's annual intake has increased
steadily during the past 17 years.f1/ (See Table I.)
In 1950, 167 cases were pending before the court. The
nu~ber of pending cases more than tripled by 1960 when there were
548'. Of course, a large proportion of pending cases are not at
issue (ready for final disposition): however, the proportion of
pending cases at issue has increased steadily. For example, in
1956 there were 90 of the 201 cases pending which were at issue,
or 45 percent.Y In 1960, there were 318 of the 548 pending
cases at issue, or 58 percent •.§/ In 1967, there were 521 of the

W'
21.

y

§/

The State of the Courts, Annual Report of the Chief Justice
Mthe Colorado Supreme Court (1968) .(Submitted to the General Assembly pursuant to 37-11-2 (3), C.R.S. 1963, as
amended). ·
Id. at p. 5.
Judicial Administration in Colorado, Colorado Legislative
Council, Research Publication No- 49, p. 98 (Dec. 1960).
Ibid.
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TABLE l
Cases Before the Colorado Supreme Court
1950 Through 1967

Yea,

Cases
Pending
Jan. 1

Cases
Filed

Total

Number of
Written
012inions

Cases
Closed

385

154

204

131

---

1950

167

218

1951

181

188

1952

a

199

568a

138

399

1953

169

330

499

175

284

1954

215

252

467

162

269

1955

198

287

485

184

284

1956

201

301

502

161

261

1957

241

345

586

197

230

1958

356

412

768

159

285

1959

483

407

890

250

342

1960

548

364

912

371

489

1961

423

420

843

355

524

1962

319

486

805

238

378

1963

427

505

932

255

424

1964

508

490

998

239

385

1965

613

550

1163

264

464

1966

699

556

1255

260

445

1967

810

639

1449

378

588

1968

861

a.

l95l and l952 combined.
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TABLE I

(continued)

The 861 cases pending at the end of 1967 consisted of
the following&

Source:

Cases at Issue Awaiting Oral
Argument

446

Cases Orally Argued Awaiting
Opinion

39

Cases Submitted .Without Oral
Argument

15

Opinions Announced Awaiting
Action on Rehearin~

17

Cases Reopened

1

Cases Reopened and at Issue

2

Cases a.t Issue on Rehearing

1

Total Cases at Issue

521

Cases Not at Issue

340

Total Cases Pending

861

Judicial Administration in Colorado, Colorado Legislative Council, Res. Pub. Jro. 49, p. 100 (Dec. 1960);
and lb!, State of t~e Courts, Annual Report of the
Chief Justice oft e Colorado Supreme Court, p. 5
(Jan. 1968).
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861 pending cases at issue, or 60 percent •.2/ Thus the proportion
of cases at issue to the total number of cases pending has increased from 45 percent in 1950 to 60 percent in 1967.
In addition, the number of original proceedings has also
increased. In 1955, only 12 original proceedings were filed in
the Supreme Court. By 1965, the number of original proceedings
filed in the Court had grown to 131. This factor is especially
significant because study and action on these proceedings often
takes as much or more time than the usual appellate cases.!.Q/
Case dispositions. The Colorado Supreme Court disposed
of more cases, 588 in 1967, than in any previous year in the
court's history. At the same time, however, the court's intake
of 639 cases filed was also the highest in the court's history.
Of the 588 cases that were closed, 378 of these were by written
opinion. The previous high for cases closed was 524 in 1961,
and the five-year average, 1962 through 1966, was 419. The previous high for written opinions was 371 in 1960, and the fiveyear average, 1962 through 1966, was 251.W The number of
cases closed has been less than the filing rate in each of the
years from 1950 through 1967, with the exception of the years
1954, 1960 and 1961, when cases closed exceeded those cases
filed. (See Table I.)
Several reasons are attributable to the court's significant increase in case dispositions in the years 1960 and 1961.
First, all judges for the first time employed law clerks for
research and analysis assignments. Appropriations for this purpose were made in 1959oW Second, the court required oral argument in all matters except those waived by the court. In this
way the aid of c~~')sel was obtained in the pinpointing of issues
and authorities.11! Third, in early 1960 the court began calling selected district court judges, county court judges and retired Supreme Court judges to assist it in opinion writing.
Senate Bill No. 28 of the 1960 General Assembly authorized the
court to pay expen~es and supplemental remuneration to visiting
judges who perform these services. The visiting judges hear
oral argument, confer with the court without voice or vote and
prepare opinions in line with the tentative decision of the
court. The court then reviews, modifies as necessary, and approves these opinions as per curiam decisions of the court.W

The State .2.i the Courts, op. cit. supra note 5, at p. 6.
Ya: at p .. 4.
Ibid.
ruaTcial Business of Colorado Courts, Annual Report of the
Judicial Administrator, p. 11 (1959}.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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In 1960 and 1961, approximately 70 opinions were written
by outside judges. One retired Supreme Court judge, 24 district
judges, and four county court judges assisted the court in
1960.W This explains why the number of written opinions in
1960 was high.
During 1967, four retired judges and four active district
judges were assigned to assist the Supreme Court pursuant to
Article VI, Section 5 of the Colorado Constitution. These assignments resulted- in 20 written opinions. This assistance was
of considerable help to the court in achieving its record productivity in 1967 •.!.2/
Other considerations. To be considered also are the other matters which take up a sizable portion of the court's time,
because the growing volume of work in the court is not reflected
entirely be case filings and dispositions and the number of written opinions. These other matters are requests for extensions
of time, motions to dismiss, and similar paper work -- all of
which have to be received, examined, stamped, listed and studied
and then orders issued and the papers filed, microfilmed, and
stored.11./
In 1966, the Supreme Court received 1,668 requests for extensions of time and 1,476 other motions of various"kinds for a
total of 3,144 items. As statistics were not kept on these matters prior to 1965, a comparison must necessarily be limited;
however, the in6rease of 1,198 or 53.7 percent· over the 1965 total of 2,046 illustrates the increased activity in this area.
It also demonstrates that delay begets delay, because it appears
that the more cases that are not disposed of, the more requests
that are made to the court for extensions of time and the more
motions that are filed to dismiss. It should be note~ that these
totals do not include orders transferring trial judges and other
administrative 1 gStions taken through the office of the Judicial
Administrator •.!!Y
.
.
It should also be remembered that in the last 15 years
the state has nearly doubled the number of trial court judges.
This increase in trial court judges has resulted in an increase
in the number of dispositions at the trial court level. This
increase, in turn, has resulted in an increase in the number of
cases coming to the Supreme Court. In the meantime, the Supreme

Judicial Administration !.o Colorado, op. cit. supra note 7.
The State of the Courts, Annual Report of the Chief Justice
'or°the ColoraooSupreme Court, p. 6 (Jan. 1968).
Ibid.
Ibid.

-
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Court has had to do an adequate job with the same personnel and
structure which existed in 1905. As is readily· apparent from a
look at the figures in Table I, the court has not been able to
keep up with the number of cases filed, thus creating a backlog.
Considerations relevant to written opinions. Even if the
number of written opinions and case dispositions continue at the
all-time high rate set in 1967, it does not appear that the court
will be able to reduce the backlog substantially in the foreseeable future. In this regard it is appropriate to ask ·how many
cases a seven man appellate court can be expetted to dispose of
annually by written opinions consistent with the time needed to
give proper consideration to impo.rtant matters and co.nsistent
with the development.of good case law. Various opinions have
been expressed on this subject, but generally an average of 50
cases per judge is probably the maximum, and 35 to 40 cases is
considered a more satisfactory total~ This means that the court
can be expected under the best of.circumstances to dispose of a
maximum of 350 cases in any one year by written op!qion, and the
total i's more likely to fall between 225 and 275~.!2/
The written opinions per judge averages cited above are
guide posts at best, because the number of written opinions in
any given period will fluctuate considerably according to the
type of case before the court •. Many c~ses are relatively minor
and may be disposed of in a short·period of time. Others are
extremely complicated and technical.and may involve statutory
and/or constitutional construction. During a period when a
large proportion of the cases before the court fall in this latter category, the number of written opinions will naturally be
fewer.
While productions expressed in the number of written opinions and cases closed is important, it is only one factor to be
considered. Because of the important matters coming before the
court and the effect of the court's decisions on Colorado law,
there should be sufficient time for consideration of these matters and for each member to review carefully the opinions written by his colleagues. For this reason, the opinion has been
expressed that only the most important cases should come before
the Supreme Court, and the court should have the right to determine whether it wishes to review less important cases. Consistent with this point of view is the position that if only the
most important cases are considered, then the average number of
opinions written annually per judge should be from 25 to 30.

This discussion and the following discussion is based upon
a 1963 Legislative Council staff memorandum to the Legislative Council Committee on Amendment No. l on the subject of
appellate procedure and the need for an intermediate court
of appeals.
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Dispositions without written o~inion. Judging from the
experience each year from 1960 throug 1967, an annual average
of 167 cases are closed without written opinions. Therefore
the court may be expected to dispose of a total number of cases
annually of 392 to 517 cases. As long as the filing rate continues to exceed this maximum, no reduction in the number of
cases pending can be anticipated. In fact, the number of pending cases can be expected to increase.
Delay from issue to disposition. In 1960 the Legislative
Council Committee on Judiciaf Administration conducted a docket
analysis of cases filed in the Supreme Court in 1959 to determine the kind of cases and the origin of cases before the court.
The analysis also sought to determine the delay in the court.
It was demonstrated that the average delay between the time a
case became at issue before the Supreme Court and was disposed
of was 20 months. Half of the cases were disposed of more quickly and half took longer. At the time the analysis was made,
September 1959, there were 311 pending cases at issue before the
court. Of these cases, the earliest had come of issue in the
third quarter of 1957. Only 21 cases, less than seven percent,
were at issue prior to 1958, and almost half of the 311 cases
became at issue in 1958.~ This information is shown in Table

II.

Time lag -- filin to issue. Another factor in the delay
in disposition of casesefore the Supreme Court is the length
of time it takes for cases to be ready for trial (at issue). At
the time the 1959 analysis was made, half of the cases took more
than 5 .2 months from filing to issue, .with the average for all
cases, 6.3 months.· Forty-eight· cases or 15.4 percent of the total took three months or less from filing to issue; 144 cases or
46.3 percent took from three to six months; 106 cases or 34 percent took from six to 12 months; and only 13 cases or 4.2 percent
took more than one year. Of these latter~~~ three cases took
two years or more from filing until issue.~

6

When the delay from filing to issue is added to the time
from issue to disposition, it shows that the average case disposed of by the Supreme Court by ·the e~~/of 1959 had probably
been filed 25 to 26 months previously.~
Present delay~ The committee directed that a similar
analrsis be made of the Supreme Court docket in an attempt to
disc ose the present delay. An analysis was thus made of the
Judicial Administration in Colorado, Colorado Legislative
Council, Research Publication No. 49, p. 102 (Dec. 1960).
Id. at p. 104
Ibid.

-

-8-

Table II
Cases At Issue Pending Before the Co1orado Supreme Court
By Type of Case, As of September 30, 1959
Time When Cases Became At Issue
1957
3rd 4th

TJ'.:oe of Case

I

'°
I

Pers9nal Injurya
To:rt 0
Money Demand
Contract
l,iunicipal and
Local Gcv't.c
Water hights
State Agenciesd
Property
Domestic Relationse
Frobaie
Otherr
Not 3hown9
TOTAL

a.

:o.

c.

d.
e.
f.

g.

1st

2nd

1958
3rd 4th

1st

1959
2nd 3rd

19571959
Total

.JL .JL Total __Q_ __g_ .JL __Q_ Total __Q_ _g_ __Q_

Total

5
3
8
3

5
2
8
3

18
7
26
13

17
5
23
11

39
13
50

3
2

l
l

12
3

24

l

3

3
2

l
l

4

1
l

4
l
l

3

l

4

l

2

3

l
l

l
l

3

5

l

l

3
3

4

2
2

2

l

2
5
6
2

3
l
4

l
l

7

7

l

2

3

4

2
7

14

21

32

l

4

7

4
l

46

35

6
l

7
2

4

5
2

5

4
l

2
2

11
2

8
6
3
12
11
9
21
17

2
3
5
3
5
5

·3
5
2

6
13
3

23

38

151

46

33

58

4

2

10

8

6

l

3

6

3

4
l

10
7
12

l

24

12
9
23
19
21

Per Cent
Of Cases
At Issue
.12.54%
4.18

16.08
7.71
7.71
3.86
2.90
7.40

6.11

10

46
31

6.75
14.79
9.97

139

311

100.00

Includes auto.
Other damages.
All cases involving municipal, county, school districts and special districts.
All cases involving the state of Colorado and its agencies.
Includes divorce, separate maintenance, annulment, custody, dependency, etc.
Includes the few criminal cases not disposed of.
Not indicated in docket book.

Source:

Judicial Administration in Colorado, Colorado Legislative Council, Research Publication
No. 49 (Dec. 1960).

civil{ cri. minal. and workmen's compensation cases at issue and
await ng oral argument in the court as of June 1. 1968. This
analysis determined the time lapse from the date a case becomes
at issue until the date it is orally argued. The median time
from issue date to oral argument is 10 months in civil cases.
six months in criminal cases. and one month in workmen's compensation cases. This information is set forth in Tables III, IV,
·
and V.
The convnittee also determined that the average length of
time from the date a case is filed until it becomes at issue is
approximately six to eight months. In other words, six to eight
months precede the date the case becomes at issue. It was noted
that the court often grants extensions of time within which the
attorneys must file their briefs. All extensions of time, of
course, increase the length of time from filing to issue date.
The average length of time from oral argument to final decision
is approximately two months. This means that there is a lapse
of approximately 18 to 20 months from the filing date to the
date of final disposition; some litigants now'have to wait for
a period of approximately two years before a final decision is
reached in their case.
table III
Workmen's Compensation Cases at Issue
Awaiting Oral Argument
Colorado Supreme Court,
As of June 1, 1968

No,

Time at I§sue
6

l

mo.

5
4

·l

3
2

4

1
0

Total

6

Median

1 mo.
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Table IV
Criminal Cases at Issue Awaiting
Oral Argument
Colorado Supreme Court,
As of June 1, 1968

Timg a.t Issue
9 mo.

No,
3

Percent
5.4%

8

10

17 .9

7

9

16.l

6

6

10.7

5

6

10.7

4

5

8.9

3

4

7.1

2

4

7.1

1

6

10.7

0

3

5.4

Total
Median

56
6 mo.

- ' t ...

100.0%

Table V
Civil ea,.. at IHue Awaiting Onl A~nt- Colorado Supreme Court, .A• of June 1. 1968
Total

Jin at JHY•
27 Month•
26

i:11.'ffl!
2

8
13
14

~

14

....
I

I,)
I

13
12
11
10
9

8
7
6

,
4
3
2

3.4

-~

l

0

Total

Median

_io;r

Real

fror.

Agencx and1
LR!il l szxli •

ua..

380 99.CJJ'b
10 mo.

Money
~-

Breach

t 'l!,r•ct

0

rifrt

Water

All

Bimdil

.2l!m

l

1
2
2

IL

1ma

l

.,

2.1

3.7
11 2.9
16 4.2
10 2.6
26 6.8
20 ,.3
13 3.4
19 ,.0
13 3.4
8 2.1
24 6.3
23 6.1
17 . 4.,
3.9
~
24 6.3
23 6.1
23 6.1
l~ 3.9
17 4.,
6.1
23
2

20

19
18
17
16

IL

Per,onal

-2%

l

~

24
23
22
21

ga. Bd,

3
6
2

l
l
3
2

3

l
6
6
2

l
l

,

4

l
2
l
3

2
l

,
2
l
3
2
l

l
2
l

2
l
2
2

l
2

2
3
3
4
2
2

,
2
,2

l

l
2
2
2

l

2
l

l

2
3

2

3

3

l
l

3
6

4

l

80

29

48

~

10 mo.

l~ mo.

,

32

7

~

4

7

8 mo.

3

3

2
2
2
l
2
2
2
l
2

3

2

22

9

l

IIOo

3
6
6
3

2
1

2

,l..

l

l

10 mo.

2

8

~
~

l
l
l

2
3

8
3
l
3

a. DoH not include Worlcaen•• CompenaaUon.
b. DoH not equal lOQC becau,e of rounding.

3
l

·2
2
7
l
l
3

4

mo.

l
2

2
2
4
l
l
2

l
2
3
l
l
l
3

-u

l
2
2
l

41

9

14 ao.

6 ao.

3

3

4
3
4

7
3
6
1

67
8 mo.

C9mparison With Other

States

That a serious backlog problem exists in the Colorado
Supreme Court is demonstrated by the above data. It may be relevant at this point to ask how the record in Colorado compares
with the record in other states. An analysis conducted by the
Office of Judicial Administration shows that in 1967 the Colorado Supreme Court had one of the best records in the country,
both in the number of cases closed and in the number of written_
opinions. Table VI shows the number of justices, appeals accepted, and the number of written opinions in 1967 for the 30
states which do not have an intermediate appellate court. Only
Kentucky, with the equivalent of 11 justices, exceeded Colorado
in the number of written opinions, and only Kentucky and Washington exceeded Colorado in the number of appeals accepted.
Table VI
States Without Intermediate Appellate Courts
Number of Justices, Appeals Accepted, and
Written Opinions in 1967*
State

No. of
Justices

Appeals
Acceeted

Written
Opinions

Written
Opinions
Per Justice 8

5

Alaska
Arkansas

1

105
342

61
35_0

12.2
50.0

COLORADO

1

639

m

54.0

Connecticut
Delaware
Hawaii
Idaho
Iowa
Kansas
KentuckyC
Maine
Massachusetts
Minnesota
Mississippi
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
North Dakota
Oregon
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota

6
3
5
5

141
126
102
190
395
312
803
87
320
430
367
172
321
157
124
102
612
244
143
105

127
80
42
96
230
234
637
72
232
245
267
105
257
67
95
96
305
182
143

25.4b
26.7
8.4
19.2
25.6
33.4
57.9
12.0
33.1
35.0
29.7
21.0
36.7

9
1

11
6

7
1

9
5
7
5
5
5
7

5
5
5
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45

i3.4

19.0
19.2
43.5
36.4
28.6
9.0

Table VI (Continued)
No. of
Justices

State

Appeals
Accepted

Written
Opinions

Written
Opinions
Per Justicea

170
70
133
350
57
275
71

34.0
14.0
19.0
38.9
11.4
39.3
17.8

182
130

27.5
26.2

Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

4

333
137
260
734
53
347
75

MEAN
MEDIAN

6
5

276
217

5
5
7
9
5
7

*This table was taken from a memorandum "An Intermediate Appellate Court: A Proposal and Alternative," prepared at the request
of the Legislative Council Committee on Appellate Courts, presented by the Colorado Supreme Court, Aug. 30, 1968.
a.
b.
c.

Computed for actual number of justices, even though several
states (including Colorado) had some assistance from retired
and trial court judges.
Computed for five justices; the sixth justice has administrative duties only.
Seven justices and four full-time commissioners.

SOURCE:

Workload of State Courts of Last Resort - 1965-67, a
compilation prepared for The Conference of Chief Justices, The Council of State Governments, Chicago, Illinois 1967.

A Look at the Future
Without reform of some type to ease the continuing backlog of cases in the Supreme Court, it is anticipated that by
1980 the backlog will be at almost 3,800 cases. The anticipated
backlog by 1980 is based upon a projection of the annual filing
rate using past population-case filing ratios and population projections. This projection was made by Mrs. Winifred Lewis, Judicial Department Statistical Analyst. The assumption was made
that the court would close 550 cases per year, which means that
the court would have to write approximately 325-335 opinions.
This assumption is very optimistic, but even if the court could
close an average of 550 cases per year, the backlog as of the
end of 1980 is estimated at almost 3,800 cases. (See Table VII.)
The time lag between issue and oral argument in civil
cases in 1980 is estimated at between 5 and 5.5 years. In other
words it would take more than six years from filing to termination for a case on the civil docket.
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Table VII
Estimated Annual Number of Cases Filed and Backlog,
Colorado Supreme Court, 1968-198()1New Cases
Filed

Year
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
. 1980
a,

626
652
679
705
731
757
783
809
835
862
888
914
940

Cases
Closed·
550
550
550
550
550
550
550
550
550
550
550
550
550

Yearly
Remainder
76
102
129
155
181
207
233
259
285
312
338
364
390

Bac~l52g
861 8
937
1039
1168
1223
1404
1611
1844
2103
2388
2700
3038
3402
3792

As of December 31, 1967.

*This table was taken from a memorandum "An Inter·mediate Appellate Court: A Proposal and Alternative," prepared at the request of the Legislative
Council Committee on Appellate Courts, presented
by the Colorado Supreme Court, Aug, 30, 1968,
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SUPREME COURT OOCXET ANALYSIS
Introduction
At the request of the committee, the Judicial Administrator, with the assistance and cooperation of the Legislative Council staff, was directed to conduct an analysis of the Supreme
Court docket. The committee believed that such an analysis would
be helpful in pointing toward what kind of action is necessary to
solve the backlog problem. In terms of the possible creation of
an intermediate court as a solution to the backlog problem, such
an analysis was felt necessary in order to determine the size of
the caseload that could be expected in such an intermediate court.
It was felt that the analysis might also suggest several appropriate ways in which the intermediate court could be structured
and organized. The analysis thus prepared was primarily concerned
with the kinds of cases filed in the Colorado Supreme Court and
the origin of these cases.
Period covered and data base. Cases filed in the Supreme
Court in 1966 and 1967 were ttsed as the data base for the analysis, regardless of the current status or prior disposition of
those cases. It was felt that an examination of cases filed
would provide a more accurate analysis of the types and origin of
cases than would pending cases, because the composition of the
latter is affected by the advancement of certain kinds of cases
on the docket (e.g., criminal and workmen's compensation). Original proceedings, including disciplinary actions, filed in 1966
and 1967 were excluded, leaving 922 cases during the two-year
period which were brought on writ of error Q~ .in three instances
(county court cases) by writ of certiorari.W
Origin of Cases Filed
The oriqin of cases filed in the Colorado Supreme Court
in 1966 and 1967 is presented in Tables VIII and IX. Table VIII
shows this information bra straight numerical listing of judi•
cial districts. Judicia districts have been grouped geographically in Table IX. A judicial district boundary map has been·
included (Figure A) to identify the counties in each district.W
Table IX shows that 71 percent of the cases came from the
Denver metropolitan area, with 44 percent being from Denver•itself. Table IX shows that 6.2 percent of the cases came from the

W'

w

Supreme Court Docket Analysis, Memorandum from State Court
Administrator, p. 1 (June 6, 1968).

ill£!.
-16-

Table VIII
Origin of Cases Filed
Colorado Supreme Court
By Judicial District 1966-67a
Judicial District
lstb
2ndc

~~

5th
6th
7th
8th
9th
10th
11th
12th
l~th
1th
15th
16th
lithd
1th
19th
20th
21st
22nd
a.
b.
c.
d.

!2~

Pct.

84
405
6
41
11
18
24
11
31
15
9
14
2
14
4
42
78

.o
4i-1~
.6
7.7
.4
1.2
2.0
2.6
1.2
3.4
1.6
1.0
1.5
.2
1:i
4.6
8.5
2.1
4.8
1.0
.6

ii
9
6

Writs of error only, does not include original
proceedings, and disciplinary proceedings.
Includes one county court case (Gilpin}.
Includes 24 Superior Court, 11 Probate Court,
2 Juvenile Court.
Includes one county court case (Arapahoe}.
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Table IX
Origin of Cases Filed, Colorado Supreme Court
By Region and Judicial District
Region and District
Denver Metro

1st

2nd
lith
1th
20th
Total

Pct.

84

9-1~
44.o
4.6
8.5
4.8.

4o6
42

.4~
oslf

North East
8th
13th
19th
Total

24

5th

6th
7th
9th
12th
14th
21st
22nd
Total

2.6
1.5
2.1
o.2

4
11
18
11
9
2

1.2
2.0
1.2

9

1.0

7o

"r.o

6
31
14
4

.6
3.4
1.5
.4

6

South Eastern
3rd
10th
15th
16th
Total
Central
4th
11th
Total

n:o

14

~

Western Slopea

a.

No.

.4

1.0

.2

.6

5S"

5-9

71

7.7
1.6

ti

9-3

Includes San Juan Basin and San Luis Valley.
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JUDICIAL DISTRICTS

OF

JANUARY 12, 1965

EFFECTIVE

District
2 Judges

8th

14 th District
,..,
1 Judge

COLORADO

_____....,

19th District
2 Judges

PHILLIPS

WE L 0

ROUTT
MORGAN
RIO

LOGAN

BLANCO

13th District
4 Judges
YUMA

WASHING TON

District
2 Judges

9th

ARAPAHOE

GARFIELD

District
4 Judges

18th

KIT

CARSON

ELBERT

.....I

LINCOLN-------,

'°I

EL

M ES A

PASO

District
8 Judges

CHEYENNE

4th

GUNNISON

7 th

District
2 Judges

K

PUEBLO

MONTROSE----.

O

W

A

15th District

10th

District
4 Judges

SA<3UACHE

I

18th District
2 Judges

PROWERS

BENT

OTERO

22nd

District
1 Judge
MONTEZUMA

.,

District
2 Judges

8th

CONEJOS

COSTILLA

L

ARCHUL!TA

NOTE: Each of the four districts ( /st, 8th, /7th, and /8th} will receive an
additional judge in. January 1969---to be elected at the 1968 general election

•

District
Judges

Figure A

A

S

A N

I

M A

B

A

C

A

S

Prepared by State Planning Division
May 1984

Northeast region of the state, 7.6 percent from the Western Slope,
5.9 percent fro~ the Southeast region and 9.3 percent from the
Central region of the state.
The 1959 docket analysis disclosed that 87.5 percent of
the cases originated in the district courts, and almost nine percent of the cases originated in the county courts. Almost four
percent of the cases were original proceedings. In 1959, 35 percent of the cases filed originated from the Denver district, as
compared with 44 percent in 1966 and 1967. Table X sho_ws · the _
source and type of cases filed in the Supreme Court in 1959 and
is included so that this information may be compar~d with information in Tables VIII and IX from the 1966-1967 docket analysis.
Origin of cases in relation to creation of intermediate
court. Assuming that an intermediate appellate court is to be
created~ it can readily be seen from Tables VIII and IX that it
would not be a simple matter-to divide the state geographically,
Because 44 percent of all cases filed during 1966 and 1967 were
generated from the Denver district and 71 percent came from-the
Denver metropolitan area (including Boulder), it would be difficult to equalize case loads and travel time if two or more divisions or circuits are considered.
It was. suggested that one possible division might be be- .
tween the 2nd, 17th, and 18th judicial districts (57.l percent)
· and the rest of the state. Under this division considerable time
would be required in travel in the second circuit to cover 42.9
percent of.the case load. If three divisions are considered, it
appears that the Denver case load would have to be divided in
some way between two of them, and perhaps, the metropolitan area
divided among all three so_tnat the division would be a pie shape.
with Denver in the middle.W
Types of·Cases Fil~d
.

,.•,·.,

The kinds of cases filed in the Colorado Supreme Court are
analyzed in Tables XI, XII. and XIII. Table XI shows the number
of cases by major type and judicial district of origin. During
1966 and 1967, criminal cases accounted for 23 percent of the
filings, exclusive of original proceedings. The next largest
category was administrative (agency) revfew and local government
cases, 13.3 percent, followed by personal injury (9.7 percent)
and money demand (9.3 percent).

W Id.

at p. 5.
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Table X

Source and Type of Cases Docketed in Supreme Court During 1959
Cases Appealed
Orig.
Proc,

Total

Crim.

Dist. !Golden)
Dist. Denver)
Dist. Colorado Springs)
Dist. Boulder, Greeley,
Fort Collins)
10th Dist •. ,Pueblo)
17th Dist. Brighton)
18th Dist. Littleton)

23
113
16

4
21

27
17

0

2

3

6

26

8.6
4.4
2.2
6.4

Total-Metro. Dists.

212

~

~

~l

69.0

4

1

l

1

0

1st
2nd
4th
8th

9
7

Total

!& of

Civil

Metropolitan District Courts

4

2
10
0

29
144
20

3
9

5
0

35
18
9

7.1

35.4
4.9

Non-Metropolitan
District Courts
I

I\)
I-'
I

3rd Dist.

5th
6th
7th
9th
11th
12th
13th
14th
15th
16th

Dist.
Dist.
Dist.
Dist.
Dist.
Dist.
Dist.
Dist.
Dist.
Dist.

2
4

2

1

0
2

6

0

0

1

6a

6

1
5

10
3

1.4
.25
1.2
2.4
.7
3.4
.5

4

0
0
0
0
0
0

14

8
7

1.9
1.7

46

26

4

76

18.5

258
34

70

29

357

0

34

0

0
0

87.5
8.6
3.9

292

70

8
2

0

12

6

2
6
3

0

Total-Non-Metro. Dists.
District Court Total
County & Superior Courts
other - Original
Total for State

2

16
45

2

18
2

16

407

4.4

.5

100.0

a. Writs of error from denials of habeas corpus from state penitentiary.
Source: Judicial Business gf Colorado Courts, 1959, Annual Report of Judicial Administrator.

· Table XI
cases Filed in Colorado Supreme court
By Judicial District and Major Type
_ 1966 • 67

;

/

Judicial Districts
MaJor !Z,ee ot Case
l Domestic Relations
2 Personal Injury
Real Property
Agency &: Local Govt •.
Money Demand
Breach ot Contract
Damages ( Other)
Water Rights
9 Injunction
10 Specific Performance
11 Repleven
12 FED
Recission ot Contract
Construction ot Contract
15 Declaratory- Judgment
16 Habeas Corpus
Extradition
Probate
19 Juvenile
20 Mental Health
21 Criminal
22 Other and N.I.
23 County Court

i

i
i

ii

ii

I
I\)
I\)
I

Total

,!!! 2nda 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th.™ 11th~ 13th ,!ilh 15th 16th 17th 18th 19th
3
11
6
8
8

~
l
l
l

3
l
2

12
31
4
65
41
11
15

~

l
l
2

'
2
l
4
4
l

6
8
5
l
2
l
2
2

l
l
l

l
l
l
2

l
l
l
2
2
1

l

l
6

'

l
l

l
l
2
4
2

3

2
l

l

l

l

84 406

2

l

6

71

4

l

l
l

l

l

2
6

3
3

2
2

11
5

5
7

5
2

2
1

11. 18 24

11

31

15

9-

14

l

2

l
l

l
l

4
2

3

l

l

3

2
5
l
3
3

2

l

l
16
10

2

2

2
l

l

l

1

3
10
·2
l
12114
15 70
1
l

2

l
l
3
2
2

l

4
10
4
17
8
l
5

2
3
2
l
4

rn ~ 22nd
3
8
2
5
6
l
3

l

34

2

~

l

46

22

10

~

l

4

2
9
6
5

l

g

l

2

l

l
2

l

8
16

5
18
1

5
2

9
7

4
l

l
2

14

4

42

78

19

44

9

6

l

!!2.·
~-

2
l

~

2

2,
2
·212
172
3

E.9.i•
4.1~
9.7
3.7
13.3
9-~
5.0
1.1
1.0
.9
.4
.2
1.0

2.

.1
.5

1.0

.1

2:i

.2
2~-0
l .6
.3

922 100.o:c

Includes Probate, Juvenile, and Superior-Courts
Includes contested divorces, property settlement, alimony, child support and custody.
All personal inJuey actions, such as motor vehicle accidents, .malpractice suits etc.
Includes quiet titles, condemnations, mechanics liens, boundary- questions, etc.
Includes workmen•s camp., unemployment comp., P.U.c. orders and rate decisions, liquor anC: beer licenses, zoning, annexattons, bank charters,
special district formation and elections, etc.
5) Includes contracts, promissory- notes, attorney•s tees, etc.
'
7) Includes all damage cases, not covered in personal injury and breach of contract (or otherwise identified), such as property ~amage, false
arrest, libel, etc.
i
12 Forcible entry and detainer
18 All probate matters
19 All juvenile cases
20 All mental health cases
21 All criminal cases
22 Includes cases for which case files not available tor identification, contempt proceedings, partnership accounting, receivership, stockholders•
derivative suits, and other cases not classified above.
ai1 ·1
2

Approximately 19 percent of the cases were in the "other
or not identified" category. Approximately one-half of the cases
shown in this category were civil cases for which the files were
not readily available, i.e., they were either checked out or incomplete (active cases) or in•the archives (closed cases). If
this category is apportioned according to the distribution shown
in Table XI, agency and local government cases would be almost
15 percent of the total number filed; personal injury, 11 percent; and money demand, 10 percent.
·
·
For comparative purposes, the 1959 docket analysis disclosed that money demand cases constituted the greatest percentage of cases filed (16 percent). Thirty-nine or 12.5 percent
were personal injury cases, as compared with 9.7 percent in 19661967. Cases involving local governmental units totaled 24 cases
or almost eight percent, as compared with almost 13.3 percent in
1966-1967. In 1959, property, probate,. and domestic relations
cases each accounted for more than six percent of the total.
(see Table II.)
·
· ·
Dollar amounts. Considerable committee interest has been
indicated in the monetary value of cases filed in the Colorado
Supreme Court. Accordingly, the amounts involved were analyzed
for four different kinds of cases (personal injury, money demand,
breach of contract, and other damages) in Table XII.
Table XII .indicates that 55 percent of all cases in these
four categories filed in 1966 and 1967 involved $10,000 or less.
This figure should be used with caution, however, because a number of cases in the "not identified" category are likely to have
involved more than $10,000 initially, even if the amount was not
an issue ~2 the appeal. Therefore, the 55 percent figure may be
inf lated .6211
A enc and local overnment cases. Because the category
of administrative agency review and ocal government cases accounted for more than 13 percent of all the cases filed in 1966
and 1967 (the second largest category), a separate analysis was
made of this category. This analysis is contained in Table XIII.
Workmen's compensation cases accounted for the largest proportion in this category, 39 percent, followed by liquor and beer
licenses (11.4 percent), and Public Utilities Commission cases
(10.6 percent). Altogether, workmen's compensation, unemployment
compensation, and P.U.C. cases comprised slightly~~~re than 55
percent of the agency and local government cases.llt

W

Supreme Court Docket Analysis, Memorandum from State Court
Administrator, p. 5 (June 6, 1968).

'i:1./ Ibid.
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Table XII
Dollar Amount; ea ... Jliled
Colorado Supreme Court, 1966-67
l'enonal

Ifljfrv

!ti:.::.

m•ot

lloney
Dtmand!d
~ Percent

Breach of
~n1;1st

·~•rs•ot

Not Indicated Jl/

5

5.6

13

15.l

Under Sl,000

2

2.3

11

12.8

Sl ,OOO-S2,500

l

1.1

9

10.5

3

S2,500-S5,000 .

9

10.1

18

20.9

S5,000-Sl0,OOO

10

11.2

13

Sl0,000-Sl5,000

7

7.9

S15,000-S~,OOO

14

I

S25,000-S35,000

I

~

Cumulative

IL

Tq: l

ercerif

&:hi!l rtt

5

10.9

28

11.5

3

6.5

16

6.6

44

18.l

13.6

8

17.4

21

8.6

65

'l:1.7

2

9.1

3

6.5

32

13.2

tr,.

40.9

15.l -

4

18.2

8

17.4

35

14.4.

132

55.3

3

3.5

2

9.1

1

2.2

13

5.3

145

60.6

15.7

9

10.5

3

13.6

6

13.0

32

13.2

177

73.8

9

10.1

5

5.8 ·

l

4.5

2

4.3

17

-1:0

194

ao.8

S35,000•S50,000

4

4.5

2

2.3

1

4.5

2

4.3

9

3.7

203

84.5

S50,000-S100,000

14

15.7

l

1.2

3

6.5

18

7.4

221

· 91.9

Over s100,000

li

lla1

...a

.....1J

~

~

~

19.&2

..l2

--2..tl

243

100.0

89

99.9

86.

100.0

22

99.8

46

99.9 ~.

243

100.0 ·

Total

~

5

Dama,..
(gther·,t
r!2.a. Percent·

22.7

~

includes aii damage ca••• mt covered in personal injury and breach of contract (or otherwise identified) such as property damage, false
arrest, libel, etc.
.
Either amount not indicated or not an iHue in th• case.
·
Total doH not equal 100,C becauH of rounding.

Table XIII
State Agency and Local Governnent Cases
Filed in the Colorado Supreme Court, 1966-67

No,

~

Workmen's Compensation

Percent

48

39.0

7

5.7

Public Utilities Commission

13

10.6

Liquor and Beer Licenses

14

11.4

8

6.5

6

4.9

Bank Charters

3

2.4

Zoning Ordinances and Orders

5

4.1

Agency Orders and Regulations

3

2.4

Bond Elections

2

1.6

2

1.6

4

3.3

-123

6.5

Unemployment Compensation

Taxation and Assessment
Civil Service

!I

. Annexation
Municipal Ordinances
Other

8

Total

j/

Includes both state and local.
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100.0

County Court Appeals
Appeals from the county court presently lie to the district court, with further review possible upon writ of certiorari to the Supreme. Court. It was felt that information concerning county court appeals should be available to the committee in
case it determined to establish an intermediate appellate court.
In determining the jurisdiction of an intermediate appellate
court (should. one be recomm~nded), conf?ideration perhaps should
be given to changing county court appellate procedure, so that
county court appeals would lie to the intermediate court rather
than the district court. It was felt by some that this procedure
might possibly help eliminate any diversity which exists between
districts in construing the validity of county court practices,
such as the verification of traffic tickets.
The quantitative impact of this possibility can be seen
from Table XIV. The proportion of county court appeals from
each area varies somewhat from the distribution shown in Table
XI for appeals to the Supreme Court, but the differences are
slight. In other words, the addition of county court appeals to
an intermediate court of appeals case load woul5:Lqot have much
effect on the geographic distribution of cases.~
Administrative Review and Local Government Cases
Another possibility in designing the jurisdiction of· an
intermediate appellate court (should one be recormnended) might
·be to have the initial review of workmen's compensation, unemployment compensation, and similar cases made by the intermediate court rather than the district court, as presently provided
by law. Several other jurisdictions with.an intermediate court
follow this procedure. With respect to workmen's compensation
cases, some states grant direct.appeal only to the highest court
(New Jersey), while others vest appellate jurisdiction in this
class of cases in both the intermediate and highest appellate
courts. In New Mexico and North Carolina, appeal as of right
lies to thE, intermediate court to review decisions of workmen's
compensation cases. In New Mexico, the Supreme Court may review
by certiorari the decision of the intermediate court in a workmen's compensation case, but in North Carolina no appeal from
the decision of the court is allowed to the Supreme Court. In
Arizona, Florida, and Pennsylvania, the intermediate court has
jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari to review awards of
workmen's compensation.

W'

id. at p. 9.
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Table XIV
County Court Appeals Filed 1n District Court, 1967
By Region and Judicial District
Region a.nd District

Denver Metro
1st

7

85
12
16

2nd
17th
18th
20th
Total

19

ng

North East
8th
13th
19th
Total

7
.6
7

N)"

Western Slope 8 ·
5th
6th
7th
9th
12th
14th
21st
22nd
Total

6

0
4
3
9
2
2
3

"29

South Eastern
3rd
10th
15th
16th
Total
Central
4th
11th
Total

Pct.

s·2·i

35.
i-2
.6
"62:-9
3.2
2.7

3.2

p

2.7

-

1.8
1.4
4.1
.9
1:4

~

1

.4

i0

3.2
2.7

IT

o.3

12
7

5.4

"I9

Grand Total
a.
b.

No.

221

H
100.lb

Includes San Juan Basin & San Luis Valley.
Does not equal 100 percent because of rounding.
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Table x-/ is included to demonstrate the possible impact
of the addition of these matters to an intermediate appellate
court, should one be established. Table x-/ divides agency review and local government cases into three categories and is
derived from information supplied to the Judicial Administrator's Office under the district court statistical reporting
system. The three categories are workmen's compensation, other
administrative review cases, and local government. The last
category is not really important for this purpose, because most
local government actions (annexation, incorporation, etc.) must
start in the trial court. It is included only to show a comparison with the administrative review cases.
·
Table XV shows that there were 108 workmen's compensation cases filed in the district courts in 1967. Table XIII
shows that there were 48 workmen's compensation cases filed in
the Supreme Court in the years 1966 and 1967. Assuming that
half of these (24) were filed in 1967, it means that approximately 25 percent of the workmen's compensation cases filed in
the district courts are coming to the Supreme Court for review
(24 of 108 cases).
As more than 90 percent of the workmen's compensation and
other administrative review cases are filed in the Denver metropolitan area (more than 50 percent in Denver), inclusion in the
intermediate court case load of these cases would further unequalize the potential case load between Denver and the rest of
the state. This is important to keep in mind if an intermediate
court is established and if the court is to sit in geographical
subdivisions of the state.
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Table >N
Agency Review and Local Government Cases
Filed in District Court, 1967
By Region and Judicial District

~egion a.nd District
Denver Metro
1st
2nd
17th
18th
20th
Total
North East
8th
13th
19th
Tota.I

Western SloEe

5th

6th
7th
9th
12th
14th
21st
22nd
Total
South Ea.stern
3rd
10th
15th
16th
Total

Workmen's
Com:e.
No.
Pct.

60

55.6%

41

38.0

5
38
1
14

101

93-o

09

1
1
1

.9
.9
.9

1
1

11

1

2--:7

1
1

.9
.9

1

.9

1.3

H.

1
2
1
1f

4.2%
20.8
2.8
1~-9
.2
45.9
1.4
2.7
1.4

Total
Pct.

8
113
3

~ .1
4 .1

203

79-T

2
4
3

1.6
1.2

~~

1.2

25.3
5.ij

.8

5-"5

-g

T:15

7
1
1
4
3
2
4

9.7
1.4
1.4

5.5

7
2
2
4

5.5

2
4

2.7
.8
.8
1.6
2.0
.8
1.6

1

1.3

22

10:5

N>

T0:1

4.2
2.8

3
6

1.2
2.3

1.3

4.2
2.8

5

2.7

1

.9

3

3.9

3
2

~

3

3.9

5

;:o

9

1:5

1

1.3

5

6

1.3

~

2.3
1.2

T

6.9
4.2
"IT.T

76

99.9b

72

100.00

11th
Tota.I

a.

#H
9

3
15
2
10
3
·33

No.

3

4th

b.

"2"

6.6%

50.0
1.3
18.4

Local
Government
No.
Pct.

a

Central

Grand Total
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ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES IN COLORADO ·

Introduction
Judicial reformers for many years have sought for solutions to overcome the delay in the courts from the backlog of
cases. Current approaches and means that have been tried are
many and varied. The judges themselves have been shifted about,
have been added to appellate benches, have been divided into
panels, have been assisted by court commissioners and have been
restricted in the cases they could hear. Temporary "stop-gap"
measures designed to overcome court congestion suggested by reformers include assigning of court commissioners to aid appellate judges, employing law clerks to assist in legal research,
using Bar Association members to function as part-time arbitrators and referees. In addition, there are those who suggest
solutions to court congestion which tend to reduce the amount of
judicial time spent on cases. These measures include appealable
cases through certiorari, writs of error or certification from
the lower courts, and reducing the number of written opinions
through memorandum and per curiam opinions.
In handling excessive case loads, many states have found
that their first basic need has been to recruit additional qualified appellate judges. It was found that any workable solution
must in some way provide for more judges. Adding judges to the
high court has been done through the selection of new judges and/
or by following a similar pattern executed by Colorado in 1960
wherein district court and retired supreme court judges were
temporarily called back intg 07ervice to help reduce the case load
on the Supreme Court level •.6.Zt
All of these measures have been tried in an attempt to
bring balance and a semblance of order to appellate procedure.
Yet no one of these methods seem~ to be the panacea which will
totally alleviate the problem. While all of these methods aid
and assist in overcoming court congestion and delay, it is generally felt that none are sufficient measures in themselves to
be solely relied upon.
Probably the most controversial of all approaches tried
has been the creation of an intermediate appellate court system.
Many of those states which have used some of the "stop-gap" measures mentioned above still experienced excessive case loads.
As a result many of them turned to the intermediate appellate
court system as a more permanent and long lasting solution to
their court problems. There are currently 20 states which use
one form or another of the intermediate appellate court system.

w

Brown, Solutions for the Backlog of the Supreme Court of Colorado, 36 Univ. of Colo. L. Rev. 554 (1964).
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Approaches in Colorado. There is no reason to believe
that Colorado's current ra-Ee of population and economic growth
will diminish appreciably in the near future, rather it appears
that the converse is more likely. Consequently, a continued increase in new matters coming before the Supreme Court can be
anticipated. When the filing rate trend over the past several
years is projected into the future, it is estimated that the
number of cases filed annually will approach 700 by 1970 and will
be approximately 940 by 1980. By 1970 the backlog ·of cases in
the Supreme Court is estimated to be 1,168. By 1980 the backlog
will approach 3,792 cases. (See Table VII.) Thus, it is becoming more and more evident from the continuing increase in the
annual filing rate that additional steps are necessary to cope
with the backlog problem.
·
There have been several alternative solutions proposed
and considered by various study committees and groups to ease
the burden upon the court caused by the continued high filing
rate. The Committee on Appellate Courts also considered these
suggested proposals in an attempt to arrive at a workable solution to the problem. These alternative~ are: .(1) increase the
number of Supreme Court judges from seven to nine; (2) more extensive use of retired and outside judges; (3) some limitations
on the right of appeal; (4) a Supreme Court Commissioner plan,
such as the one used in Kentucky; (5) improvement in the internal efficiency of the court; (6} creation of a separate Criminal
Court of Appeals; and (7) the creation of an intermediate court
of appeals.
Increase in the Number of Supreme Court Justices
The 1959 Legislative Council Committee on Judicial Administration considered incre~§~ng the number of Supreme Court
judges from seven to nine •.;m/ It was felt that this increase
would allow the court to sit in three departments instead of two
(as at present), and thus increase the court's productivity.
The idea was rejected as a short-term means of providing assistance to the court, partially because it would have required· a
constitutional amendment. Consequently, it would have been at
least 1961, and possibly 1963, before the additional judges
could be appointed. In addition, the idea was opposed by some
on the grounds that the nine-member court would be cumbersome
and would so complicate administration and procedure that the
efficiency of the court would not be improved.
Even though this proposal was rejected as an immediate
method of assisting the court in 1Q59, the committee inc~uded a
Judicial Administration in Colorado, Colorado Legislative
Council, Research Publication No. 49, p. xi (Dec. 1960).

-31-

possible future increase in the number of Supreme Court judges
in its proposed constitutional amendment (Amendment No. 1, 1962)
to the judicial article. This amendment was adopted in 1962.
Section 5 of the judicial article (Article VI) in part provides
the following: "Upon request of the supreme court, the number
of justices may be increased to no more than nine members whenever two-thirds of the members of each house of the General Assembly concur therein." This provision was included as a possible solution to problems which might arise in the future from
increased case loads. To avoid any possibility or suggestion of
court packing on the part of the General Assembly, such increase
would be possible only if requested by the court itself.
It is argued on the one hand that increasing the number
of judges would preclude the necessity of creating an intermediate appellate court to handle the increased case load. On the
other hand, it is argued that a nine-member court would be too
unwieldy and would not increase the court's production appreciably, because·each member would be required to review the opinions of eight other justices instead of six as at present.
Consequently, the extra time involved in such a review might
offset or at least minimize the increase in the number of written opinions which might be expected from the addition of two
justices.
Only four states (Iowa, Oklahoma, Texas, and Washington)
currently have nine-member Supreme Courts; most states of Colorado's size have Supreme Courts with either five or seven members. None of these states, however, have a filing rate as
great as Colorado's.
Because of the constitutional provision, the possibility
of adding two justices cannot be considered by the General Assembly unless the court so requests. However, there appears to
be some resistence within the court to such an increase. This
resistance is based upon the proposition that an increase in the
size of the Court, while it would provide more judges to write
opinions, would also provoke more discussion, disagreement and
diversity within the court, thus causing a substantial reduction
in net gain of judicial time.
The only hope for a solution to the problem along these
lines is by an increase in the size of the court to nine members,
coupled with a practice of sitting in three-man departments. This
was the recommendation of the 1959 Legislative Council Committee
on Judicial Administration. Several states, including Colorado,
presently have their highest courts sitting in divisions. Generally, there are three judges to each division who make the decisions, but considerations by the whole bench are infrequently required. Proponents of this system claim it saves time and money
and is far less complicated than instituting an additional appe late level. Those who favor divisional sitting also point out
that under normal condi~ions each judge would not be required to
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make an investigation of all cases coming before the court, and
thus fewer judges would normally be required to participate.
The criticism of sitting in divisions or departments of
three has many facets. One obvious concern is the liklihood of
conflicting opinions from the different divisions. With the
court seated in divisions, there seems to be no single authoritative determiner of the law which would seem to make uniformity
of law impossible. Another criticism is the fact that all three
judges would probably have to concur in order to render a judgment. Thus, any dissent would require a reargument, with a consequent waste of judicial time. Another criticism is that there
is too much "luck of the draw'' involved in which judges sit on
which cases. If the divisions are permanent the result, in effect, could be two or three supreme courts. Finally, there is a
feeling that a Supreme Court should sit en bane as much as possible.
As indicated above, there are some advantages to an increase in the size of the court to nine members, provided that
it is coupled with a practice of sitting in three departments of
three judges each. For whatever reasons, however, the court has
not chosen to request an increase in the size of the court. For
this reason, and because it was felt by the committee that increasing the court to nine members would provide an excessive
and unwieldy number, this solution appeared to the committee to
be impractical and probably ineffective.
Use of Outside Judges to Assist the Supreme Court
The use of outside judges was first advocated by members
of the court in 1960 as a temporary expedient to reduce the number of pending cases. The Legislative Council Committee on Judicial Administration ultimately adopted this proposal as being
the best of several alternatives considered by it. It decided
that the immediate need to reduce the cases pending before the
Supreme Court outweighed the proposal's drawbacks. Thus in 1960,
the General Assembly appropriated $15,000 to the court to be expended to pay honorariums and expenses to judges assisting the
court. During 1960 and early 1961, outside judges accounted for
approximately 70 written opinions.
At the time the proposal was adopted there were some reservations expressed by some committee members and others. Opposition was based upon the following three reasons:
1) Opinions would be written by judges who did not participate in making the decision.
2) There was a possibility that a backlog could develop
in the courts of those district judges called up to assist the
Supreme Court.
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3) There was a question as to whether it was desirable
to have such a close relationship between active trial court
judges and the highest appellate court.
Because of these reservations the court was careful to
avoid the possibility of backlogs developing at the trial court
level by not inviting trial judges to assist the court unless
they could provide assistance without jeopardizing their own
dockets.
During 1967, four retired judges and four active district
judges were assigned to assist the court. These assignments resulted in 20 written opinions. This assistance was of considerable help to the court in achieving its record productivity in
1967.
It was noted by the committee that Chief Justice Moore
will retire the second Tuesday in January, 1969, and will be
available to assist the court after his retirement, if necessary. In addition to the assistance of Chief Justice Moore after retirement, it was noted that Justice Edward Day will also
soon retire and that his assistance could be anticipated. However, even with the assistance of Chief Justice Moore and Justice Day and other district court judges, it is anticipated that
the court still will not be able to keep up with the case load.
This program of using active district court judges and
retired Supreme Court judges was first adopted as a temporary
solution to the immediate backlog problem in 1960 and received
legislative approval on that basis. At present, the committee
agreed that the use of outside judges to assist the court is
simply not facing the problem. They are what their name implies,
a temporary expedient. The committee concluded that the need is
for a more permanent solution to the problems caused by the increased filing rate, which is no longer viewed as a temporary
condition. Any solution to the problem of appellate congestion
should look to a gradual phasing out of temporary solutions,
rather than an ~~5rease, as permanent solutions replace temporary expedients.~ ·Therefore, the committee concluded that the
visiting judges' program is not a satisfactory long term solution.
Pro tempore judge system. At the July 26, 1968 meeting,
the committee heard from Mr. William M. Lowry, Clerk of the Supreme Court of Washington, who explained to the committee the
operation of the pro tempore judge system in the state of Wash-

W
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ington. This system was created in 1962 when a constitutional
amendment was adopted and implemented by legislation in 1963
which empowered a majority of the regular members of the Supreme
Court to authorize judges or retired judges of courts of record
to serve temporarily in the Supreme Court. Under this system
the judge pro tempore has the same power and authority as a judge
of the Supreme Court, except he is not allowed to function on
opinions written by members of a department of the court of which
he was not a member, did not hear oral argument, or did not participate in departmental conference discussion of the case. Not
more than one judge pro tempore is to sit with a department at
any one time. A judge pro tempore writes opinions for the court
that have been assigned to him and when these opinions become
the opinion of the court they are published in regular fo:rrn, except that a reference symbol is placed after the name of the pro
tempore judge, directing att~qtion to the fact that he is serving as a judge pro tempore._g,
It was reported by Mr. Lowry that the pro tempore judge
system.was commenced in 1963 and that maximum use has been made
of it since 1965. While the additional manpower of the pro ternpore judge system has been eno:rrnously helpful, increasing the
number of decided cases by approximately 90 per year, it has not
been capable of stemming the growth of the backlog •. Mr. Lowry
reported that the average time required for the regufarjudges
to write an opinion is 12 days while the average time required
for a pro tempore judge is 8.4 days. One limitation on the use
of active judges is that they cannot hear appeals from their own
districts. With respect to cost, Mr. Lowry reported that it
averages out to a cost of $672.18 per case for the pro tempore
judges.
Mr. Lowry reported that three of the regular members of
the Supreme Court feel that the use of pro tempore judges results
in a looseness in the definition and clarification of issues.
More revisions of opinions are required for opinions wtitten by
pro tempore judges (3.03 percent) as compared with opinions written by regular judges (2.9 percent). In addition, Mr. Lowry reported that the Court Reporter has stated that the opinions of
the pro tempore judges are more difficult to h.ea~~<}te because
they usually lack experience in opinion writing.~
Limitations on the Right of Appeal
Changes in the prevailing method of appellate review, or
restrictions on the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, have

See note 36, infra, at p. 12.
Id., at p. 13
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also been suggested as methods for curtailing the number of
cases filed in the Colorado Supreme Court. There are two general methods of cutting down the input of appeals by restricting
the right of appeal. The first is by increasing the jurisdictional limits, or by making certain types of cases non-appealable. A system of permitting at least one appeal, however, is
deeply ingrained in the Colorado judicial system, as in the
American procedure generally. In almost no jurisdiction has it
been found acceptable to eliminate the right of appeal in certain types of cases.
It was also suggested that a monetary limit could be
placed on cases appealed to the Supreme Court. For example, it
could be provided that cases wherein the amount in controversy
was less than $20,000 are not appealable. It was felt, however,
that it is the issues of law in the case which are important and
not necessarily the dollar amount. A monetary limit on the
amount involved in an appeal not only would eliminate too few
appeals to make any great difference, but would probably eliminate the wrong ones. It is most unusual for a $2,500 case to be
appealed, unless there is an important legal question involved,
justifying consideration by the Supreme Court; a $25,000 case,
on the other hand, is likely to be appealed simply because of
the amount involved, irrespective of the importance of the questions involved.
The other way of eliminating appeals is by permitting discretionary review of at least certain types of cases, as in the
certiorari practice of the United States Supreme Court. The
term "certiorari" means a discretionary appellate proceeding for
review and re-examination of the action of an inferior court or
tribunal. Once again, however, the tradition has been to permit
at least one appeal as of right in practically every American
jurisdiction. Almost the only states having courts with certiorari powers are those which provide an appeal as of right to an
intermediate appellate court.
The committee, in its deliberations, has abided by what
seems to be an unvarying thesis: a litigant is entitled to at
least one appeal as a matter of right in every case. The thesis
that there should be nti limitation on the right to at least one
appeal in every case still persists. Therefore, the committee
ruled out serious consideration of devices designed to reduce
appellate congestion which would preclude in all or some instances one's absolute right to an appeal in every case.
Supreme Court Commissioner System
Several jurisdictions have commissioners to assist the
judges of their highest courts in the performance of their duties. A recent survey of the Institute of Judicial Administration indicates that eight states utilize commissioners in their
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highest courts, and Missouri has two commissioners in each of
its intennediate appellate courts. The duties relegated to these
commissioners vary vastly.l1/
In Michigan the commissioners are older and experienced
lawyers. Everything addressed to the Supreme Court, after being
docketed by the clerk, is assigned to one of the commissioners.
He studies the application for leave to appeal, the motion, or
whatever it is, and the briefs in opposition and prepares a
written report stating: (1) the subject: (2j the facts and proceedings below; and (3) the issues. The commissioner then analyzes the law of the case and concludes with a fonnal recommended
order. If it be a denial of the appeal, the reasons are brieflr
stated. If an appeal is granted, the order may limit the appea
to certain issues. Copies of the commissioner's report are
placed in the hands of each member of the court. If there is no
objection from any justice within a certain period of time the
chief justice signs the order. If any justice dissents or wants
to discuss the matter with his colleagues, he advises the commissioner's office and the matter is held. for the next conference
of the justices.~
In Kentucky the commissioners are elected by majority vote
of the justices of the Supreme Court. These commissioners are
lawyers who have had considerable legal experience and meet the
same qualifications as the regular members of the court. The
commissioners are given the same power as a regular justice, except the power to vote. The commissioners are directed to write
opinions for the court and these opinions, if approved by a majority vote of the Supreme Court, are adopted by the court as
their opinions. In addition, each District Court judge is designated as an ex-officio commissioner and can be called upon to
assist the court as a commissioner. For this service they are
paid an additional $2,400. The justices of the Supreme Court receive an annual salary of $26,000 and the commissioners are paid
a salary of $22,500.W
The Oklahoma
thorizing panels of
Bar Association, to
Several panels were
panels for advisory

Supreme Court, in 1964, adopted a rule authree attorneys, recommended by the Oklahoma
prepare advisory opinions for the court.
established and cases were assigned to the
opinions. Justice Pat Irwin of the Oklahoma

Special Report of the Committee on Judicial Administration
of the Maryland State Bar Association, 1 Md. App. Rep. XVIII
(1965-66).
A Report of the Judicial Council of Virginia to the General
Assembly and Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, 1966 and
1967, p. 15.
Minutes of Meeting, July 26, 1968, p. 2.
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Supreme Court reported to the committee that this system did not
prove to be ~uccessful and.the plan has now been abandoned._/
The main criticism of this plan or suggested solution is
that the use of commissioners or other outside help is not really
that beneficial to the court. Persons who are called to assist
the court are just not as precise and clear with respect to opinion writing as are the regular judges who are responsible for
their opinions and who are familiar with opinion writing techniques. The most important challenge which may be leveled at
this plan is that litigants are entitled to a decision in a case
made by judges, not by assistants of the court. If the court is
to be expanded by providing for additional personnel, there is
no reason why they should not be full fledged justices, rather
than a judge in fact but not in name. The same arguments militating against the addition of additional judges to the Supreme
Co~rt apply to the employment of commissioners.
Improvement of the Efficiency of the Supreme Court's Operations
Other solutions to the backlog problem have been proposed
in the past. These proposals are mainly concerned with improving the internal efficiency of the Colorado Supreme Court. The
committee, during i.ts deliberations 1 9ave consideration to several of these proposals, including \1) the use of memorandum
opinions, (2) doing away with oral _argument in some instances,
(3) not granting extensions of time. and (4) providing for more
assistants.
Memorandum oginions. There are two approaches to writing
an opinion •. One approach is tenned "result opinion writing,"
i.e., an opinion that merely decides the ca~e without setting
forth any reasons why the v.articular result was reached. The
second approach is t_ermed 'legal opinion writing," i.e.,. an approach that sets forth the legal reasoning behind a particular
result or decision.. In this approach, an opportunity is afforded
the bench to set down legal principles that will serve to guide
others in their actions.
The Supreme Court of Colorado tried to gain on the backlog
several years ago by not writing a full detailed opinion for
every case. In other words, some cases were disposed of by a
memorandum opinion which merely announced the decision of the
court without the statement of reasons therefor. However, this
procedure did not meet with the favor of the bar and has practically been discontinued. Nevertheless, the court began using the
memorandum opinion again in 1967.

Memorandum No. 5, Olclahoma Appellate Court System, p. 7
(July 25/, 1968) •
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The past court procedure of not utilizing the memorandum
opinion was criticized because, when one case is governed by a
prior decision, the extensive written opinion often adds nothing
to the body of law and sometimes proves detrimental to discovering the true rules of decision. In addition, it takes a great
deal of time, study and effort to prepare a full dressed, detailed opinion and/or to study an opinion submitted by another
judge. The time and effort expended in preparing an opinion by
the judge to whom it is assigned and consideration of the same
by the other judges are not always devoted to the results to be
obtained, but to the verbage employed and what should be and
should not be in the opinion.
It is argued that if no new legal issue is presented, and
only one or two decisive issues are presented, and the court is
of the view that the case should be either affirmed or reversed,
and a detailed opinion is not necessary to avoid errors on retrial if reversed, there is very little reason to promulgate a
detailed written opinion under such circumstances. For these
reasons, it is suggested that it would be-preferable for the
court merely to write a memorandum decision declaring that the
case is governed by a prior decision or the result that was
reached by the court when circumstances permit. This technique, it is hoped, will reduce the work of the court to some
degree.
The committee generally concluded that the Supreme Crurt
is already using the memorandum opinion or the per curiam system
wherever it thinks it possible to do so. At the present rate of
filing, even more extensive use of the memorandum opinion is not
likely to be effective in reducing substantially the backlog of
cases. Therefore, the committee determined that this method
could not be an effective long term solution. The committee also
noted that the Supreme Court has considered the practice of affirming the judgment of the trial court without written opinions
and decided not to implement the practice -because of various
policy reasons.
Less use of oral argument. It has been suggested.in the
past that the court abandon the practice of hearing oral argument, at least in some cases. The court now hears oral argument
in almost all cases. Pursuant to Rule 117 of the Colorado Rules
of Civil Procedure either party may request an oral argument or
the court may, of its own motion, order oral argument at any
time. Oral argument is limited to 30 minutes to a side unless
the court, by order, extends the time thereof. It is felt by
some that if the court did not hear oral argument in most cases
it could devote that time to the writing of opinions and other
duties. However, the hearing of oral argument is very important
and valuable to the individual judges and the court presently has
no inclination to abolish the practice~
·
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Extensi9ns of time. Th~ committee recognized that the
court has often been criticized for and accused of not accomplishing more work because of its liberal attitude toward the
granting of extensions of time within which to file briefs and
records •.. That the court could adopt a get tough attitude and
stop granting extensions is admitted; however, the committee
considerQd that one _should not forget the litigant in this matter and that th·e litigant should not be penalized because of the
delay of his attorney. Because of the present delay in the court,
there is no sound reason for not granting extensions of time as
it· would not aid the court in any event. It was noted that if
other things could be done to expedite the process of cases
through the_ courts, any problems with respect to the granting of
extensi·Qn.S·
... ,, wi-ll work itself out .
.

Use of more assistants. Some of the states authorize the
appointment of more than one assistant for the judges on their
appellate courts. For example, each judge of the California
Supreme Co~~~ employs two research attorneys and one research
assistant.2§/
.
It is believed by some that the employment of additional
law clerks for the judges of the Supreme Court would not bear appreciably on the workload of the judges. Assistants could not
help out in many of the time-consuming tasks such as reading
briefs, hearing arguments, and attending conferences.
Summary. The committee generally concluded that the present case load appears to be well beyond what even the most efficient court can reasonably be expected to handle with the present
number of personnel. To expect the present judges to write more
opinions appears to be unreasonable for the quality of judicial
opinions is more likely to be deficient when a judge is expected
to write more than the optimum number of opinions. The effect
of poor quality opinions is to produce uncertainty in the law.
This uncertainty has the effect of encouraging more appeals.W
Thus, even if there should be an increase in the internal operating efficiency of the court, it would not furnish a complete
solution to the existing problem.
A Separate Court of Criminal Appeals
The committee expressed some interest in the possible
creation of a separate Court of Criminal Appeals. The docket

Special Report of the Committee on Judicial Administration
of the Maryland State Bar Association, 1 Md. App. ·Rep. XVIII
(1965-66).
Minutes of Meeting, June 14, 1968, p. 8.
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analysis disclosed that 23 percent of the cases before the court
· were criminal cases. The total of all criminal, habeas corpus,
extradition, and juvenile cases amounts to approximately 2o percent of the total case load. For this reason, the suggestion
was made that the creation of a separate Court of Criminal Appeals, with jurisdiction to hear all criminal cases, would help
alleviate the backlog problem in the Colorado Supreme Court.
A Court of Criminal Appeals could be established by any
one of the following three alternative methods: 1) a Court of
Criminal Appeals with final jurisdiction; 2) an intermediate appellate Court of Criminal Appeals with further appeal to the Supreme Court; and 3) an increase in the size of the Supreme Court
and establishment of a Criminal Appeals Department.
Separate court of criminal ap~eals. Only Oklahoma has a
separate court of criminal appeals with final jurisdiction.
Thus, there is little precedent for dividing the appellate business between civil and criminal courts. In addition, the creation of such a court would require a con~titutional amendment.
In Oklahoma, appellate jurisdiction is divided between
two courts: the Supreme Court (nine members) has appellate jurisdiction in all civil cases at laws and equity; the Criminal
Court of Appeals (three members) has exclusive jurisdiction over
all criminal cases appealed from courts of record.iQ/ The Criminal Court of Appeals is composed of three judges elected for
six-year terms and who receive the same annual salary as Supreme
Court Justices ($22,500).~ The court may issue writs of habeea corpus and other writs as may be necessary to exercise its
jurisdiction. In addition, the court may pre·scribe its own rules,
and ascertain matters of fact upon affidavit or o~h~rwise as may
be necessary in the exercise of its jurisdiction.W
Until July 1, 1968, the Court of Criminal Appeals operated
with only three judges, each of whom is provided with one secretary. Commencing July 1, 1968, the court has employed one referee. It is the plan to utilize the referee to meet the deluge
of original proceedings, especially the petitions for issuance
of the writ of habeas corpus filed prose by inmates in one of
the penal institutions.
It is argued that the greatest single advantage found in
having a separate court for criminal appeals with exclusive jurisdiction in all criminal appeals lies in the relief provided

k a. on st. rt. 7, § •
20 Okla. Stat. Ann. § 31, § 285 (1962); Okla. Session Laws
1967, ch. 128; Senate Bill 351, 1968 Session.
20 Okla. Stat. Ann. §§ 41, 42 \1962).
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the Supreme Court. Notwithstanding the urgency attached to
criminal processes, there are many instances when civil matters
require the same urgent attention. The Oklahoma system, it is
argued, prevents any interference in this respect because the
Court of Criminal.~ppeals makes a final determination of all
criminal appeals.~
Intermediate appellate court of criminal appeals. Three
states, Texas, Tennessee, and Maryland, have created an intennediate appellate court with exclusive criminal jurisdiction. The
decisions of these courts are not final and are subject to further review, by certiorari or otherwise, by the Supreme Court in
that state.
Texas has two intermediate appellate courts, the Court of
Criminal Appeals and the Courts of Civil Appeals. The Court of
Criminal Appeals consists of three judges elected for six-year
te:rms. The current annual salary for the judges of the Court of
Criminal ~peals is the same as for Supreme Court justices,
$27,000.~ There are 14 separate Courts.of Criil Appeals, and
each court is composed of three judges elected for six-year terms
and who receive an annual salary of $24,000.~
The Constitution of Texas grants the Court of Criminal Appeals appellate jurisdiction over all criminal causes with the
proviso that exceptions and regulations may be prescribed by law.
The court and the judges have the power to issue writs of habeas
corpus and other writs necessary to enforce the court's jurisdiction. The court also has the power, by affidavit or oth~r1ise,
to ascertain matters of fact in cases pending before it.W'
Tennessee presently has a Supreme Court (five members),
and an intermediate Court of Appeals (nine members) which was
created in 1925. In addition, in 1967, the state established a
Court of Criminal Appeals, wbLch is an intermediate court with
criminal jurisdiction only.W The Court of Criminal Appeals is
composed of three.jqdges who, after 1968, will be elected for
eight-year terms.1§/ Salaries of judges of the Court of Criminal
Appeals are to be the same as the judges of the Court of Appeals,
$17,500.~

Letter from Vice Chief Justice Pat Irwin of the Oklahoma
Supreme Court ;to Colorado Legislative Council Committee on
Appellate Courts, dated July 16, 1968.
Vernon's Ann. Civ. St. Art. 1801 (1964); Texas Const. Art.
5, § 4.

Vernons Ann. Civ. St. Art. 1817 (1964).
Texas Const. Art. 5, § 5.
Public Acts of Tenn. 1967, ch. 226.
16 Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 442{ 443 (1956, Supp. 1967) •.
16 Tenn. Code Ann. § 445 1956, Supp. 1967); $20,000 as of
1970.
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The jurisdiction of the Court of Criminal Appeals is appellate only and extends to all criminal cases, both felony and
misdemeanor. The court also has jurisdiction over all cases
arising under any post conviction procedure statute and cases
involving or attacking the validity of a final conviction or
judgment in a criminal case. The court does not have jurisdiction of ony case in which the sole question for determination
involv£~ 1 the constitutionality of a statute or municipal ordinance.~ Before the court was created the Supreme Court heard
all criminal cases. Now, however, they go to the new intermediate Court of Criminal Appeals and to the Supreme Court on petition for writ of certiorari. During the first year of operation over 400 cases were filed in the new court. This has
created a heavy case problem and consider 2 t~on is now being
given to increasing the number of judges.W
In 1966, the Maryland legislature created an intei~ diate
court of appeals, known as the Court of Special Appeals.g7 By
these acts, the court's jurisdiction was prescribed to include,
inter alia, ( a) appeals of criminal convi_ctions where the death
sentence had not been imposed, and (b) applications for leave to
appeal under the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act, where
the sentence was other than death, and (c) applications for
leave to appeal from determinations and redeterminations of defective delinquency under the Maryland Defective Delinquent Act.
The court is composed of five judges, elected to serve a term of
15 years. They currently receive an annual salary of $27,500.
The concurrence of a majority of the entire court is necessary
for the decision of any cause and the c9~~t is not allowed to
sit in one or more panels or divisions.W
A similar proposal to create a three-man intermediate appellate court with criminal jurisdiction only was considered and
recommended in Oregon in 1966. The court was to have final jurisdiction subject to further appeal at the discretion of the~~/
preme Court. However, this recommendation was never adopted.~
Advantages and disadvantages of a court of criminal appeals. The number of criminal cases being appealed continues to
increase. The large number of crimes being committed will generate inevitably a greater number of criminal appeals. Often
groundless appeals are taken because an individual convicted of
a crime feels that he has nothing to lose by appealing. Also,
16 Tenn. Code Ann. § 448 (1956, Supp. 1967).
Letter from Mr. T. Mack Blackburn, Exec. Secretary to Supreme
Court of Tennessee, to Legislative Council, dated August 5,
1968.
.
Acts of Maryland 1966 1 ch. 11 and 12.
Md. Code Ann. 26-130 ~1957, Rep. Vol. 1966).
Minutes of Meeting, July 26, 1968, p. 25.
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counsel is provided by the state for a large percentage of all
criminal appellants. In addition, recent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States have contributed in large part
to the increasingly dominant role of criminal cases on the docket of the Supreme Court. Also, new trials often result from a
finding that such U.S. Supreme Court cases must be given retrospective application. All of these factors, it is believed, will
result in a continued increase in the number of criminal cases
before the Colorado Supreme Court.
It is claimed that the major advantage to the creation of
a separate court of criminal appeals, whether final or intermediate, is that it will greatly alleviate the burden on the Supreme Court. It is believed that it would be of material benefit
to the administration of justice to have an appellate court specializing primarily in criminal law. This area of law has been
developing in recent years as rapidly as any and probably more
rapidly than most. With the criminal law in a state of change,
it seems desirable to establish a court with expertise in this
critical area.
If it is desirable that the business of the Supreme Court
be divided between it and another court, whether final or intermediate, it is argued that the division between civil and criminal cases is as simple and convenient as any other. It is felt
that this division will avoid any conflicts of jurisdiction or
vague categorization of classes of cases.
The objections to the court of criminal appeals approach
have principally been along the line that judges should not be
specialists.· Another area of criticism of the idea, at least
the idea of having a court of criminal appeals with final jurisdiction, is that the decisions between the Supreme Court and the
Court of Criminal Appeals might conflict, and there would be no
method of resolving differences of opinion regarding, for example, the law of evidence. On the other hand, it is argued that
this is a criticism of little merit, because in different contexts the same question may well lead to different answers, and
there appears to be no reason why evidence which is admissible
for the purpose of a ci"vil trial may not be admissible for purposes of a criminal trial, and vice versa.
In any event, if a separate court of criminal appeals is
to be established, a decision has to be made whether the court
is to be intermediate or final. Arguments in favor of having a
court with final jurisdiction are that it would avoid double appeals and relieve the Supreme ~ourt of all responsibility for
hearing criminal cases. This approach is criticized because it
would create two Supreme Courts, one with civil and one with
criminal jurisdiction. It is felt that two courts with final
jurisdiction is undesirable •.
Advantages to an intermediate court of criminal appeals
are that it would relieve the Supreme Court of its criminal case
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load while at the same time avoiding the objections raised with
respect to the·establishment of a court with final jurisdiction.
This approach is criticized because it would probably lead to
double appeals in many instances. Because many litigants in
criminal cases have their appeals financed by the state, it is
presumed that virtually all of them will petition the Supreme
Court for review of any intermediate decision. For example, if
it is assumed that there would be 90 such petitions, and the Supreme Court deems one out of six worthy of its consideration,
there would be some 75 cases which the Supreme Court would have
to discuss, study, consider, and vote on, which would nevertheless be finally determined in the court of criminal appeals.
Thus, while there might be a considerable saving of judicial time,
there would, at the same time, be a considerable waste.
Increase size of Supreme Court and provide for criminal
tlpeals department. Consideration of the two foregoing alternave approaches suggested another alternative approach. Assuming that it is desirable that a court of criminal appeals have
final jurisdiction and to have it utilize the same facilities as
the Supreme Court, a question was raised as to why it is necessary to have a separate court at all. It was thus suggested
that perhaps the Supreme Court could be increased in number, with
the provision that three members of the court, on assignment by
the Chief Justice, sit as a Department of Criminal Appeals. It
is argued that this approach would achieve every advantage of a
separate court of criminal appeals without the necessity of an
actual separate court. This approach, however, would require a
constitutional amendment if the Supreme Court were increased to
more than nine members. Thus, if more than nine members were
necessary in order to establish the suggested plan, there would
be a delay of two or more years before the system could be operative. On the other hand, it is arguable whether the implementation of the plan with just nine members (thus obviating the
necessity for a constitutional amendment) would be effective in
reducing the case load.
The advantages to the approach are that a statutory
structure necessary to establish a new court would be eliminated
and it would not be necessary to establish new budgetary provisions, new administrative provisions, and new procedural provisions. Moreover, the objection of specialization could be
avoided by permitting the judges of the criminal department to
serve terms of one, two or three years, on a rotating basis, depending upon the preference of the individual judge and the needs
of the court as determined by the Chief Justice.
The primary objection to this proposal is that it will require a constitutional amendment if more than nine judges are
necessary. The problem of the backlog is an immediate problem.
The delay inherent in obtaining voter approval of a constitutional
amendment will create further delay in the court. Furthermore,
it is argued that more than nine judges will be too many for the
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Supreme Court. If an intermediate appellate court is eventually
established, the Supreme Court would be larger than nec;essary to
handle its case load.
Creation of Intermediate Appellate Court
l

As indicated previously, many states which have used some
of the methods discussed above for reducing court congestion have
eventually turned as well to the intermediate appellate court
system as a mo:re permanent and long lasting solution -to their
court problems. The creation of an intermediate court of appeals
on a temporary basis and/or on a permanent basis has_ also been
considered several times in the past as a solution to the Supreme
Court backlog problem in Colorado. Many are of.the opinion that
the creation of an intermediate court of'appeals would provide
the best solution to the appellate case load problem. Others feel
that the problems can be solved without creating another appellate court.
Prior courts of appeal in Colorado. An intermediate appellate. court has been established twice before in Colorado ·
(1891-1904 and 1911-1915) to assist the cou~t in disposing of a
large number of pending cases. On both occasions, the Court of
Appeals was created by statute.
·
Th_e Colorado Court of Appeal~ ( 1891-1904) was created by
Senate Bill 98, adopted at the 1891 legislative session. The
Court of Appeals was grante~ appellate jurisdiction· only. The
legislation provided for thre~ judges to be appointed by the Gov-_
ernor. The first appointment& were to be made for staggered
terms of two, four, and six years. Subsequent appointments were
to be made for six .. year terms. The appointed judges were to possess the same .qualifications required of Supreme Court judges and
they received an annual salary of $5,000.
·
The Court of Appeals was granted final jurisdiction to review the final judgments of-inferior courts in all civil cases
where the amount involved in the judgment, or in replevin, was
$2,500 or leSSi It also had -jurisdiction; not final, to review
all criminal cases, except capital criminal cases. This final
jurisdiction was subject ·to the limitation that it was not final
in cases where the controversy involved a franchise or freehold,
or where the construction of a provision of the constitution of
Colorado or the United States was necessary to a decision in the
case. Thus, no writ of error from, or appeal to, the Supreme
Court would lie to review the final judgment of any inferio~
court, unless the judgment exceeded $2,500, except when the matter in controversy related to a franchise or freehold or where
the construction of·a constitutional provision was involved. However, none of the foregoing limitations applied to writs of error
to county courts.
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Writs of error from, or appeals to, the Court of Appeals
to review final judgments were. to be made within the same time
and in the same manner as was provided by law for_such ~eviews by
the Supreme Court. The Court of Appeals was given authority sim-:.·
ilar to that of the Supreme Court to issue all necessary and proper
writs and other processes on causes within its jurisdiction. The
statute also provided that any cases pending before the Supreme
Court which were within the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals
could, by order of the Supreme Court, be transferred to the Court
of Appeals for determination. Every final judgment of the Court
of Appeals, in cases which could have been taken to the Supreme.
Court in the first instance, could be appealed to the Supreme
Court. Cases filed in the Court of Appeals which were not within
the final jurisdiction thereof could, before decision, be transferred to the Supreme Court upon motion of any party.
The Court of Appeals was a court of record and its opinions
were to be delivered as required by the Supreme Court and published
in a like manner. That the Court of Appeals did a vast amount of
work was shown in the 20 volumes of its reports. However, the
existence of two appellate courts apparently created a certain degree of friction, so that in 1904 the Court of Appeals was abol- ·
ished and a constitutional amendment was adopted increasing the
number of Supreme Court judges from three to seven and terms from
nine to ten years.
In 1911, the Colorado General Assembly again created an intermediate court of appeals by the adoption of Senate Bill No.
351, 1911 session. This court was created for a four-year period.
The courl was composed of five judqes. not more than three of whom
could belong to the same political-party. These judges were to
·
have the same qualifications and were to receive the same salary
as Supreme Court judges. The judges where to be appointed by the
Governor, with the approval of the Senate, to serve during the
existence of the court.
The Court of Appeals was given the jurisdiction to review
and determine all judgments in civil cases pending before the Supreme Court and all cases that could thereafter and during the
life of the Court of Appeals be taken to the Supreme Court for
review, except in those cases from county courts on writs of error. The legislation provided that the Supreme Court should
transfer to the Court of Appeals, for hearing and determination,
as many civil causes, then or thereafter pending before the Supreme Court, as it deemed advisable. All jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court on appeal was repealed.
The decision of the Court of Appeals in all such cases was
final and conclusive, except in causes wherein the decision necessarily involved the construction of a provision of the Colorado
or United States constitution, or related to a franchise or freehold, or involved a judgment for more than $5,000. Such cases
could be reheard in the Supreme Court by writ of error from the
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Court of Appeals. Or if, before any hearing in any case, either
party thereto advised the Court of Appeals that the case belonged
to one of the classes of cases above, and if the court upon investigation so found, it was at once and without further proceedings remanded to the Supreme Court for determination.
The Court of Appeals was given the power to issue all necessary and proper writs and processes in aid of its jurisdiction,
in the same manner and with the same effect as the Supreme Court.
The court was created as a court of record and its opinions were
required to be published in the same manner as were the opinions
of the Supreme Court. However, the preparation of written opinions giving reasons for the conclusion reached, especially in the
affirmance of judgments, was discretionary, anq the court could·
at its option dispense therewith in such cases as it desired.
The statute provided that the Court of Appeals would terminate and cease to exist at the end of four years from the taking effect of the act. The General Assembly did not re-enact the
statute in 1915 at the expiration of the four-year period and
Colorado has not had an intermediate court of appeals since that
time.
Possibility of intermediate court in Colorado. As indicated before, many feel that the creation of a permanent intermediate appellate court is the best long-run solution to Colorado's
backlog problem. If an intermediate court of appeals were to be
of immediate help to the court, it.would have to be provided for
by statute rather than by the more time-consuming process of constitutional amendment. One possible disadvantage of creating
this court by statute is that its jurisdiction might be limited
by the provisions of the judicial article concerning appeals.
These limitations would probably require the Supreme Court to review certain decisions made by the intermediate appellate court
or at least consider their review on writ of certiorari. At·
least the question has been raised as to whether the new judicial
article permits the creation of an intermediate appellate court
whose decisions would be final unless the Supreme Court granted a
writ of certiorari. Unless cases could be terminated at the intermediate appellate level, the addition of such a court would
probably only add to the problem; the cost involved and the complications arising out of double appellate review might offset
the advantages to be gained from having two appeals courts.
Article VI, Section 2 (2) of the judicial article provides
the following:
(2) Appellate review by the supreme court of
every final judgment of the district courts,
the probate court of the city and county of
Denver, and the juvenile court of the city and
county of Denver shall be allowed, and the
supreme court shall have such other appellate
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review as may be provided by law. There shall
be no appellate review by the district court
of any final judgment of the probate court of
the city and county of Denver or of the juvenile court of the city and county of Denver •.
It has been the opinion of some that the above section
makes it mandatory for the Supreme Court to allow all appeals
from district court and from the Denver juvenile and probate
courts. Therefore, an intermediate court would be of little
value because all of its decisions could be appealed as a matter
of right to the Supreme Court. Others have been of the opinion
that the section can be interpreted in such a way that Supreme
Court review to determine whether a case should be heard by the
court on a writ of certiorari would be sufficient to satisfy the
appellate review provision. If this is the case, it would be
possible to establish an intermediate Court of Appeals with
specific statutory jurisdiction. Cases falling within the jurisdiction of the intermediate court could be taken up to the Supreme Court on a writ of certiorari. Cases falling outside of
the statutory jurisdiction given the intermediate appellate
court would go from the trial court to the Supreme Court on appeal as a matter of right.
Assuming that the creation of an intermediate appellate
court is feasible, many problems arise as to the court's structure, composition and jurisdiction. It has been suggested that
an intermediate appellate court would not be effective unless
there were at least two divisions of three judges each,with these
divisions established geographically so that they would in effect
be circuit courts of appeal. Indeed, most of the states which
utilize an intermediate appellate court system-have either (1) a
single court with several divisions thereof,each division serving a different region of the state, or (2) several district
courts of appeal, each district serving a different region of the
state. It is• felt by some that an intermediate appellate court
with only one division -- even one with more than three judges -would very rapidly build up a backlog. of pending cases, so that
the problem would merely be transferred from one appellate level
to the other.
Arguments for and against intermediate court system.
Those who favor an intermediate court maintain that its creation
has dramatically reduced the case load at the highest appellate
level in most states, and has thus enabled the highest appellate
court to take more time to deliberate cases and in this way has
improved the complexion of appellate jurisdiction overall.
Others, in favor of the system, emphasize that the intermedi·ate
appellate system increases the capacity of the court system to
accommodate-more litigants. Defenders of the srstem suggest, as
well, that the intermediate court's main virtue s its flexibility
in organization which allows it to counter excessive case loads
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in many different areasdepending_on the area most burdened.W
.

·,

;

Opponents of ·the system disagree that the advantages of
an intermediate system outweigh its disadvantages and suggest
that separation of ·appellate Jurisdic:tion breeds confusion in
rules and procedure and makes uniformity impossible. Those who
are against the system maintain that adding an inferior appellate
structure decreases the quality of the state's appellate judiciary
and weakens the re_spectabili ty ·. of precedent law. Others in opposition argue that an intermedia·te appellate system encourages
double appeals •. Still others are in opposition to_tl\e plan because of the expense to establish and maintain it.2.2/
Intermediate courts in o her ·urisdictions. A summary of
the organizat on, power, and jur sd ction oft e intermediate
appellate courts in the 20 states which have such a court is contained in the next ~ectipn of this report.
Questionnai-re to Dis.trict and County Court Judges
At the June 14, 1968 meeting, the committee directed that

a questionnaire be !;ent to district and county court judges in an

attempt to solicit comments and suggestions on various methods to
alleviate the backlog problem. The judges were.asked to answer
specific que~tions -· Qn the questionnaire and these replies were
compiled by the staff. (See Appendix B for copy of questionnaire.)
Forty-severi·of 70 dj,,stric:t judges and 42 of 94 county judges completed the question~ai;re~ _The. compilation. of ·these replies, in
relation to the spec.ific questions·. asked, follows:

1.

D.o you think that more extensive use of outside
and retired judges would aid the Supreme Court
in its attempt ·to reduce-the current. backlog of
cases? : _ · · ··
District jud9es
Yes
No

County judges

. ·. 20

18
23

···24

w

Intermediate Appellate Coµrts, American Judicature Society,
Report No. 20, p. 9 (Aug. l967).
a§/ ill.q.
'
e
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2.

Do you think that increasing the number of
judges in the Supreme Court from seven to
nine would be effective in reducing the
backlog?
District judges

3.

Yes

14

No

30

18

21

Do you think that an enlarged court. with
possibly 12 judges. sitting in separate criminal and civil divisions. would alleviate the
backlog problem?
District judges
Yes
No

4.

21
22

18

Do you think that the prevailing method of
appellate review should be changed, such as by
limiting the right of appeal or by changing
the method from writ of error to writ of certiorari?
County judges

Yes

15

12

No

27

23

Do you think that an intermediate appellate
court between the trial courts and the Supreme
Court should be established?
District judges
Yes
No

6.

County judges
17

District judges

5.

County judges

County judges
32

33
11

10

Assuming that an intermediate court of appeals
is established, do you think the intermediate
court should be (1) one court with jurisdiction
coextensive with the entire state, l2) one
court with several separate divisions. each division having jurisdiction over a particular
geographical region of the state, or (3) two
or more se~arate courts of appeal, each court
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having jurisdiction over a particular district

of the state?

t~l
7.

District judges

Counti judges

21
10

13
11

4

5

Assuming that an intermediate appellate court
is established, do you think that county court
appeals should go (1) to the intermediate
court or (2) continue to go to the district
courts?
District judges

11

8

33

8.

County judges
27

Assuming that an intermediate appellate court
is established, do you think that it should be
granted jurisdiction to review administrative
decisions (workmen's compensation, unemployment
compensation, Public Utilities orders and decisions, etc.) rather than having the district
courts review such decisions?
District Judges
Yes
No

17

County Judges

14
12

24

Summary. It appears that most of those who replied to the
questionnaire favor the establishment of an intermediate appellate court as the best solution to the Supreme Court backlog
problem. A majority of those responding apparently thought that
none of the first four proposed solutions {the first four questions) was the best answer or solution. Questions six through
eight relate to specific problems involved in the establishment
of an intermediate court. The majority of those responding to
question six believed that the intermediate court should be one
court with jurisdiction coextensive with the state. Question
seven demonstrates that the majority believe that county court
appeals should continue to go to the district courts rather· than
the intermediate court, should one be established. Question
eight shows that there is a split of opinion by those responding
as to whether administrative review cases should go to the intermediate court or the district courts, should an intermediate
court be established.
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INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURTS
IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
Twenty states (and the federal government) now have tribunals or intermediate appellate courts betwf~en the trial courts
and the court of last resort. These states are as follows:
Alabama
Arizona
California
Florida
Georgia

Illinois
Indiana
Louisiana
Maryland
Michigan

Missouri
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina

Ohio
Oklahoma
Pennsylvania
Tennessee
Texas

The jurisdiction of these intermediate bodies is primarily
appellate. Some have no original jurisdiction whatsoever; others
have limited original jurisdiction. These intermediate courts
purportedly serve two main purposes. They relieve the state
pUpreme court of its caseload, while at the same time giving litigants at least one appeal, and they.provide for specific disposition of appeals in certain classes of cases.
The constitutions of eight of these states provide for an
intermediate court. In Illinois, the creation of such courts is
discretionary. The legislatures of Alabama, Indiana, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee have established intermediate courts under
general powers to create additional tribunals. Three states have
abandoned the plan -- Colorado (1915), Kansas (1901) and Kentucky
( 1894) •
Court Structure
Intermediate appellate courts are of two organizational
types: a central court serving the entire state, or a regional
system with a number of courts, each covering a judicial district. The first form is in operation in Alabama, Arizona, Georgia, Indiana, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, New Mexico, North
Carolina, Oklahoma, and Pennsylvania. Regional courts are used
in California, Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, Missouri, New York,
Ohio, Tennessee, and Texas. Table I outlines the structure of
these courts.
The number of judges in states having one central body
ranges from three (Alabama and Oklahoma) to twelve (New Jersey).
Judges are elected in all but one of these eleven states, with
terms varying from four to fifteen years. In New Jersey, the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court assigns Superior Court judges
to the Appellate Division for a one-year period. New Jersey's
Appellate Division may be, and has been, enlarged by· the addition of parts corresponding to divisions.
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TABLE XVI
ORGANIZATION OF INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURTS

I

Method of
Selection

Number of
Judges

Term
(years)

Alabama

3

6

Elected

$19,500

One central body.

Arizona

6

6

Elected

$22.500

One court -- two ·divisions of thrn judges
each. Division 1 at Phoenix and Division
2 at Tucson.

Georgia

9

6

Elected

$26.500

One court -- three divisions of three judges
each. All divisions located at Atlanta.

Indiana

8

4

Elected -- four
judges each from
two districts.

$22.500

One court -- two divisions of four judges
each. Both divisions located at Indianapolis.

Maryland

5

15

Elected

$27.500

One central body.
only.

Michigan

9

6

Elected

$32.500

One court-· three divisions of three judges
each. Divisions located at Detroit, Lansing. and Grand Rapids.

New Jersey

12

l

Supreior court
judges are assigned to appellate division by
chief justice

$27.000

One court -- separate divisions established
as necessary. Four divisions in 1967. Are
appellate divisions of superior courts.
Located at Trenton and Newark.

New Mexico

4

8

Elected

$19.500

One court.

North Carolina

6

8

Elected

$24.000

One court. Located at Raleigh.
have 9 judges by 1969.

Oklahoma

6

6

Elected

$22,500

One court -- two divisions of three judges
each in Tulsa and Oklahoma City.

Pennsylvania

7

10

Elected

$35.500

One court -- sits at three different districts at different times of year.

Central
Court

Salaries

JI

i:,,.
I

Type of Court
Located in Montgomery.

Criminal jurisdiction

Located at Santa Fe.
Court to

Regional
Court

California

I

(JI

V'

Number of
Judges

Term
(years)

39

12

Method of
Selection

Nominated by governor. Approved
by a committee on
qualifications.
Run for re-election upon record,

Salaries

Type of Court

$30,000

Five appellate districts, with four
divisions in first district. five
divisions in second district, two
divisions in fourth district, and
one division in each of the third
and fifth districts. Each division
has three judges each.

Amended
to -$36,216

(Sept.

1, 1968)

Florida

18

6

Elected

$28,000

Four appellate districts, each with
a District Court of Appeal. Five
judges in three districts and four
judges in one district.

Illinois

24

10

Elected

$35,000

Five judicial districts, each with an
appellate court. There are four di•
visions in the first district, with
three judges in each division, and one
division in each of the other four
districts, with three· judges to a. di·
vision.

Louisiana

22

12

Elected

$24,000

Four appellate circuits, each with a·
Court of Appeals. Six judges in First
Circuit, three judges in Second Cir•
cult, five judges in Third Circuit,
and eight judges in Fourth Circuit.

9

12

Appointed by gov- $25,000
er nor from list
submitted by nominating commission.
Run for re-election
upon record.

Missouri

Three courts, one in each of three
districts. Three judges each.

\

Method of
Selection

Number of
Judges

Term
(years)

New York

26

5

Appointed by governor from among
judges of supreme
court.

$33,500
to
$40,000

Appellate divisions in each of four
judicial departments of state. Seven
judges in two departments, five judges
in other two. Additional judges may
be assigned. Appellate terms may be
established in first and second department.

Ohio

34

6

Elected

$27,000

Separate court of appeals in each of
ten judicial districts. Eight districts have three judges, two districts
have six and four judges respectively.

9

8

Elected

$20,000

Court of Appeals.

3

8

Elected

$20,000

Court of Criminal Appeals.

Regional
Court

Tennessee
I

(JI

Salaries

Q\
I

Type of Court

Two separate intermediate appellate
courts. Court of Appeals sits in
three divisions of three judges each.
Court of Criminal Appeals is one court.
Texas

42

6

Elected

$24,000

Court of Civil Appeals.

3

6

Elected

$27,000

Court of Criminal Appeals.
Two separate intermediate appellate
courts. There are fourteen separate
judicial districts, each with a Court
of Civil Appeals composed of three
judges. Court of Criminal Appeals is
one court.

Source:

Council of State Governments, Sat Curt S stems Revised 1968; "Judicial Salaries in Major Trial
and Appellate Courts," 51 J. Amer. Jud. Soc. 240, 241
uly 968 ; Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory,
Vol. V; Constitutions and Statutes of the various states.

The nine jurisdictions having regional courts present a
variety of forms. The number of separate intermediate courts
ranges from a low of three (Missouri) to a high of fourteen
(Texas). In addition, New York authorizes appellate terms of the
trial court (Supreme Court), Illinois permits creation of branch
appellate courts, and divisions in Missouri may be created by
having pro tempore judges sit with one or more regular judges.
The number of judges on the intermediate courts of these nine
states is as high as 42 (Texas with 14 courts). Usually there
are three judges for each court or division thereof.
In New Jersey and New York, judges of the intermediate
appellate courts are appointed by the Chief Justice and Governor,
respectively, from among the judges of the trial court. In California and Missouri, judges are appointed or nominated by the
Governor and approved by a commission and run for re-election on
their record. The other states elect their judges, either on a
district basis or on a state-wide basis.
Each court or division usually has a presiding judge designated variously as Presiding Judge, Chief Judge, Chief Justice,
Presiding Justice or President. Presiding judges are generally
selected by the court or division thereof. The office rotates in
Indiana. The Governor of New York designates the presiding justice in each department and he acts as such during his time in
office. In Ohio, the chief justice for all ten Courts of Appeals
is chosen annually by the membership of the court. Tennessee has
a presiding judge for the whole court as well as for each division.
Most of the larger states use regional courts -- California, Illinois, New York, Ohio, and Texas; howevef, Florida,
Louisiana, Missouri, and Tennessee also have regional courts.
Michigan and Pennsylvania, both with large populations, utilize
a central court. All of these variations are designed to meet
the particular needs of each state.
A state's size and location may make one appellate system
more preferable for one jusisdiction than for another. Since
New Jersey is a small Eastern Coast state, for example, a statewide central court system is easily adaptable to its needs without inconveniencing its lawyers who must travel to Trenton to try
their cases. California, on the other hand, because of its size,
has found it impossible to establish the same type of appellate
system, preferring to set its courts in several convenient geographic locations throughout the state.
Expense -- Salaries
The most obvious direct cost of an intermediate appellate
court is the salaries and expenses of the judges and staff. Salaries of intermediate appellate court judges in 1968 ranged from
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a high of $40,000 in New York to a low of $16 1 500 in Oklahoma~
with $26.500 approximately the median state salary. Intermediate
court judges usually receive from $1,000 -- $3,000 less in salary
than do justices of the highest court.
Double Appeals - Jurisdiction
Finality of decision is one of the most vital problems in
a court system having an intermediate appellate court. A balance
should be maintained between limiting review in order to curtail
double appealsj while at the same time giving the highest court
enough authority to assure uniformity of decision and granting
review by the highest court on questions of general interest and
importance. It appears that in the twenty states surveyed there
is a tendency toward giving finality to the intermediate courts
in increasing classes of cases.
The state-by-state survey indicates the broad division of
appeals assigned to the supreme court and to the intermediate
court and the method used in each state for granting double review. Appellate jurisdiction of intermediate courts in some of
the states is residual, after specific grants of appeals to the
supreme court. In the other states, the classes of cases appealable to the intermediate court are specifically set forth by
constitution or statute.
Direct appeal to the supreme court, by-passing the intermediate body, is generally to be had in criminal causes, especially capital cases and felonies, and those cases involving a. ·
constitutional question. Other direct appeals as of right to the·
highest court are not uniform from state to state and include:
all equity cases; land title or homestead cases; revenue matters;
condemnation proceedings; divorce or alimony; probate or matters
concerning wills; election contests or right to public office;
annexation and zoning; workmen's compensation; public utilities
decisions and orders; quiet title actions; etc.· Some states
grant direct appeal only to the highest court in workmen's compensation cases (New Jersey), while others vest appellate jurisdiction in this class of cases in both the intermediate and
highest appellate courts. In New Mexico and North Carolina, appeal as of right lies to the intermediate court to review decisions of workmen's compensation cases. In New Mexico, the Supreme
Court may review by certiorari the decision of the intermediate
court in a workmen's compensation case, but in North Carolina no
appeal from the decision of the court is allowed to the Supr~me
Court. In Arizona, Florida, and Pennsylvania, the intermediate
court has jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari to review
awards of workmen's compensation.
Some states place a monetary limit on civil appeals. For
example, in Alabama the intermediate court has final appellate
Jurisdiction of all suits at law where the amount involved does
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not exceed $1,000. For there to be jurisdiction in the intermediate courts of Indiana and Louisiana the amount in controversy
must exceed $50 and $100 respectively.· In Missouri, the intermediate court has appellate jurisdiction in civil causes where
the amount involved is less than- $7,500. If the amount involved
is over $7,500 the highest court has sole appellate jurisdiction.
Appeals from the intermediate court to the highest court
may be taken either as a matter of right or by leave. Another
pronounced tendency has been to cut down appeal as of right and
to provide some form of discretionary review, usually by supreme
court certiorari or intermediate court certification or both.
Some states either allow or require review by the highest court
on the basis of some objective standard in addition to discretionary review. These criteria include conflict with a prior
decision, lack of unanimity in the intermediate court, and reversal or modification of the trial court.
Most of the intermediate courts in addition to the highest
appellate courts, have power and authority to issue various writs.
In Ohio the intermediate court has original jurisdiction in issuing writs of mandamus, habeas corpus, prohibition and quo warranto. In Pennsylvania, the intermediate court has no original
jurisdiction except when issuing writs of habeas corpus. Besides these variations, grounds for judicial decisions often differ. Certain intermediate courts, for instance, have jurisdiction .to decide appeals on the grounds of facts as well as law as
in the case of Louisiana's intermediate court. In California,
however, the intermediate court must decide questions only on the
basis of law.
Divergency of Rules of Law
Conflicting interpretations among courts in states with
one central intermediate body may not present too many problems.
However, the possibility of conflicting decisions exists in regional intermediate court systems. This possibility is enhanced
when there are as many as nine or fourteen such courts. In all
of the states having regional intermediate courts, some provision
is made for discretionary review by the highest tribunal. This
serves as a means of maintaining uniformity of jurisprudence. In
addition, the intermediate court in some jurisdictions has the
power to certify cases to the supreme court because of conflict
with prior decisions.
Jurisdiction of Intermediate Appellate Courts
Jurisdictional delineation between the intermediate and
highest courts is as varied as the number of states with intermediate courts. Summaries of the major provisions for each state
are included in Appendix A.
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_/

States Currently Consideri09 Establishment of Intermediate Appellate Cour_i
In addition to the 20 states which currently have an intermediate appellate court, there are three states wi Uf 'Supreme
Court filings and backlog problems somewhat similar to Colorado's which are considering the creation of an inte!~~diate appellate court: Minnesota, Oregon, and Washington.a7./ At-the
July 26, 1968 meeting, the committee consulted with Mr. William
M. Lowry, Clerk of the Supreme Court of Washington, and Justice
Ralph Mo Holman, Justice of the Supreme Court of Oregon, who
reported on their respective state appellate court systems, problems, and proposed solutions.
In Washington, there is currently a proposed constitutional amendment providing for the creation of a court of appeals.
This constitutional amendment is to be submitted to the voters in
November. The implementing legislation has been drafted and
there is an extensive campaign being conducted to obtain passage
of the amendment. In Oregon, a proposed bill to create an intermediate court of appeals is to be introduced in the 1969 legislative session. This bill apparently has the support of most
interested groups or bodies in the state.2.§./

Memorandum from State Court Administrator, July 8, 1968, p.
11.
Minutes of Meeting, July 26, 1968, pp. 14, 25.
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COLORADO SUPREME COURT PROPOSAL FOR
AN INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
On July 26, 1968, the committee requested that the Colorado Supreme Court present to the committee its proposed solutions to the backlog problem. The committee determined that
since this study uniquely involves the Supreme Court it should
be given an opportunity to present any recommendations it may
have with regard to proposed solutions and alternatives. Pursuant to this request, the Supreme Court submitted its report
and recommendation~ to the committee on August 30, 1968. The
~eport sets forth a proposal for the creation of an int~rmediate appellate court to meet the ever growing appellate backlog
~n Colorado. This proposal was approved in principle
the
Colorado Supreme Court, sitting en bane, on August 15, 968.

br

The report by the Colorado Supreme Court discusses two
different ways in which an intermediate court might be organized
and function. These two proposals, as recommended by the Supreme
Court, are set forth below exactly as they appear in the report,
except for the renumbering of pages, figures, and footnotes.
Plan A:

Organization and Jurisdiction

Organization
The intermediate court of appeals would comprise three
circuits of three judges each. The boundaries of the three circuits are shown in Figure B. Because 71 percent of all Supreme
Court appeals (1966-67) are filed from the Denver metropolitan
area (including Boulder)f caseloads can be equalized among circuits most easily by: lJ dividing Denver between two circuits;
and 2) dividing the Denver metropolitan area among all three.
As can be seen from Figure B, one-half of Denver and the
1st District would be combined with the 1st Circuit: the other
half of Denver plus the 17th District (Adams) and the 20th District (Boulderf would comprise the 2nd Circuit, with the addition
of the 8th District (Larimer). The remaining judicial districts,
including the 18th (Arapahoe) would comprise the 3rd Circuit.
It is necessary to divide Denver, because 44 percent of
all Supreme Court appeals originate in the Denver Courts. The
division of Denver could be accomplished in t~e enabling legislation by providing that appeals originating from Divisions 1,
3, 5, 7, and 13 of the Denver District Court and from the Denver
Superior Court will lie to the 1st Circuit, and appeals from Divisions 2, 4, 6, 8, and 12 of the Denver District Court and from
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PROPOSED INTERMEDIATE COURT CIRCUITS _
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the Denver Probate and Juvenile Courts shall lie to the 2nd Circuit, except as otherwise provided.~
Court Location. Two of the three circuits would headquarter in Denver, and the 3rd Circuit would headquarter in Colorado Springs. Each circuit, however, would be permitted to sit
anywhere within its boundaries. Although the statute should not
be specific, it would appear logical for each circuit to restrict
where it sits as follows:
·
1st Circuit: Denver, Grand Junction, Durango, and (possibly Glenwood Springs and Steamboat Springs)
2nd Circuit:

Denver, Brighton, Boulder, and Fort Collins

3rd Circuit: Colorado Springs, Pueblo, Littleton, Greeley,
and (possibly Alamosa)
Jud es and Other Personnel. The nine judges of the intermediat~"7ourt three in each circuit) should have eight year
terms.filu' The salary for intermediate court judges should be
halfway between that of Supreme Court justices and district court
judges. The presiding judge of each circuit would be appointed
by the Chief Justice and exercise authority in the same way as is
provided for judicial district chief judges in Article VI, Section 5 (4) of the Colorado Constitution.
Probably there should be a provision that no more than two
of the three judges appointed in each of the 1st and 2nd Circuits
should be from the Denver metropolitan area.
One clerk's office could serve the 1st and 2nd Circuits,
with a smaller office serving the 3rd Circuit because its headquarters would be in a different location.
Facilities. If this proposal is adopted, inquiry should
be made as to the possibility of housing the 3rd Circuit in the
new court building in Colorado Springs, which may be completed
about the time the intermediate court would be created.
While the two intermediate circuits headquartering in
Denver might be able to use the Supreme Court chambers for oral
argument under the best and most efficient scheduling conditions,

The divisions of the Denver District Court enumerated above
are the ones handling civil and domestic relations cases.
Criminal appeals under this proposal would lie directly to
the Supreme Court.
After initial appointment and two years' service before referral to the voters on a non-competitive ballot at the
next following general election, which would be 1974.
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there is no available space in the Capitol for offices for the
six judges and their law clerks and secretaries, nor is there any
apparent space available for the clerk's office. This problem .
(along with the other space needs of the Supreme Court and its
various adjuncts) suggests that immediate legislative attention
should be given to the construction of a separate judicial building and for temporary quarters during the construction period.
Jurisdiction
Supreme Court. All criminal cases, except those brought
on judgments of the county court, and all habeas corpus cases
arising out of criminal actions would be filed directly in the
Supreme Court. In addition, Supreme Court jurisdiction would include: 1) all original proceedings; 2) all cases attacking the. .
constitutionality of a statute or an ordinance; 3) all P.U.C. cases;
and 4) all water cases involving priorities and ajudications.
Any case which results in a different or conflicting opinion from that rendered by another circuit- in a similar matter
would be heard automatically by the Supreme Court. The Supreme
Court would also have the authority to raise any case from an intermediate circuit court prior to decision by that court, either
on the Supreme Court's own motion or upon petition of an intermediate circuit court. The losing party in any case before an
intermediate circuit court could petition the Supreme Court for
a writ of certiorari.
Intermediate Court. The intermediate circuit courts
would have appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments in
civil, juvenile, probate, and mental health cases, except as restricted above. In addition, the intermediate circuit courts
would have jurisdiction 9y~r all appeals from county courts,
both civil and criminal.2.!I
.
Appeals from Industrial Corl'lmission decisions in workmen's
compensation and unemployment compensation cases would also lie
to the intermediate court, bypassing district court review. All
other agency review cases would continue to be taken to the district court, with appeal lying to the intermediate court, except
in P.U.C. cases (as already indicated). The intermediate court
would have no original jurisdiction.
Additional Provisions.
authority:

The Supreme Court would have the

1) to transfer to the intermediate court any case within
the intermediate court's jurisdiction, even if filed in the Supreme Court; and

ID'

The district courts and the Superior Court of the City and
County of Denver would no longer have appellate jurisdiction.
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2) to transfer cases among circuits to equalize caseload,
regardless of circuit boundaries.

These provisions would provide considerable flexibility
in the handling of appellate cases. Further. it would eliminate
the necessity of refiling an appellate case if docketed in the
wrong c2~ 7t initially, nor would a case be dismissed for this
reason.g
It would also be possible for the Supreme Court to transfer to the intermediate court appropriate cases already filed in
the Supreme Court prior to the creation of the intermediate court.
This procedure would provide an immediate workload for the intermediate court and greatly assist in the reduction of the backlog.
Type of Opinions. The intermediate court should write
brief memorandum opinions of two of three pages in all cases
where possible. In those instances where longer opinions are required, their publication could be determined perhaps by a committee composed of the three presiding judges of the tD\ermediate
circuit court and three members of the Supreme Court.W'
Plan A:

Estimated Caseloads

Supreme Court
As of January 1, 1970, it is estimated that the annual
filing rate in the Colorado Supreme Court will be approximately
680 cases. The estimated backlog as of that date will be 950
case~, of which approximately 50 percent, or 475 will be at issue. Approximately 85 percent, or 400, of the cases at issue
will be civil.
Total Appellate Filings
Assuming that: 1) county court appeals will be taken to
the intermediate court; and 2} initial judicial review of workmen's compensation and unemployment compensation cases will be
in the intermediate court, the total estimated appellate cases
which will be filed in 1970 is 1,000, broken down as follows:

In this connection, there should also be a provision that
any case filed in an intermediate court which should have
been filed in the Supreme Court would automatically be
transferred ·to the Supreme Court.
As an alternative, all regular full-length opinions could
be published - either separately or as part of Colorado Reports.
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Supreme Court

680

County Court Appeals

220

Workmen's Compensation and

Unemployment Compensation

100
1,ooo

Division Between Supreme Court and
Intermediate Circuit Courts
Supreme Court. Of these 1,000 cases, approximately 350
will be in the Supreme Court:
All criminal and habeas corpus arising
out of criminal actions
Original Proceeding's

135-150
150

All cases attacking the constitutionality
of a statute or ordinance; water cases
concerning priorities or ajudications;
P.U.C. cases (from district court);
cases in which circuits differ; cases
transferred from circuits; granting of
certiorari
Total

50-65
350

Intermediate Courts. This will leave~j/balance of 650
new cases which would be divided as follows:~
1st Circuit
2nd Circuit
3rd Circuit
Total

215
225
220

-

650

Division of Backlog. Experience in other states which
have recently created intermediate courts indicates that it will
be several months before a sufficient number of cases are at issue for an intermediate court to become fully operative. It
would be possible, however, for the intermediate court to begin
work immediately by transferring cases from the backlog on the
Supreme Court civil docket that are within the jurisdiction of
the intermediate court.
Based on the data contained in the June 6, 1968 memorandum
to the Legislative Council Cormnittee on Appellate Courts.
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There are several ways in which this might be done, for
example:
1) transfer only those cases which are at issue;
2) transfer all civil cases, whether at issue or not; or
3) transfer only those cases which are at issue a specified length of time (i.e., 12 months) or longer.
The first alternative is recommended, as it would provide
a more efficient means of docket control during the formative
period of the intermediate court. It would also provide fewer
cases for the Supreme Court to screen to determine if they are
within the jurisdiction of the intermediate court. It is likely
(statistically) that 350-375 of the estimated number of civil
cases at issue on January 1, 1970 would fall within the jurisdiction of the intermediate court. Transfer of these cases would
give each intermediate circuit court an immediate oral argument
docket of approximately 115-125 cases. As the other cases on the
Supreme Court civil docket become at issue, they could be assigned, either to the proper circuit or to any other circuit (under the Supreme Court transfer authority) as deemed necessary to
keep caseloads equalized and avoid the problem of one circuit becoming unduly overburdened or behind the other two.
Plan A:

Budget

The annual initial cost of operating three three-judge intermediate appellate circuit courts is estimated to be between
$425,000 and $475,000, the most important varying factor being
the salary to be paid the intermediate,~gpellate judges. The details of this estimate are as follows:~
Judges, Clerks, Secretaries
Judicial salaries (including PERA and
Health Insurance)
Nine law clerks (at Supreme Court rates
of $7,920 per year)

72,000

Nine secretaries (Grade 16, ~tep 2 or
$469 per month plus
PERA and Health Insurance)

55,000

Sub Total

ID

$215,000-$250,000

All totals are rounded.
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$342,000-$377,000

Denver Clerk's Office
Clerk (Grade 30, Step 1 or Grade 29,
Step 2)

$10,500

Assistant Clerk (Grade 20, Step 1)

6,500

Two Deputy Clerks (Grade 14, Step 1) 8

10,200

Intermediate Clerk-Steno (Grade 12,
Step 2)

4,600

(PERA and Health Insurance on above)
Sub Total
a.

2,200
$34,000

One could also serve as bailiff.

General Operating Expenses (based on
Supreme Court budget}

$ 7,500

Travel

10,000

Sub Total
Sub Total - Denver Office

$17,500
$51,500

Colorado Springs Clerk's Office
Clerk (Grade 22, Step 1)
Deputy Clerk (Grade 15, Step 1)
Clerk-Bailiff (Grade 12, Step 2)
Intermediate Clerk-Steno (Grade 12,
.
Step 2}
(PERA and Health Insurance on above)
Sub Total
General Operating Expenses
Travel

$

7,200
6,500
4,600
4,600
1.800

$24,700
$

3,500
5.000

Sub Total

$8,500

Sub Total - Colorado Springs Office

$33,200

Grand Total

*

$426,700-$461,700*

This total does not include any provision for an intermediate
court reporter, which would add another $12,000 or so. It also
assumes that the Colorado Springs based circuit would use the El
Paso District Court law library. In which event, it might be
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necessary to provide at least one-half of a librarian's salary
($5,000) and also to include library additions as part of initial
capital outlay. The salary grades and number of employees are an
educated guess and will be checked further with our personnel officer.
Initial Capital Outlay. It is very difficult to estimate
initial capital outlay costs. According to purchasing office estimates, it costs about $1,000 per official or employee to outfit
an executive office and approximately $700 per employee to outfit
other offices. On this basis, the initial capital outlay cost
would be approximately $30,000 to $35,000. This estimate assumes
that space is made available without rental in Denver. It also
does not include possible rental of space in the new El Paso
County Hall of Justice, nor does it include library additions
which may be required. If $10,000-$15,000 is added for this purpose, total initial capital outlay would be approximately $45,000.
Plan B
Under Plan B, county court appeals would remain in the
district court with certiorari to the Supreme Court. All other
jurisdictional provisions would be the same as in Plan A, with
the exception of circuit boundaries. Consequently, only two
three-man divisions would be needed initially. Both divisions
would be based in Denver, but would have the authority to sit in
other locations. Through proper administrative control, transfer of cases between divisions would eliminate the likelihood of
both divisions sitting in the same out-state location, e.g.,
Grand Junction, within a few weeks of each other.
Caseload
By eliminating county court appeals (which would remain
with the district court), the estimated appellate workload in
l 97Q_~ould be:
)

Supreme Court
Workmen's Compensation
and Unemployment
Compensation

680

1QQ
780

As 350 of these will be in the supre~e Court (see Page 6~,
it would leave a remainder of approximately 430 cases for the two
intermediate appellate jurisdictions. It should be recognized,
however, that the anticipated increase in the annual filing
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rat~W will require one and maybe two.additional intermediate
appellate divisions during the next decade to keep up with the
workload.
·
Supreme Court RecornmendJll:pn
The Supreme Court recommends Pl,n B over Plan
eral reasons.

A

for sev-

1) Plan B would cost approximately $150,000 less per year
to operate than Plan A, and the initial capital outlay expense
would be reduced by at least one-third. There would also be no
need for library additions and the partial salary of a librarian,
because both additions would be housed in Denver.
2) .There would be greater flexibilitr if geographic circuits are not required; yet, attorneys and 1 tigants would have
the convenience of having their causes heard in or closer to·
their home communities.
3) County Court appeals have not ret become a burden on
district courts. By handling these appea sin the same way as
now provided, litigants would not be discouraged from taking appeals in minor cases because of a possible increase in the cost
of per.fecting the appeal. Also, the possibilitr of the intermediate court's docket becoming clogged with re atively minor
matters would be avoided.
4) Appointments to the intermediate court would be considered on a statewide basis, similar to Supreme Court appointments, thus providing for the appointment of the best qualified
men regardless of place of residence •

.§§7 More than 800 by l975, and more than 900 by 1979.
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APPENDIX A
SUMMARY OF JURISDICTION OF INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURTS
Alabama

The Court of Appeals (intermediate court) of Alabama is
composed of three judges possessing the same qualifications of
the supreme court judges. They serve for.~ term of six years
and are paid an annual salary of $19,500 •.!t
The Court of Appeals has final appellate jurisdiction of
all suits at law where the amount involved does not exceed
$1,000, and of all misdemeanors, bastardy, habeas corpus, and
felooi.es where the punishment has been fixed at 20 years or bnder.Y The court has original jurisdiction of quo warranto and
mandamus in relation to matters over which it has appellate juridsiction. The court also has authority to issue writs of injunction, habeas corpus, and such other remedial and original
writs as are necessary to give it a general superintendence and
control of jurisdiction inferior to ~t and in matters over which
it has final appellate jurisdiction.V The judges each have au':'
thority to issv~ writs of certiorari and supersedeas to all in,._
ferior courts.Y
>
The Court of Appeals may approve the constitutionality.of
a statute. But when it entertains the view that a statute is unconstitutionl, and the law has not been struck down previously
by the Supreme Court, the case is submitted to the Supreme Court,·
which court's decision controls the Court of Appeals in this as
in all matters. A Court of Appeals' decision upholding an assailed statute, and the question not previously having been dedided by the Suprem:,court, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court
upon writ of error.,§,
·
Appeals to the Court of Appeals are taken in'the same manner and with the effect and subject to the limitations and·restrictions provided by law with respect to appeals to the Supreme
Court, and the rules and regulations obtaining with respect to ·
applications for re.heJ;ings in the Supreme Court also apply to
th~ Court of Appeals •.21

!/

"Judicial Salaries in Major Trial and Appellate Courts,•·51
J. Amer. Jud. Soc. 240 (Feb. 1968), and Code of Ala., Tit.
13 § 29 (1958, Supp. 1967).
Code of Ala., Tit. 13 § 86
19581.
Code of Ala., Tit. 13 § 89 1958.
Code of Ala., Tit. 13 § 91 1958.
Code of Ala., Tit. 13 § 98 1958.
Code of Ala., Tit. 13 § 90 1958.
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Deel s.ions of the Supreme Court control the Court of Appeals, and the former court has general superintendency_qver the
latter. The Supreme Court makes rules for both courts.11 Cases
improp3;1y submitted to one court are transferred to the other
court.Y Cases pending in the Court of Appeals may be transferred
to the Supreme Court wnen advisable or necessary for the prompt
dispatch of business.j/ Whenever the members of the Court of Appeals are unable to reach a unanimous decision, any one member
may certify the.point of law to the s~2;eme Court, and the Supreme Court must decide the question.J.!V .
·
·
Arizona
In 1964, Arizona created a Court of Appeals, a single
court of record divided into two divisions, each division having
three judges who serve_ a six-year_ term from the date ?~ election.ll/ The annual salary of each judge is $22,500.w1
The Court of Appeals has original jurisdiction of habeas
corpus and appellate jurisdiction in all actions and proceedings
originating in or permitted by law to be appealed from the superior court, except criminal actions involving crimes punishable by
death or life imprisonment. The Court also has jurisdiction to
issue writs of certiorari to review awards of the industrial commission. In addition, jurisdiction to issue injunctions, writs
of mandamus, review, prohibition, habeas corpus, certiorari, and
other writs necessary and proper to the complete exercise ~~/its
appellate jurisdiction is granted to the Court of Appeals.~
Appellate procedure to the Court of Appeals is the same as·
the procedure for appeals to the Supreme Court and within the same
time limits.· If the case is not brought within the.p;oper court ·
or division, it is transferred to the proper place.~ Also, the
Supreme Court'may transfer to the Court of Appeals for decision a
case or appeal pending before the Supreme Court, if the case or
appeal is within the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals.
Section 12-120.24, Ariz. Rev. Stat. (1967 Supp.) provides
for a rehearing review by the Supreme Court. Because of its
length and importance it is quoted in full.

Code of Ala., Tit. l3 § 95 (1958) •.
Code of Ala., Tit. 13 I 96 (1958).
Code of Ala., Tit. 13 § 102 (1958).
Code of Ala., Tit. 13 § 88 (1958).
Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-120.01 (B) (1967 Supp.).
Legislation adopted in 1968 session.
Ariz. Rev. Stat.§ 12-120.21 (1967 Supp.).
Ariz. Rev. Stat. i 12-120.22 (1967 Supp.).
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A party against whom a decision has been
rendered in the court of appeals may file in such
court a motion for rehearing after the rendition
of the decision, setting forth with particularity
the reasons why he believes the decision erroneous. The opposite party may file his response to
such motion. If the motion is denied, and the
party against whom the decision has been rendered
desires a further review by the supreme courti he
shall serve upon the opposite party and file with
the clerk of the division a statement that he desires such review. The clerk of the division
shall thereupon transmit the record in the case
to the clerk of the supreme court. The supreme
court shall either Qrant or deny the request for
review. No further briefs or oral argument shall
be filed or had unless the supreme court so directs. If no request for review by the supreme
court has been filed, or upon the receipt from
the clerk of the supreme court of notification
that the request for review has been denied, the
clerk of the division shall· issue the mandate of
the court of appeals.~
California
The state of California .is presently divided into five appellate districts, in each of which is a District Court of Appeal,
consisti~2 1 of a division or several divisions having three judges.
in each.!§, The Legislature may create and establish additional
Distri~\ Court of Appeal and divisions thereof as it deems necessary.!1/ At the present time, there is a total of 39 judges, as
shown in the following table:
·
No. of
Divisions
in District

No. of
Judges in
Division

Total
No. of
Judges

1
2
3

4

4

2

3
3
3
3
3

12
15
3
6
3

Appellate
Dist. No.

1

l
TOTAL

5
1

5

39

13

- 0.24 (1967 Supp.).
r z. ev. Stat.
Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory, Vol. 5, p. 3488 (1968).
Calif. Const. Art. VI,§ 4a.
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These judges are appointed by the Governor with the approval of
the Commission on Judicial Appointments. Ther serve a term of
12 years and run for re-election on a nonpart san t,a].lot on their
record. They receive an annual salary of $30,000.!§/ and this
will go up to $36,216 on September 1, 1968.
The District Courts of Appeal have jurisdiction in all
cases in law appealed from the superior courts {trial courts of
general jurisdiction). These classes of cases do not include
those appealed directly to the highest court, the Supreme Court.!21
The District Courts of Appeal also have jµrisdiction in all cases
of forcible or unlawful entry or detainer; in proceedings in insolvency; in actions to prevent or abate a nuisance; in proceedings of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, usurpation of .office,
removal from office, contesting elections, eminent domain, and
in such other special proceedings as may be provided by law. The
courts' jurisdiction also extends, on questions of law alone, to
all criminal cases presented by indictment or information, except
where judgment of death has been rendered.W
The District Courts of Appeal also have appellate jurisdiction in all cases, matters, and proceedings pending before the
Supreme Court which the Supreme Court orders·transferreg_\o a
District Court of Appeal for hearing and determination.W The
~upreme Court can order any cause pending before a District Court
of Appeal to be heard and determined by the Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court can also,,~ 7ansfer cases between intermediate courts
and divisions thereof.~
.
The District Courts of Appeal have the power to issue units
of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, habeas corpus and all other ·
writs necessary or_Q;oper to the complete exercise of their appellate jurisdiction.~ In addition, the District Courts of Appeal
have appellate jurisdiction on appeal in certain cases_wtthin the
original jurisdiction of municipal and justice courts.W
· ·

State Court s,stems, 1966, The Council of State Governments
(1966); and" udicial"sa!aries in Major Trial.and Appellate
Courts," 51. 3. Amer. Jud. Soc. 240 (Feb. 1968).
·
Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory, Vol. 5, p. 3489 (1968).
Calif~ Const. Art. VI§ 4b.
Calif. Const. Art. VI§ 4c.
Ibid.
~ f . Const. Art. VI§ 4b.
Calif. Const. Art. VI§ 4e.
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Florida
The state of Florida is presently divided into four appellate districts, in each of which there is a District Court of Appeal, consisting of three or more judges. In the first three
districts, there are five judges in each district, and in the
fourth ~t}trict there is just three judges, making a total of 18
judges.~ The Legislature may provide for more judges or may
reduce the number in any district to not less than three.W The
judges serve fo~~~ term of six years and are paid an annual salary of $28,000.&
·
The jurisdiction of the District Courts of Appeal includes
appeals as of-right from the trial courts in each appellate district, and from final orders or decrees of"cou-nty judge's courts
pertaining to probate matters or to estates and interests of
minors and incompetents, excepting those from which appeals may
be taken directly to the Supreme Court or case~,..in which the circuit courts have final appellate jurisdiction.~
_
The District Courts of Appeal have such powers of direct
review of administrative action as may be provided by law. Rule
4.1 states that all appellate review of the rulings of any commission or board shall be by certiorari~ The statute relating
to judicial review under the Administrative Procedures Act and
the statutes relating to review by certiorari of final administrative orders of certain regulatory boards should be consulted
in the preparation of certiorari proceedings, as well as the appropriate governing statute, relating to the particular agency
or board, to determine the appropriate court wherein review will
lie. The scope of review under certiorari is narrowly limited
to a determination of whether the administrative agency acted
without or in excess of its authority or whether it departed from
the essential requirements of law in entering the order sought to
be reviewed. Before an administrative order may be reviewed by
certiorari, such order must be quasi-judicial in character, rather than purely executive in character • .The District Courts of
Appeal specifically have jurisdiction to review industrial commission orders and decisions as to workmen's compensation claims.
District Courts of Appeal may issue writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, and quo warranto and all writs
necessary and proper to the complete exercise of its jurisdiction.W
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Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory, Vol. V, p. 3500 (1968).
Fla. Const. Art. 5, § 5.
·
"Judicial Salaries in Major Trial and Appellate Courts," 51
J. Amer. Jud. Soc. 240 (Feb. 1968).
-Fla. Const-.-Art. 5, __§_5_ (3)
Ibid.·
•
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Georgia
The state of Georgia has one Court of Appeals which is divide.d into three divisions, .consisting of three elected judgei_in
each division, making a total of nine appellate court judges.W
They serx, /a term of six years and receive an anm..ial salary of
$26,500.~

·

The intermediate Court of Appeals has jurisdiction for the
trial and correction of errors in law or equity from the superior
courts and city courts of Atlanta and Savannah, in all cases in
which jurisdiction is not conferred on the Supreme.Court. The
Supre'!!e Cour~_ has jurisdictie>_n, denied to the intermediate court,
in the following matters: cases involving constitutional questions; land titles in equity cases; validity or construction of
wills; capital felonies; habeas corpus cases; extraordinary remedies; divorce and alimoney; and in all cases certified to it by
the Court of Appeals.W
·
The Court of Appeals can certify cases for determination
by the Supreme Court if the intermediate court is divided and may
certify cases to the court of last resort for instructions as to
a proper action. The Supreme Court can review and determine, by
certiorari or otherwise, cases certified to it from the Court of
Appeals. In actual practice, it appears that most matters are
funneled to the Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Couri_~ffords
double appeal by means of certiorari or certification.~
·
Precedents of the Supreme Court govern the intermediate
court, which can be compelled to obey orders of the. highest.
court. Cases improperly appealed are tran~f~rred to the correct
tribunal under rules of the Supreme Court.~
Illinois
The Appellate Court of Illinois is organized in five Judicial Districts. The court consists of 24 judges, 12 selected
from the F!!'~t District and three from each of the·other four
districts.W Thei~ selection (election at general election) and

30

w

Ga. Code Ann. § 24-350 et seq. (1958, Supp. 1965).
Ga. Code Ann. § 24-3503 (1958, Supp. 1965); "Judicial Salaries in Major Trial and Appellate Courts," 51 J. Amer.- Jud.
Soc. 240 (Feb. 1968).
.
·. In~ermediate·~~pellate Courts, Kentucky Legislative Research
Commission, Informational Bulletin No. 12, p. 7 (Jan. 1956)~
Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory, Vol. V, p. 3504 ( 1968) • '
Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory, Vol. V, p. 3504 (1968).
Ga. Code Ann. § 24-3501 et seq. \1958, Supp. 1965).
Ill. Const. Art. VI, § 6.
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terms (ten years) are the same as for the Supreme Court judges.36/
They receive an annual salary of $35,00o.W·
In all cases, other than thos~ appealable directly to the
Supreme Court, appeals from final judgments of a Circuit Court
(trial court) lie as a matter of right to the Appellate Court in
the district in which the Circuit Court is l.ocated, except that
after a trial on the merits in a ~rj,minal case, no appeal shall
lie from a judgment of acquittal •.i.liV' The Appellate Court.has
such original jurisdiction as may be necessary for complete de.. termination of any cause on review. The Appellate Court also
has such powers of
ect review of administrative action as may
be provided by law.;!2,7 Any final d.ecision, order, judgment or
decree of the Circuit Court entered in an action to review a decision of an administrative agency may be reviewed by the Appellate Court and Supreme Court.

~!

Appeals to the Supreme Court from Appellate Court lie as a
matter of right only {a) in cases in which a constitutional question arises for the first time in and as a result of the action
of the Appellate Court, and (b) upon the certification by the Ap•
pellate Court that a case decided by it involves a question of
such importance that it should be decided by the Supreme Courin/
Appeals in all other cases are by leave of the Supreme Court •.1Qr
Indiana
The Appellate Court of Indiana is composed of eight judges,
serving a term of four years. The judges usually sit in two divisions, except that the court may sit en bane for the consideration of impo~~ant cases.ill The judges receive an annual salary
of $22,500.W
The Appellate Court has jurisdiction in all appealable
cases, not given exclusively to the Supreme Court.~ It has no
jurisdiction of appeals in criminal cases.W The court's jur-

Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory, Vol. V, p. 3512 (1968).
State Court Systems 1966, The Council oi State Governments
{1966) ; "Judicial Salaries in Maj or Trial and Appellate
Courts, 11 51 J. Amer. Jud. Soc. 240 (Feb. 1968}.
Ill. Const. Art. VI, § 7.
.
Ibid.; and see Administrative Review Act, Ill. Stat. Ann.
~110, § 264 {Smith-Hurd 1967).
Ill. Const. Art. VI, § 5.
Ind. Stat. Ann. § 4-202 (Burns, 1966 Supp.)
"Judicial Salaries in Major Trial and Appellate Courts," 51
J. Amer. Jud. Soc. 240 {Feb. 1968).
Ind. Stat. Ann. § 4-214 (Burns, 1966 Supp.)
Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory, Vol. V, p. 3514 {1968).
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isdlctional amount in civil cases is the same as that of the su-

preme Court. No appeal .in civil cases lies to either court unless

the amount.1.n controversy. excluding interest and costs, exceeds
$50, except in cases involving the validity of a franchise or ordinance; ~he construction·or constitutionality of a statute; or a
constitutionally guaranteed right. tn these instances the case
mar· be apP.ealed to the Supreme Court, regardless of the amount. invo ved.~ These cases go directly to the Supreme Court for the ·
purpose of presenting the question only. .
·
·
Appeals in criminal pro~ecutions, condemnation proceedings, election contests, cases of mandate, prohibition and quo
w~rranto, habeas corpus. oroceedinas to establish drains, change
or improve watercourses, establish.gravel roads, establish or vacate public highways, contempt proceedings, actions involving
members of the bar, various interlocutory orders, probate matters,
and child custody cases are taken to the Supreme Court. All other
appealable cases are taken to the Appellate Court.~ Misdemeanor
cases may be appealed to either court.W
·
If the three judges of a div\sion of the Appellate Court do
not agree, the case is submitted to the entire court. If f6ur do
not then concur, the case is transferred to the Supreme Court.1§.7
Rules of the Appellate Court are the same as those of the Supreme
Court. A judge in vacation or recess hes the same a_uthori ty in
regard to writs as does a Supreme Court judge. Appeals are taken
to the intermediate court in the same manner, with the same effect, and subject to the same limitations and restrictions, as
appeals taken to the Supreme Court.12/
Jurisdiction of the Appellate Court in cases determined by ·
it is final with two· exceptions: First, if two judges of any division are of the opinion that a ruling precedent of the Supreme
Court is erroneous, upon written reasons therefor, the case is
transferred to the Supreme Court. Second, within 30 days after a
petition for rehearing is overruled in the Appellate Court, application may be made to the·supreme Court· on the basis that the
intermediate court's ruling contravened a precedent of the Supreme
. Court or that a new question of law is involved and has been decided erroneously~n 1The Supreme Court has discretion in granting
such application •...ll.V
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Ibid.
!ncr.
Stat.
~

~

~

Ann. § 4-213
Ann. § 4-214
Ann. § 4-212
Ann. §_4-209

rurns,

Burns, 1946
1966
Burns, 1946
Burns, 1946

Rep.).
Supp.).
Rep.~.
Rep ••

Ann. § 4-215 (Burns, 1946 Rep.).
-78-

· Appeals to tht wrong court at@ transferred to the proper
court and stand as if so originllly filed. Cases are distributed among divisions in the o:rder of iYbmission and may be transferred between division, ta eq~allzt the caseload. The Supreme
Court may transfer to itetlf th~ old~st cases pending in the Appellate Court if a disparity ln ~aseload exists between the two
courts. Cases pending in thi A.ppollate Court appealable to the
Supreme Court as a matter of r!ght on the basis of the amount in
contro~f'.)sy are transferrod by the Supreme Court to its own calendar .21.t
Louisiana
The state of Louisiana is presently divided into four
appellate circuits, each of which has a Court of Appeal. Each
circuit is subdivided into three districts.W There are six
judges in the First Circuit (Baton Rouge), three judges in the
Second Circuit (Shreveport), five judges in the Third Circuit
(Lake Charles), and eight 'judg~~ in the Fourth Circuit (New Orleans), a total of 22 judges.W Provision is made for increasing the number of judges upon the recommendation of the Judicial
Council and approval of two-thirds of each house of the legislature. The Supreme Court can assign district court judges to the
Courts of Appeal if the docket of any of them becomes congested.W Judges are elected and serve a term of twelve Y,ears.~
They are currently paid an annual salary of $24,000.~
The jurisdiction of the Courts of Appeal extends only to
appellate cases of which the Louisiana Supreme Court is not given
appellate jurisdiction. These cases include: (1) all matters
appealed from the Family and Juvenile Courts, except the criminal
prosecutions against persons other than juveniles; (2) all civil
and probate matters of which the District Courts have exclusive
jurisdiction; and (3) all civil matters involving more than $100,
exclusive of interest, of which the District Courts have concurrent jurisdiction.21/ No appeal lies to the Courts of Appeal in
criminal cases.
The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over: (1)
cases in which the constitutionality or legality of any tax, lo-

fill Ind. Stat. Ann. s 4-127, 4-218 (Burns, 1946, Ref.).
La. Const. Art. VII, § 20, 21 (1921, as amended •
w
gt Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory, Vol. v, p. 3530 (1968)·;
~
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La. Const. Art. VII, § 21 (1921, as amended).
Ibid.
ra:-const. Art. VII, § 19 (1921, as amended).
"Judicial Salaries in Major Trial and Appellate Courts," 51
J. Amer. Jud. Soc. 240 (Feb. 1968).
·
La. Const. Art. VII, § 29 (1921, as amended).
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cal improvement assessment, toll or impost levied by the state or
by any municipality, board or subdivision of the state is contested; (2) cases in which an ordinance of a municipality, board
or subdivision of the state or a law of the state has been declared unconstitutional; (3f cases in which orders of the P.U.C.
are in contest; (4) cases involving election contests, but only
if the election district from which the suit or contest arises
does not lie wholly within a Court of Appeal circuit; and (5)
criminal cases in which the penalty of death or imprisonment at
hard labor may be imposed, or in which a fine exceeding $300 or
imprisonment exceeding six months has actually been imposed.2fv'
Control of and general supervisory jurisdiction over all
inferior courts is vested in the Supreme Court.22/ It has the
authority to assign district judges to the Courts of Appeal if
the docket becomes congested.2Q/ The Supreme Court can require
by writ of certiorari, or otherwise, any case to be certified
from the Courts of Appeal to it for review if the application
for review is made within 30 days after a rehearing is refused
by the Court of Appeal. Where the application is based solely
upon the ground that the decision of the question of law involved is in conflict with a decision of the Supreme Court or
another Court of Appeal upon a question not yet decided by the
Supreme Court, then the application shall be granted as a matter of right.2!/
·
Each Court of Appeal has the power to certify to the Supreme Court any question of law arising in any case pending
before it which, for its proper decision, requires the instruction of that court •. The Supreme Court may either give its instructions on the question certified to it, which shall be
binding upon the Court of Appeal in such case, or it may require
that the whole record be sent up for.its consideration, in which
case the whole matter in controversy is decided in the same manner as if it had been on appeal directly to the Supreme Court.22/
App~~l.s to the Courts of Appeal may be on both the law
and facts,W and all cases are to be tried on the original record,·pleadings, and evidence.W The rules of practice regulating appeals to and proceedings in the Supreme Court shall apply
to appeals and proceedings in the Courts of Appeal, so far as

~
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La. Const. Art. VII, § 10 (1921, as amended).
Ibid.
ra:-const. Art. VII, § 12 (1921, as amended).
La. Const. Art. VII, § 11 (1921, as amended); La. Rev. Stat.
of 1950, Tit. 13, § 4450 (1962 Cumulative Supp.).
La. Const. Art. VII, § 25 (1921, as amended); La. Rev. Stat.
of 1950, Tit. 13, § 4449 (1962 Cumulative Supp.).
La. Const. Art. VII, § 29 (1921, as amended).
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they· may be applicable.W Concurrence of two appellate court
judges is necessary for a decision. No specific provision exists for review by the Supreme Court when the three court of
appeals judges cannot reach a decision. If the court is deadlocked, a district,j4dge or qualified lawyer may be appointed to
serve temporarily.22/
Maryland
In 1966, the Maryland legislature created an intermediate
court of appeals, known as the Court of Special Appeals. The.
court is composed of five judges, elected by the qualified voters, who serve a term of 15 years.fill They currently receive an
annual salary of $27,500 . .§!V
The Court of Special Appeals ha~ appellate jurisdiction
coextensive with the limits of the state and includes direct appeals from the circuit courts of the counties (trial courts) and
from the Criminal Court of Baltimore City in all criminal cases
where the sentence is other than death, which appeals are subject to further appeal to the Court of Appeals.Q.2/
Four of the judges constitute a quorum, and the concurrence of a majority of the entire court shall be necessary for
the decision of any cause. There is no provision which authorizes the court to sit in one or more panels or divisions.1Q/ •
The Maryland General Assembly may provide by law for additional
judges as it deems necessary.ll/
Michigan
The Court of Appeals of Michigan was created in 1965 and
is composed of nine judges who serve for six-year terms.W The
court sits in divisions of three judges each, except as otherwise
directed by the Supreme Court, and a majority of the judges assigned to each division shall constitute a quorum for hearing
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Ibid.
ra:-const. Art. VII. § 26 (1921, as amended).
Md. Code Ann. 26-130 (1957, Rep. Vol. 1966); Acts of 1966,
ch. 11, § 1.
"Judicial Salaries in Major Trial and Appellate Courts," 51
J. Amer. Jud. Soc. 240 (Feb. 1968).
Op. cit. note 67, supra.; Md. Code Ann. 5-21A (1957, Rep.
Vol. 1968).
Md. Code Ann. 26-130 (1957, Rep. Vol. 1966).
Md. Code Ann. 26-131 (1957, Rep. Vol. 1966).
·
Mich. Stat. Anh. § 27A.301 (1962,Cum. Supp. 1968); Pub. Acts
1964, No. 281, as amended by Pub. Acts, 1966, No. 306.
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eases and transacting business.W

the judges is $32,500.W

The current annual salary for

The administration of the Court of Appeals is under the
control of the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court may transfer
judges to the Court of Appeals to act as temporary judges to replace disabled or ~Jsqualified judges or to enlarge the court to
not more than 12, if the business of the court is deemed by the
Supreme Court to warrant it.12/
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction on appeals from:
(1) all final judgments from the recorder's court, superior
court, circuit courts, and court of claims; (2) all final judgments from justice courts, police courts, municipal courts, probate courts, common pleas courts, or other court inferior to the
circuit courts, which on appeal are not triable de novo (all appeals from final judgements from the aforementioned courts which
are triable de novo shall continue to be taken to the circuit
courts); and (3) such other judgments or_;l)terlocutory orders as
the Supreme Court may by rule determine.1w' All appeals pursuant
to the Court of Appeals' jurisdiction are a matter of right. All
other appeals permitted by statute or by Supreme Court rule are
by right or by leave as provided by statute or Supreme Court
rule.1:1./
·
·
The Court of Appeals has original jurisdiction " ••• to issue prerogative and remedial writs or orders as provided by rules
of the Supreme Court, and has authority to issue any writs, directives and mandates that it judges necessary and expedient to
effectuate its determination of cases brought before it. 11 1.§/
The decisions on appeal to the Court of Appeals are final,
except as provided by Supreme Court rule.12/ Appeals may be
taken to the Supreme Court prior to a decision by the Court of
Appeals on leave granted by the Supreme Court upon a showing by
petitioner of any one of the grounds listed below and by the appellant showing a meritorious basis for the appeal. Petitioner
must show that (1) the subject matter of the appeal involves a
substantial question as to the validity of an act of the legislature, (2) the subject matter of the appeal has significant
public interest and involves a suit brought by or against the
state or an agency or subdivision thereof or by or against officers of the state or an agency or subdivision in their official
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capacity, (3) the subject matter of the appeal involves legal
principles of major significance to the jurisprudence of the

state, or (4) delay in final adju~!sation of the litigation is
likely to cause substanti~l harm.~

Appeals on interlocutory or final decisions of the Court
of Appeals may be taken to the Supreme Court only upon application and leave granted by the Supreme Court on a showing of a
meritorious basis for appeal and any one of the following grounds:
(1) the subject matter of the appeal involves legal principles of
major significance to the jurisprudence of the state; (2) the decision of the Court of Appeals is clearly erroneous and will cause
material injustice; (3) the decision is in conflict with decisions
of the Supreme Court or other Court .of Appeals decisions; or (4)
the appellant would suffer substantial harm by awaiting final
judgment before taking appea!.~hen appealing an interlocutory order of the Court of Appeals.!ll/
Miss~
In Missouri the three Courts of Appeals are composed of
three judges each,§.V a total of nine judges, who are appointed
by the Governor for 12-year terms.W The current~~qnual salary
for the judges of the Courts of Appeal is $25,000.~
.
Each separate Court of Appeals has final appellate jurisdiction in its district of all cases from circuit courts and inferior courts of record and control over these courts, except in
those cases in which direct appeal lies to the Supreme Court.~
The Courts of Appeals have superintending control over all inferior courts within the court's jurisdiction, and the Courts of
Appeals may issue and determine original remedial writs.§.£/ The
rules of practice for the Courts of Appeals are promulgated and
established by the Supreme Court.§1/
The Supreme Court has exclusive appellate jurisdiction in
all cases involving: (1) the construction of the Constitution.
of the United State or Missouri; (2J the validity of a statute
or treaty of the United States; (3) any authority exercised under the laws of the United States; (4) the construction of Missouri reye~ue laws; (5) title to any office; (6) title to real

Mich. General Court Rules of 1963, Rule 852.1 (1968 Cum.
Supp.).
Mich. Gen. Court Rules of 1963, Rule 853.l (1968 Cum. Supp.).
Missouri Const. Art. 5, § 13.
Missouri Const. Art. 5, §§ 23, 29.
Missouri Stat. Ann. § 477:130.
Missouri Const. Art. 5, § 13.
Missouri Const. Art. 5, § 4.
Missouri Const. Art. 5, § 5.
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estate; (7) civil cases where the state or its political subdivisions or officers are a party; (a) felonies; (9) cases where
the amount in dispute, exclusive of costs. exceed~_\he sum of
$7,500; and (10) all other cases provided by law.filV Appeals in
these cases lie directly to the Supreme Court.
A case before any Court of Appeals is transferred to the
Supreme Court when any member of the Court of Appeals dissents
from the majority opinion and certifies that he deems the decision contrary to a previous Supreme Court decision or a Court of
Appeals decision, or upon order of the Supreme Court or a, Court
of Appeals because of the general interest or importance of the
question involved •.a.2/
New·Jersev
The Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey
was established by the Constitution of New Jersey •.2Q/ There is
no statutory or constitutional provision for the number of judges
to be assigned to the Appellate Division; however,.there is provision for the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to assign
judges to particular divisions of the Superior Court.!ll/ The
current number of judges assigned to the Appellate Division is
twelve,W and their annual salary is $27,000.:U/
Appeals in all causes may be taken to the Appellate Division from: (1) the Law and Chancery Divisions of the Superior
Court; (2) the county courts: (3) civil causes determined by the
county district courts; (4) causes determined by juvenile and
domestic courts, except bastardy proc~edings; (5) causes determined by the criminal judicial district courts; (6) causes determined in statutory proceedings and decisions of state agencies,
except those of the Workmen's Compensation Division and the Wage
Collection Section of the Wage and Hour Bureau of the Department
of Labor and Industry; and (7) in such other causes as may be
provided by law •.2i/ Appeals may be taken on interlocutory order
or judgment or interlocutory decision or action of any state administrative agency •.2.2/ Appeals may also be taken from judgments

.@/ M!ssouri Const. Art. 5, § 3.
89/ Missouri Const. Art. 5, § 10.

N.J. Const. Art. 6, § 3, para. 3.
N.J. Const. Art. 6, § 7, para. 2.
W "Judicial Salaries in Major Trial and Appellate Courts," 51
J. Amer. Jud. Soc. 240 (Feb. 1968).
93/ Ibid.
gt· N.T. Const. Art. 6, § 5, para. 2; the Revision of the Rules
Governing the Courts of the State of New Jersey, Rule 2:2-2
(1958).
,
~ The Revision of the Rules Governing the Courts of the State
of N.J., Rule 2:2-3 (1958).
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nisi in matrimonial causes,.2.§/ and in criminal causes in lieu of
prerogative writ.2if The Appellate Division may exercise such
original jurisdiction as may be necessary for the complete determination of any cause on review •.filV
A direct appeal of right may be made to the Supreme Court
in capital cases. All other appeals are channeled to the Appellate Division. Appeal as of right lies to the Supreme Court if
there is a dissent in the Appellate Division or if the cause involves a question arising under the United States or New Jersey
constitutions. Appeal also may be allowed on certification of
the Supreme Court to the Superior Court and other inferior
courts .2,2/
The Supreme Court may also at its discretion grant appeal
from the Appellate Division. Factors considered in granting this
discretionary appeal include cases where:' (1) the Appellate Division has decided a question of substantive law not previously determined by the court of last resort (Supreme Court), and decided
it probably not in accord with other Supreme Court decisions; (2)
the decision conflicts with another decision of the Appellate Division; (3) the judges concur in the result, but cannot agree on
a common ground of decision; (4) the Appellate Division has decided an important question of procedural law not previously decided by the Supreme Court, or has departed so far from the
accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings (or sanctioned
such departure by a lower court) as to call for the exercise of
the Supreme Court's supervision; or (5) the Appellate Division
has decided a question of substance relating to the construction
or application of a statute, which has not been but should be
settled by the Supreme Court.100/
New York
The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court is the intermediate appellate court in New York, and the Court of Appeals is
the highest court. There is an Appellate Division for each of
the four judicial departments of the state. The First and Second
Appellate Divisions are allowed to split into "Appellate Terms",
terms are thus similar to the three-man divisions or sessions of
other states.101/

Ibid., Rule 2:2-2.
Ibid., Rule 2:2-4.
N.J. Const. Art. 6, § 5, para. 3.
N.J. Const. Art. 6, § 5, para. 1.
Intermediate Appellate Courts, Kentucky Legislative Research
Commission, Informational Bulletin No. 12, p. 11 (Jan. 1956).
N.Y. Judiciary Law, Art. 3.

-85-

The Constitution of New York specifically provides for
twenty-four justices elected to the Supreme Court to·be assigned
by the governor to the App~llate Division. The governor may also
assign additional justices as the need arises.to?/ The current
number of.justices assigned to the Appellate D vision is 26, and
they receive an annual salary of $33,500 to $40,000.103/ Justices of the Supreme Court are elected for fourteen years.104/
Most appeals are taken to one
Notable exceptions are direct appeal
Court of Appeals in capital cases or
the constitutionality of a statute.
appeals:

of the Appellate Divisions.
from the +.r.ial r.ourt to the
where the sole question is
The Appellate Divisions hear

1. from any fi'nal or interlocutory judgment
except one entered subsequent to an order of the
appellate division which disposes of all the issues in the action; or
2. from an order not specified in subdivision
(b), where the motion it decided was made upon notice and it:
(i) grants, refuses, continues or modifies a provisional remedy; or
(ii) settles, grants or refuses an application to resettle a transcript or statement on appeal; or
(iii) grants or refuses a new trial;
except where specific questions of fact
arising upon the issues in an action triable
by the court have been tried by a jury, pursuant to an order for that purpose, and the.
order grants or refuses a new trial upon the
merits; or

or

(iv) involves some part of the merits;
(v) affects a substantial right; or

(vi) in effect determines the action and
prevents a judgment from which an appeal might
be taken; or
N.Y. onst. Art. 6, ~
"Judicial Salaries in
J. Amer Jud. Soc. 240
N.Y, Const. Art. 6, §

4.
Major Trial and Appellate Courts, 11 51
(Feb. 1968).
4.
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(vii) determines a statutory pro-·
vision of the state to be unconstitutional,
and the determination appears from the
reasons given for the decision or is nee~
essarily implied in the decision; or
3. from an order, where the motion it decided
was made upon notice, refusing to vacate or modify
a prior order, if the prior order would have been
appealable as of right under paragraph two had it
decided a motion made upon notice.105/
·
Orders are not appealable ~o the Appellate Division as of
right where it:
1. is made in a proceeding against a body or
officer pursuant to article 78; or
2. requires or refuses to require a more definite statement in a pleading; or
3. orders or refuses to order that scandalous or prejudicial matter be stricken from a
pleading.106/
An appeal may be taken to the Appellate Division from any
order which is not appealable as of right in an action originating in the supreme court or a county court by permission of the
judge who made the order granted before application to a justice
of the appellate division; or by permission. of a justice of the
appellate division in the department to which the appeal c.ould
be taken, upon refusal by the judge who made the order or upon
direct application.107/
.
The Appellate Divisions also hear appeals from the supreme
courts and county courts when these sit as intermediate appellate
courts. Appeals from the supreme courts and surrogates' courts
may be reviewed on questions of fact or law.IO~/ In addition, an
appeal may be taken to the.Appellate Division rom any judgment
or order of a court of original instance other than the supreme
court or a county court.109/
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§

The Appellate Divisions have original jurisdiction in certain cases, e.g., admission to or removal from practice;llO/ petitions directed against a justice of the Supreme Court, a judge
of the county courts or the courts of general sessions;ill/ and
trial of issue of law on submission of agreed statementof
facts.112/
Appeals as of right are taken to the Court of Appeals in:
(1) criminal cases where· the judgment is death; (2) civil causes
from a judgment or order of final decision of the Appellate Division involving the construction of the constitution of the United
States or r~ew York; ( 3) civil causes where an Appellate Division
justice dissents or where judgment or order is one of reversal or
modification; (4) cases where the only question arises under the
constitution of the United States or New York; (5) cases where an
order of the Appellate Division granting a new trial or new hearing was entered and the appellant stipulates that, upon affirmance, judgment absolute or final order shall be entered against
him: (6) causes where the Appellate Division certifies that a
question of law should be reviewed by the Court of Appeals; (7)
and causes in which the Court of Appeals determines that a question of law should be reviewed.113/
Review by the Court of Appeals is limited to questions of
law except on judgment of death or when the Appellate Division
reverses or modifies a lower court on new findings of fact. The
right of appeal does not depend on the amount in controversy.
The legislature has the power to abolish appeal based on dissent,
reversal, or modification in the Appellate Division. In this
event, certification by either court becomes the basis of appeal.114/
The Appellate Divisions have the power to promulgate rules
and supervise the administration and operation of the courts in
their department.115/
New Mexico
Pursuant to chapter 28 of the Laws of 1966, Sections 16-71 through 16-7-14, N.M. Stat. Ann., 1953.Comp. (P. Supp.), the
Court of Appeals was created and commenced operations on April 1,

• y. Judiciary Law, § 90.
Civil Practice Laws and Rules,
N.Y.
ill/ N.Y. Civil
Practice Laws and Rules,
N.Y. Const. Art. 6, § 7.
Ibid.
N.Y.
Judiciary Law, § 216.
11t

~
HY;
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§
§

506.
322.

1966.ll~/ The Court of Appeal:, ·..: composed of four judges elected
fore gt-year terms at an annual salary of $18,500.1177
The Court of Appeals is an intermediate appellate court between the district courts and the Supreme Court. Under New Mexico
law prior to creation of the court of appeals, every final judgment of a district court could be appealed as a matter of right to
the Supreme Court. Now, certain statutorily-defined cases (N.M.
Stat. Ann. § 16•7-8, 1953 Comp.) must be appealed to the Court of
Appeals, and there is no absolute right of appeal from this court
to the Supreme Court. Application may be made to the Supreme
Court for a Writ of Certiorari for review of the final action of
the Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court may either grant or
deny the Writ.
The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals includes review on
appeals from:
A. any civil action which includes a count in
which one or more of the parties seeks damages on
an issue based on tort, including but not limited
to products liability action;

B. all actions under the Wor~men's Compensation Act l59-10-l to 59-10-317, the ~ew Mexico
Occupational Disease Disablement Law ~9-11-1 to
59-ll-4Y, the Subsequent Injury Act l59-10-126 to
59-10-13§/ and the Federal Employers Liability Act;
C. criminal actions except those in which a
judgment of the district court imposes a sentence
of death or life imprisonment;

D. post-conviction remedy proceedings except
where the sentence involved is death or life imprisonment;
E. actions for violation of municipal or
county ordinances where a fine or imprisonment is
imposed;
F. decisions of those administrative agencies of the state where direct review is provided
by law; and

11.§7 Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office
of the Courts, State of New Mexico (1967).
117/ N.M. Stat. Ann.§ 16-7-1, 1953 Comp. (P. Supp.).
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G. decisions in any other action as may be
provided by law.118/
The Court of Appeals has no original jurisdiction, but it
"may be authorized by rules of the Supreme Court to issue all
writs necessary or appropriate in aid of its appellate jurisdiction."lt9/ The method of appeal to the Court of Appeals of New
Mexico s the same as it is for the Supreme Court of New Mexico,120/ and the rules of practice and procedure of the Supreme
Court are the same for the Court of Appeals.121/
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review by writ of
certiorari to the Court of Appeals any matter in which the Court
of Appeals decision~ (1) conflicts with a Supr~m~ Court decision; (2) conflicts with a decision of the Court of Appeals; (3)
involves a "significant question of law" arising under the New
Mexico or United States Constitution; or (4) "involves an issue
of substantial public interest that should be determined by the
Supreme Court."122/ The Court of Appeals may request the !:iupreme
Court to consider cases which it has not decided and which it determines to be described by categories 3 and 4 above.123/
When neces$ary the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court may
designate any justice of the Supreme Court or any district judge
to act as a judge of the Court of Appeals. Also a judge of the
Court of Appeals may be assigned to sit as a district judge or a
Supreme Court Justice.
North Carolina
In North Carolina the Court of Appeals, which was created
in 1967, is composed of six judges who are elected for eight-year
terms. The number of judges will increase to nine in 1969.124/
They receive an annual salary of $24,000.125/
The Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals respectively
"have jurisdiction to review upon appeal decisions of the lower
courts and administrative agencies, and upon matters of law or
legal inference ••• "126/ Appeal lies of right to the Supreme Court

N.M.

Stat. Ann. § 16-7-8, 1953 Comp. (P. Supp.).
N.M. Const. Art. VI, § 29.
N.M. Stat. Ann.§ 16-7-9, 1953 Comp. (P. Supp.).
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-2-2, 1953 Comp. (P. Supp.).
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 16-7-14, 1953 Comp. (P. Supp.).
Ibid.
Geri:- Stat. of N.C., § 7A-16.
"Judicial Salaries in Major Trial and Appellate Courts," 51
J. Amer. Jud. Soc. 240 (Feb. 1968).
Gen. Stat. of N.C., § 7A-26.
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on criminal causes involving a life imprisonment or death penalty
sentence.127/ Specifically appeal lies of right to the Court of
Appeals:
1. From any final judgment of a superior
court Cexcept any judgment which includes a sentence of death or life imprisonment7 or one entered in a post-conviction proceed!ng, including
any final judgment entered upon review of a decision of an administrative agency;
2. From any final judgment of a district
court in a civil action;
3. From any interlocutory order or judgment of a superior court or district court in a
civil action or proceeding which:

(a)

Affects a substantial right, or

(b) In effect determines the action
and prevents a judgment from which appeal
might be taken, or
(c)

Discontinues the action; or

(d)

Grants or refuses a new trial.128/

Also, appeals from the decisions of the North Carolina
Utilities Commission and the North Carolina Industrial Commission
lie of right directly to the Court of Appeals.129/ Decisions of
the Court of Appeals rendered upon review of post conviction proceedings are final and are not subject to review.130/
Any decision of the Court of Appeals which: (1) involves
a "substantial" question arising under the Constitution of the
United States or North Carolina; (2) in which there is a dissent;
(3) or which involves a review of a rate-making decision by the
North Carolina Utilities Commission; can be appealed as of right
to the Supreme Court.l3l/ In addition, the Supreme Court exercises discretionary rev ew over appeals to the Court of Appeals,
except in causes involving the North Carolina Utilities Commission, other than a rate-making decision, and the North Carolina

~
Ht

Bf

Gen.
Gen.
Gen.
Gen.
Gen.

stat.
Stat.
Stat.
Stat.
Stat.

of
of
of
of
of

N.C., § 7A-27.
N.C., § 7A-27.
N.C., § 7A-29.
N.C., § 7A-28.
N.C., § 7A-30.
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Industrial Commission, and in cases reviewing a post conviction
proceeding, in which case no review is allowed.132/
The Court of Appeals has power to issue writs of habeas
corpus and prerogative writs, including mandamus, prohibition,
certiorari, and supersedeas, in the aid of the·court's jurisdiction or to supervise and control proceedings of trial courts and
of the Utilities Commission and the Industrial Commission.133/

In Ohio, there is a separate Court of Appeals in each of
the ten judicial districts; eight districts have three judges;
two districts have six and four judges respectively.li4/ The
judges are elected for six-year terms at an annual sa ary of
$27,000.135/
.
The Courts of Appeals have original jurisdiction, as does
the Supreme Court, in quo warranto, mandamus, habeas corpus, prohibition, and procedendo. These courts have jurisdiction to review, affirm, modify, set aside, or reverse judgments or final
orders of boards, commissions, officers, tribunals, and courts of
record inferior to the Courts of Appeals within their respective
districts. The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over
constitutional questions, felony cases, cases in which the Courts
of Appeals have original jurisdiction, and cases of public or
great general interest in which the Supreme Court may direct any
Court of Ppp '.?als to certify its records.. Concurrence of a bare
majority of the three appellate judge$ is necessary, except that
no judgment of any court of record entered on the verdict of a
jury can b_e set aside ~~~e_pt by concurrence of all three judges
of a Court of Appeals.~
In addition to the jurisdiction conferred by Section 6 of
Article IV of the Ohio Constitution, the Courts of Appeals have
the following jurisdiction: (1) Upon en appeal on questions of
law to review, affirm, modifr, reverse, set aside judgments or
final orders of courts infer or to the Court of Appeals, including findings of a juvenile court that a child is delinquent,
neglected or dependent, for prejudicial error committed by such
lower court; (21 Upon an appeal on questions of law and fact the
court of appeals, in cases arising in courts of record inferior

Gen. Stat. of N.C.,

§ 7A-31.
Gen. Stat. of N.C., § 7A-25.
Ohio Rev. Code Ann., §§ 2501.01-2501.012 (Page 1954).
Legislation adopted in 1968 session.
Ohio Const. Art. IV, § 6.
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to the court of appeals within the district, shall weigh the evidence and render such judgment or decree as the trial court could
and should have rendered upon the original trial of the case, in
the following classes of actions, seeking as a primary and paramount relief:
(1) The construction or enforcement of a
trust, including the enforcement or establishment
of constructive or resulting trusts:
(2)
The establishment or enforcement of
equitable estates arising from the conversion of
property;

(3) The foreclosure of mortgages and marshalling of liens, including statutory liens;
(4) The appointment, removal, and control
of trustees and receivers:
( 5)

The restraint of commission of torts:

( 6) The reformation and cancellation of instruments in writing;

( 7)

at law;

The restraint of actions or judgments

(8) The quieting of title to property, the
partition of property, and the registration of
land titles;
(9) The specific performance of contracts,
or the restraint of the breach thereof:

(10) Injunction, accounting, subrogation,
or interpleader.137/

In cases not listed above, Courts of Appeals have jurisdiction to proceed as in an appeal on questions of law only.lJB/ In
addition, the Courts of Appeals may issue writs of superse eas in
any case, and all other writs not specifically prohibited or provided for by statute which are necessary to enforce the administration of justice.
The Courts of Appeals promulgate their own rules of procedure, subject to alteration and amendment by the Supreme Court.139/

1~7/ Ohio Rev. Code Ann. ,

l38/

m,t

§ 2501. 02 (page 1954, Supp.. 1966) .
Ibid.
Ohio Rev. Code Ann., § 2501.08 (Page 1954).
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The Chief Justice of the Court of Appeals may assign a judge of
the Court of .Appeals to a district court.14r The Chief Justice.
of the Supreme Court may assign any judge o the Court of Appeals
to any county to hold court and shall determine the disability.or
disqualification of any judge of the Court of Appeals-141/
Oklahoma
In Oklahoma, appellate jurisdiction is divided between two
courts; the Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction in all civil
cases at law and equity; the Criminal Court of Appeals has exclusive jurisdiction over all criminal cases appealed from courts of
record .142/
·
.
· .
·
The Court of Criminal Appeals is composed of three judges
elected for six-year terms and who receive the same annual salary
as Supreme Court Justices ($22,500).143/
The Court of Criminal Appeals may issue writs of habeas
corpus and other such writs as may be necessary to exercise its
jurisdiction.144/
·
In addition the Court of Criminal Appeals may prescribe its
own rules, and ascertain matters of fact upon affidavit or other•
wise as may be necessary in the exercise of its jurisdiction.145/
Pennsylvania
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania is composed of seven
judges elected for ten-year terms.146/ The annual salary of the
President judge of the Superior Court is $36,000; the annual salary of the associate judges is $35,500~147/ The Superior Court
has the power to grant every lawful writ pursuant to the exercise
of .its jurisdiction.148/
·
The Superior Court has no original jurisdiction, except in
actions of mandamus and prohibition to inferior courts where such

Ohio Rev. Code Ann., § 2501.14 (Page 1954).
Ohio Rev. Code Ann.,§ 2501.12 (Page 1954).
Okla. Const. Art. 7, § 2.
20 Okla. Stat. Ann. § 31, § 285 (1962); and Okla. Session
Laws 1967, ch. 128.
20 Okla. Stat. Ann. § 41 (1962).
20 Okla. Stat. Ann. § 42 (1962).
17 Penn. Stat. Ann. § 111 (Purdon's 1962).
17 Penn. Stat. Ann. § 830.25 (Purdon's 1962).
17 Penn. Stat. Ann. § 123 (Purdon's 1962).
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actions are ancillary to Superior Court appellate proceedings,
and the Superior court may issue writs of habeas corpus under
similar conditions.149/
The Superior Court has exclusive and final appellate jurisdiction of all appeals in the following classes of cases:
1. All proceedings of any kind from court of
quarter sessions of the peace, oyer and terminer
and general jail deliveryi except c~ses involving
right to public office, and felonious homicide.
Appeals are by right to the Superior Court, but it
shall not operate as supe~iedeas unless allowed by
the court or judge thereof, who has power to admit
to bail and to make an order of supersedeas and
other writs.150/
2. All actions and proceedings at law in
courts of common pleas and in the county courts
of Allegheny County and Philadelphia County and
all similar courts, if the subject of controversy
be either money, chattels, real or personal, or
the possession of or title to real property, and
if the amount or value thereof in controversy is
not greater than $10,000, exclusive of costs.151/
3. All actions arising from proceedings and
orders of any commission or state agency, unless
specifically excluded by law, and all orders of
courts of common pleas, or court of quarter sessions of the peace and oyer and terminer involving
summary proceedings before aldermen, magistrates
or justices of the peace.152/
4. Appeals from orders, judgment, or sentence of the Allegheny County Court, or the
Municipal Court of Philadelphia, or any similar
courts, not provided by law to be taken to court
of common pleas or court of quarter sessions of
the peace of the particular county, shall be
taken to the Superior Court, and shall not be
appealable to the Supreme Court.153/

17
17
17
17
17

Penn.
Penn.
Penn.
Penn.
Penn.

Stat.
Stat.
Stat.
Stat.
Stat.

Ann. § 181 (Purdon's 1962, Supp. 19671.
Ann. § 182 (Purdon's 1962, Supp. 1967.
Ann. § 184 (Purdon's 1962, Supp. 1967 •
Ann. § 184.1 (Purdon's 1962, Supp. 1967).
Ann. § 187 (Purdon's 1962).
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·
5. Appeals or P,Ac,,dings from divorce and
joint appeals by lab9r claimants shall be taken
to the Superior Court.~
In the following cases appeal is under the sole jurisd1ctio.n of the Supreme Court:

(l)

Felonious homicide;

(2)

The right to public office;

(3) Petitions, orders and decrees arising
out of or within the jurisdiction of the orphans'
court;
(4)

Actions and proceedings in equity;

(5) Civil actions arising under the provisions of the act known as the "Banking Code," and
under the provisions of the act known as the
"Banking Code of 1965," and under the provisions
of the act known as the "Department of Banking
Code," and under the provisions of the act known
as the "Building and Loan Code," and all amendments to said acts;
(6) Matters relating to actions and orders
of the Department of Revenue arising under the
provisions of the act known as "The Fiscal Code",
as amended;
(7) Appeals from orders of the courts of
common pleas and courts of quarter sessions of
the peace involving or arising out of acts,
ordinances, regulations or orders relating to
zoning;
(8) Direct criminal contempt in lower
courts, and other contempt proceedings in lower
courts relating to orders, judgments, decisions
and decrees which are appealable directly to the
Supreme Court;
(9)
(10)

I@'

Disbarment from the practice of law;
Suspension from the practice of law;

17 Penn. Stat. Ann.§ 191.3 (Purdon's 1962, Supp. 1967).
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(11) Suspension of a district attorney by
an Attorney General or by a court.155/
(12) In actions of personal injury to a
wife or child brought by husband and wife or
child and parent, if more than one judgment is
entered, and if any is greater than $10,000,
exclusive of costs.156/
The Superior Court may deny any appeal for want of due
prosecution and it may affirm, reverse, amend or modify, any judgment or decree as it may think and determine just, or return the
record to the inferior court for further proceedings.lii/ The
Superior Court may allow an appeal over which it norma y has jurisdiction to be taken directly to the Supreme Court.158/
Tennessee
Tennessee has two intermediate appellate courts, the Court
of Appeals and the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Court of Appeals of Tennessee is composed of nine judges who are elected for
an eight-year term.151/ Judges of the Court of Appeals receive
$17,500 per annum.160
The Court of Criminal Appeals is composed
of three judges who, after 1968, will be elected for eight-year
terms.1§1/ Salaries of judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals
are to e the same as the judges of the Court of Appeals,
$17,500.162/
The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals is appellate only
and extends to all civil cases, except cases involving: the con-·
stitutionality of a statute or city ordinance which is the sole
determinative question in litigation; the right to hold public
office; workmen's compensation; state revenue; mandamus in the
nature of quo warranto; ouster; habeas corpus in cases where the
relater is being held under a criminal accusation or a rendition
warrant issued by the Governor of the state; and excepting cases
which have been determined finally in the lower court on demurrer
or other method involving a review or determination of the facts
or in which all the facts have been stipulated.163/

17
17
17
17
16

Penn. Stat. Ann. § 191.4 (Purdon's 1962, Supp. 1967).
Penn. Stat. Ann. § 191.2 (Purdon's 1962, Supp. 1967).
Penn. Stat. Ann. § 192 (Purdon's 1962).
·
Penn. Stat. Ann. § 190 (Purdon's 1962, Supp. 1967).
Tenn. Code Ann. § 401, 403 (1956).
8 Tenn. Code Ann. § 2303 (1956).
16 Tenn. Code Ann. § 442, 443 (1956, Supp. 1967).
16 Tenn. Code Ann. § 445 (1956, Supp. 1967); $20,000 as of
1970.
16 Tenn. Code Ann. § 408 (1956).
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. The Court of Appeals ~~! power to grant writs of error,
certiorari, and supersedeas.~ The court may and does sit in
sections of three and is a court of. record. The presiding
judge of the court has the power to assign and reassign judges
and sections. Concurrence of two judges is necessary in the section, five is necessary en bane, _and four if two sections -sit together.135/ The state is divided into three grand divisions with
three ju ges elected from each. Cases are taken directly to the
Court of Appeals in the division within which the case arpse. A
case may be transferred to another grand division ·if a member residing in the first division is disqualified and th- transfer i~
approved by two judges of the initial division. There is also a
tr~nsfer of jurisdiction to the Supreme Co.urt or Court of Appeals
when a case is taken to the wrong court.
·
The ju~isdiction of the Court of Criminal Appeals is appellate only and extends to all criminal cases~ both felony and misdemeanor. The court also has jurisdiction:over all cases arising
under any post conviction procedure statute and c.ases involving .
or attacking the validity of a final conviction or judgment in a
criminal case. The court does not .have jurisdiction of any case
in which the sole question for determination•invo1ves the·consti•
tutionality of a statute or municipal ordinance.166/
The Supreme Court has no original jurisdiction. ·It hears
all appeals and writs of error from the circuit, crim~nal, and
chancery courts in cases where jurisdiction has· not been given to
the Court of Appeals. Supreme Court review"of cases finally determined by the Court of Appeals is by certiorari granted by the
Supreme Court or any judge thereof .167/ . ·
Texas
Texas has two intermediate appellate courts, the Court of
Criminal-Appeals and the Courts of Civil Appeals. The Court of
Criminal Appeals consists of three judges elected for six-year
terms.168/ The current annual salary for the judges of the Court
of Criminal Appeals is the same as for Supreme Court justices,
$27,000.169/ There are 14 separate Courts of Civil Appeals, and

enn.
Tenn.
Tenn.
Tenn.
Vernon's

Code
Code
CodP.
Code
Ann.

Ann. § 410 !1956).
.
Ann. § 413 1956).
Ann. § 448 1956~ Supp. 1967).
Ann. § 452 19561.
Civ. St. Art. 1801 (1964); Texas Const. Art.

5, § 4 . .

nJudicial Salaries in Major Trial and Appellate Courts," 51

J. Amer. Jud. Soc. 241 (Feb. 1968).
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each court is composed of three judges elected for six-year
terms.170/ They receive an annual salary of $24,000.171/
The Constitution of Texas grants the Court of Criminal
Appeals appellate jurisdiction over all criminal causes with the
proviso that exceptions and regulations may be prescribed by
law.ll2/ The Court and the judges have the power to issue writs
of ha eas corpus and other writs necessary to enforce the Court's
jurisdiction.173/ The Court also has the power, by affidavit or
otherwise, the ascertain matters of fact in cases pending before
it .174/
The Courts of Civil Appeals have appellate jurisdiction
over all civil cases in which the district courts and county
courts have jurisdiction. Decisions of the Civil Courts of Appeal are conclusive as to findings of fact.175/ Jurisdiction is
final, except for those classes of cases wherein additional appeal to the Supreme Court is reserved.
Article 1821, as quoted below, describes the cases which
cannot be appealed from Court of Civil Appeals, and in which it
has final jurisdiction.
Article 1821. Except as herein otherwise
provided, the judgments of the Courts of Civil
Appeals shall be conclusive on the law and facts,
nor shall a writ of error be allowed thereto from
the Supreme Court in the following cases, to wit:
1. Any civil case appealed from the County
Court or from a District Court, when, under the
Constitution a County Court would have had original or appellate jurisdiction to try it, except
in probate matters, and in cases involving the
Revenue Laws of the State or the validity or construction of a Statute.
2.

All cases of slander.

3.

All cases of divorce.

4. All cases of contested elections of
every character other than for State officers,

Vernon's Ann. Civ. St. Art. 1817 (1964).
SP.e nnte 169, supra.
Teias Const. Art. 5, § 5.
Ibid.

Ibid.

Texas Const. Art. 5, § 6; Vernon's Ann. Civ. St. Art. 1819,
1820 (1964).
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excep:t where the validity of a Statute is questioned by the decision.
5. In all appeals from interlocutory orders
appointing receivers or trustees, or such other
interlocutory appeals as may be allowed by law.
6. In all other cases as to law and facts
except where appellate jurisdiction is given to
the Supreme Court and not made final in said
Courts of Civil Appeals.
It is provid,ed,. however, that nothing contained herein shall be construed to deprive the
Supreme Court of jurisdiction of any case brought
to the Court of ~ivil Appeals from an appealable
judgment of the trial court in which the judges
of the Courts of Civil Appeals may disagree upon
any question of law material to the decision, or
in which one of the Courts of Civil Appeals holds
· differently from a prior decision of another
Court of Civil Appeals or of the Supreme Court
upon a question of law, as provided for in Subdivisions (1) and (2) of Article 1728.176/ ·
The Supreme Cou+t has appellate Jurisdiction on all questions of law over.the following cases brought on appeal to the
Courts of Civil Appeal~:
·
1. · Cases in which judges of the Courts of
Civil Appeals mjay disagree upon any question of
law material to the decision.
2 •. Cases jn which a Court of Civil Appeals
renders a decision different from another Court
of Civil Appeafs, or of the Supreme Court, upon
any question of law material to a decision of the
case.
3. Cases :J_nvolving the construction or validity of statutes necessary to a determination
of th~ case.
·
·
4.

Cases involving state revenues.

5. Cases in which the Railroad Commission
is a party.

1W'

Vernon's Ann. Civ. St. Art. 1821 (1964).
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6. Cases in which it is made to appear that
an error of substantive law has been committed by
a Court of Civil Appeals which affects the judqment, excluding cases over which judgment of
courts of civil appeals i~ final ll821 above).177/
All of the above causes of which the Supreme Court has ap,pellate jurisdiction may be transferred to the Supreme Court by
writ of error or by certificate from the Court of Appeals.178/
The state legislature has the power by statute to authorize direct appeals to the Supreme Court on order of any trial
cour~ granting or denying an interlocutory or permanent injunction on the question of constitutionality of a statute or on the
validity or invalidity of any administrative order issued pursuant to statute.179/
The Supreme Court promulgates rules for all courts.180/
The Supreme Court has the exclusive power to issue mandamus and
other mandatory or compulsory writs to officers of the state,181/
but the Court of Appeals may issue mandamus and other compulsory
or mandatory writs on officers of political parties.182/ The
Supreme Court may transfer causes within the Courts of Civil Appeals to equalize dockets.183/
The Supreme Court can issue writs of procedendo, certiorari and all writs of quo warranto or mandamus to the Courts of
Civil Appeals or a judge thereof.184/
·
Courts of Civil Appeals have the power to determine, by
affidavit or otherwise, matters of fact as may be necessary to
exercise their jurisdiction,185/ and to issue writs of mandamus
and all other writs necessary to enforce their jurisdiction.186/
In addition, the Courts of Civil Appeals may mandamus judges of
district courts to proceed to trial and judgment in a cause returnable as the nature of the case may require.187/

Vernon's Ann. Civ. St.
Vernon's Ann. Civ. St.
Texas Const. Art. 5, §
( 1964) •
Vernon's Ann. Civ. St.
Vernon's Ana. Civ. St.
Vernon's Ann. Civ. St.
Vernon's Ann. Civ. St.
Vernon's Ann. Civ. St.
Vernon's Ann. Civ. St.
Vernon's Ann. Civ. St.
Vernon's Ann. Civ. St.

Art. 1728 (1964).
Art. 1729 (1964).
3b; Vernon's Ann. Civ. St. Art. 1729
Art.
Art.
Art.
Art.
Art.
Art.
Art.
Art.
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1731 (1964).
1735 (1964).
1735a, (1964).
1738 !1964l.
1733 1964 •
1822 1964 •
1823 (1964 •
1824 (1964 •

Finally, the Courts of Civil Appeals can certify questions
on an issue of law to ·the Supreme Court, but the Courts of Civil
Appealc;,..i;e bound to.conformance with the judgment of the Supreme.
Court.1&§/ The Supreme Court may review final judgments of
Courts of/Civil Appeals upon writ of error when good cause can be
·
shown. 16 9

ernon s u es of Civil Proc., Rule 461 (1968).
Vernon's Rules of Civil Proc., Rule 467 (1968).
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.,
APPENDIX B

QJESTIONNAIRE
estionnaire to

Court Jud es

Legislative

-------------------------

Name of court
Judge completing questionnaire ___________________
1.

Do you think that more extensive use of outside and retired
judges would aid the Supreme Court in its attempt to reduce
the current backlog of cases?

2.

Do you think that increasing the number of judges in the
Supreme Court from seven to nine would be effective in reducing the backlog?

3.

Do you think that an enlarged court, with possibly 12 judges,
sitting in separate criminal and civil divisions, would alleviate the backlog problem?

-103-

4.

Do you think that the prevailing method of appellate review
should be changed, such as by limiting the right of appeal or
by changing the method from writ of error to writ of certiorari? Do you foresee any problems (constitutiohal problems)
if the method of appellate review were changed? Do you think
such a change would effectively reduce the Supreme Court backlog?

5.

Do you think that an intermediate appellate court between the
trial courts and the Supreme Court should be established?

6.

Assuming that an intermediate court of appeals is established,
what do you think should be the division of jurisdiction between the intermediate court and the Supreme Court, if any?
Do you think the intermediate court should be one court with
jurisdiction coextensive with the entire state; one court with
several separate divisions, each division having jurisdiction
over a particular ge09raphical region of the state; or two ~r
more separate courts of appeals, each court having jurisdic-(
tion over a particular district of the state? How many judges
do you think an intermediate appellate court should have?
What qualifications should the judges have and what salary
should they be paid?
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7.

Assuming that an intermediate appellate court is established,
do you think that county court appeals should go to the intermediate court or continue to go to the district ·courts?
Do county court appeals present any problems in the district
courts?

8.

Assuming that an intermediate appellate court is established,
do you think that it should be granted jurisdiction to review
administrative decisions (workmen's compensation, unemployment
compensation, Public Utilities orders and decisions, etc.J
rather than having the district courts review such decisions?
Does the review of administrative decisions present any problems or crowding of the docket in the district courts?

9.

Do you have any other comments regarding possible solutions
to the Supreme Court backlog problem?

Please use additional sheets as needed.

Send your reply tG:

Mr. Lyle C. Kyle, Director
Colorado Legislative Council
Room 341, State Capitol
Denver, Colorado
80203
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